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81. Countering Sanctions: The Unequal Geographic Impact of Economic Sanctions in North Korea

Author:
Yong Suk Lee
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
This paper examines how an autocratic regime domestically counters the impact of economic sanctions. A stylized model predicts that, as long as non-compliance is not too costly, the autocrat redistributes resources to the more valuable urban area when sanctions increase. Empirically, I examine the case of North Korea. I use the satellite night lights data to create average luminosity for each one minute by one minute cell between 1992 and 2010. I construct a sanctions index that varies based on the international response to North Korea's nuclear pursuit. I find that sanctions increase the urban-rural luminosity gap by 1.07%. Consistent with urban elite capture, Pyongyang, the center of power is best shielded from sanctions followed by province capitals. The hinterlands respond: luminosity near the Chinese border increases with sanctions. Sanctions that fail to change the leader's behavior increase inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

82. South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Author:
Bruce E. Bechtol
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
South Korea is in a unique position. It is an economic powerhouse and a thriving democracy that faces the most ­ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any democracy in the world. Moreover, this is a threat that continues to evolve, with increasing missile, cyber, special operations, and nuclear capabilities and a new leader who shows no signs that he will be any less ruthless or belligerent than his father. To meet this threat, Seoul has undertaken a number of efforts to better deter and defend against North Korean capabilities and provocations, including increasing the defense budget, upping training with US forces, creating new command elements, and establishing plans for preemptive strikes against imminent North Korean missile launches. However, in part because of administration changes in Seoul, the South Korean effort has been uneven. And decisions remain to be made in the areas of missile defense, tactical fighter aircraft, and command-and-control arrangements that will be significant for not only South Korea but all states that have an interest in Northeast Asia's peace and stability.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, Development, Emerging Markets, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
United States, East Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

83. The Nuclear Security Summit and South Korea’s Growing International Role

Author:
Sang-Hyun Lee
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On March 26-27, 2012, South Korea successfully held the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. This was the largest diplomatic gathering ever held in South Korea with fifty-three countries and four international non-governmental organizations participating. Alongside the summit, President Lee Myung-bak held twenty-seven bilateral talks which helped to elevate South Korea’s international role. The Seoul Summit has been judged to have produced a more concrete outcome that has strongly supported the achievements made at the Washington Summit in 2010. The result is the Seoul Communiqué, which states that nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the shared goals of humanity while also reconfirming the commitment to seeking a safer world for all and sharing the objective of nuclear security. Moreover, the communiqué stresses the fundamental responsibility of all countries, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control, as well as to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. The communiqué further reaffirms that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of states to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With North Korea’s nuclear threat still overshadowing the Korean Peninsula, the summit had some meaningful implications. South Korea will have undoubtedly enhanced its national image from passive recipient to an active rule-maker in international norms. In preparing for the summit, the South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) focused on comprehensive and action-oriented measures under the belief that by only transforming political commitments from the Washington Summit into action would guarantee the success of the summit. As a result, the Seoul Summit has demonstrated that the promises from the 2010 Washington Summit have now advanced to fruitful outcomes. The seventy-two commitments from that summit have now been almost realized with only a few still to be finalized. In addition, the Seoul Summit has proven itself to be the transition point for global nuclear security moving from political declaration to concrete implementation. The summit itself has also widened its agenda including nuclear safety, the safe use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials, therefore able to address some of the key issues raised following the Fukushima accident. Despite the achievements, some limitations are evident when looking at the preparations for the summit and its aftermath. In the build-up to the summit in South Korea, there were problems in communication between state and people. While the summit is dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, some questioned why South Korea was hosting a summit that did not address issues closer to home such as the North Korean nuclear issue or the U.S.-Korea nuclear energy agreement controversy. Such criticism required strong justification of why South Korea was hosting the summit. Another area of difficulty was that nuclear security itself actually lacks a clear definition even among experts. To cope with such questions, MOFAT sought for advice and creative ideas by hosting advisory board meetings during the preparation for the summit.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Summit
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

84. Inching Forward at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

Author:
Sharon Squassoni
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A few days before Seoul hosted the official Nuclear Security Summit in late March, experts met to discuss progress on nuclear security. The keynote speaker, Dr. Graham Allison from Harvard University, suggested a strategy of three “No's” to reduce future nuclear risks: no loose nuclear weapons or materials; no new national enrichment or reprocessing facilities; and no new nuclear weapon states. This strategy links traditional “nuclear security”—physical protection of nuclear material—with nuclear nonproliferation and fuel cycle management. Yet at the summit a few days later, the 52 heads of state, along with leaders of four international organizations on nuclear terrorism, focused on doing exactly the opposite: separating out nuclear security from nonproliferation, and putting as much distance between the growth of nuclear power and nuclear risks as possible. The result: underwhelming progress and no surprises.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
South Korea

85. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

86. Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power

Author:
Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Predictions of the Kim regime's demise have been widespread for many years, particularly in the 1990s, as upwards of 1 million North Koreans perished in a famine. Limited openness in the form of bustling markets and some cross-border trade were viewed as a possible threat to the regime's control. Recently, analysts have argued that North Korean bellicosity—for example, the March 2010 attack on a South Korean warship and its nuclear and missile tests in 2009—is aimed at a domestic audience: an effort by a weak regime to shore up support among the North Korean military in advance of succession. Analysts also point to surprising popular protests after Pyongyang's botched 2009 currency reform and to increased information flows as reasons to think the regime may soon fall.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

87. North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea

Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Yellow Sea off the Korean peninsula has become a potential flashpoint for a wider conflict. An escalating series of confrontations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has seen the sinking of a Republic of Korea (ROK) naval vessel and the shelling of civilian settlements on an island near the boundary. The disputed nature of this maritime boundary, known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL), as well as the volatility of DPRK politics has created a serious risk that any further provocation might turn into a wider conflict. While international attention is once again focused on the North's nuclear program, there is an urgent need to implement measures that could reduce the possibility of a clash in the Yellow Sea becoming something worse.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Island

88. The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This study finds that North Korea's nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea's trade with its two principal partners.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

89. The Rise and Fall of KEDO: A Case of Multilateral Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Joel Wit, Robert Carlin, and Charles Kartman
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
When the South Korean fast ferry Hankyoreh sailed out of North Korean waters into the cold wind and waves of the East Sea on the morning of 8 January 2006, it carried a sad and somber group of South Korean workers, ROK officials, and personnel from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). These were all that remained of a decade long multinational effort transforming what in 1994 had been only a paper notion into a modern construction complex of steel and concrete. KEDO's profile on the North Korean landscape was unmistakable, its impact on Pyongyang profound. Yet, real knowledge and understanding about the organization in public and official circles in South Korea, Japan, and the United States was terribly thin at the beginning, and rema ins so to this day.
Topic:
Communism, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea

90. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea

Author:
Scott Snyder, Bonnie Glaser, and John Park
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea. There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests. Chinese analysts are generally less concerned with North Korea's immediate economic prospects than they were last year, reporting severe but stable conditions. Inflation has subsided and market mechanisms have largely replaced government rations as the primary means for securing a livelihood. In contrast to last year, when Chinese analysts were consumed by the seeming zero-sum choice between stability and reform facing the North Korean leadership, North Korea's slightly improved economic situation seems to have allayed the immediacy of Chinese concerns about North Korea's economic stability. Chinese experts report no fundamental change in North Korea's economic policies following the 2002 reforms. Chinese analysts provide conflicting assessments of whether government attempts to prohibit selling of grain in markets are succeeding and the extent to which the grain rationing system is working. Chinese DPRK specialists are encouraged that the DPRK has haltingly adopted some agricultural and market reforms and allowed greater autonomy to individual factories and enterprises. But they acknowledge that North Korea has not yet allowed farmers to act independently of their work teams, a step China took as early as the late 1970s that raised productivity sharply. Chinese analysts anticipate that reforms will continue as long as they do not threaten central government control. Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured. There are numerous indicators that the Chinese examine to assess stability trends in North Korea. These indicators are grouped in the following manner: 1) factionalism in the regime and potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership; 2) political controls and ideological education; 3) influences from the outside; 4) the general public's loyalty to the Kim family; 5) crimes and illicit activities; 6) the economy, food supply, and economic reform; and 7) Kim Jong Il's health and the leadership succession. Chinese analysts see few signs of immediate instability in any of these areas at present, but they worry that the potential for instability may grow. In the event of instability in North Korea, China's priority will be to prevent refugees from flooding across the border. If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea. China's strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the United Nations (UN) in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability. Contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform at least three possible missions in the DPRK: 1) humanitarian missions such as assisting refugees or providing help after a natural disaster; 2) peacekeeping or “order keeping” missions such as serving as civil police; and 3) “environmental control” missions to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Sino-DPRK border and secure “loose nukes” and fissile material. There is apparent new willingness among Chinese institute analysts and PLA researchers to discuss the warning signs of instability in North Korea and how China might respond if the situation gets out of control and threatens Chinese security. Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion on stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material. Other analysts maintain that such discussions are premature.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea