Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography South Korea

31. KEDO: How Multilateral Cooperation Helped an Unprecedented North Korean Project

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor (LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger political changes, KEDO’s experience offers lessons for future nuclear projects that face similar hurdles. EXPLORE:
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

32. A “Modest Proposal” To End The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Trump Should Threaten Beijing With A Nuclearized Taiwan

Author:
Steven Holloway
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University
Abstract:
As the North Korean nuclear crisis escalates, the media is filled with an endless rehashing of the old inutile options. Typically articles in Globe and Mail and others will restate all the traditional options from multilateral diplomacy to tougher sanctions to unilateral US military action but then recount the long acknowledged problems with each option. This paper suggests a simple but revolutionary diplomatic move. It agrees with the many commentators who have said that China is the only actor with the leverage to effectively halt or even roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program (or even to attempt regime change.) But unlike some of these analyses, I will argue that so far China has not had sufficient motivation to fully exercise its leverage on North Korea. Therefore the key is to develop a threat plausible enough to provide that motivation. If the US is to face a nuclear deterrent from North Korea, then China should face a similar deterrent and threat from Taiwan.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

33. The lessons of the Annual Crisis

Author:
Ilya Dyachkov
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
Occasional escalations on the Korean Peninsula each time are hotly debated in mass media, but can hardly surprise experts. Typically, difficult periods start in spring and there are several reasons for that. Exactly at this time the United States and the Republic of Korea usually conduct a joint exercise. This fact cannot but bother the DPRK. By the way, the scale of the maneuvers becomes larger every year: for instance, the personnel can practice such operation as seizure of Pyongyang. One more reason is connected with the actions and statements of North Korea itself. The North Korean missile launches, making Seoul and Tokyo nervous, usually “fall” exactly on May or April.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

34. China’s Uneven Response to THAAD and its Coercive Strategy Aimed at the ROK: Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance has arrived at a critical juncture. In July 2016, the countries jointly decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula to defend against North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China has long opposed an American-led, regional missile defense system, persistently warning South Korea against deploying THAAD. Since the deciding to deploy THAAD, the political landscapes in the U.S. and the ROK have changed dramatically. The new Donald J. Trump administration has signaled a change from the previous administration’s “strategic patience” policy, but details of the new approach have yet to emerge. North Korea, meanwhile, continues to aggressively test ballistic missiles and promote its nuclear weapons program. In South Korea, the impeachment and subsequent removal of Park Geun-hye triggered the need for a snap election, and a left-leaning candidate, Moon Jae-in, is leading in the polls. The election could mark a return of previous liberal administration policies that favored cooperation with North Korea. Additionally, Moon has signaled his opposition to THAAD. Nonetheless, the U.S. began deploying THAAD to South Korea in March 2017. China retaliated, implementing a series of economic, political, and military measures to pressure South Korea. This paper provides background on THAAD, analyzes the decision by Washington and Seoul to deploy the system to Korea, and examines Beijing’s concerns and coercive counterstrategy
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Military Strategy, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

35. North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Threats and the Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Author:
Sam-man Chung
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten South Korea and its neighbors. Pyongyang’s engineers are likely capable of producing a warhead small enough to place it atop a missile. As its ability to engineer warheads for flight and reentry improves, North Korea increasingly endangers the United States. Deterring Pyongyang is extremely difficult given North Korea’s conventional, unconventional, and cyber capabilities. South Korean and American strategists have reponspded by developing a tailored deterrence strategy to address specific threats. At the operational level, this is supported by the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan. Ballistic missile defense, including the ability to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missiles, is critical to the success of the tailored deterrence strategy. South Korea opted to develop its Korean Air and Missile Defense and Kill Chain system. These systems are independent of American ballistic missile defense systems. The Korean systerms were conceived and developed amidst plans to transfer Wartime Operational Control from the U.S. to South Korea. Because transfer has been postponted, there is less rationale for maintaing separate systems. Despite the official desire to keep these systems independent, South Korea needs to develop options for enhancing interoperability with American missile defense systems to support the tailored deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

36. North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yonho Kim
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD issue has become a political hot potato that could easily entrap major presidential candidates. To avoid any backlash, the candidates will refuse to choose between China and the U.S. while placing the alliance with the U.S. at the center of South Korea’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

37. Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization

Author:
Lawrence Korb and Adam Mount
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
n the next decade, the United States will have to make decisions that will shape its nuclear arsenal for much of the next century. Nearly every missile, submarine, aircraft, and warhead in the U.S. arsenal is nearing the end of its service life and must be replaced. As Congress and the Obama administration continue to wrestle with the effects of sequestration on projected levels of defense spending, the U.S. Department of Defense has begun a series of procurement programs that will nearly double the amount the country spends on its nuclear deterrent in the next decade compared to what it spent in the past decade. Over the next 30 years, the cost of the nuclear deterrent could pass $1 trillion and crowd out defense and domestic investments needed to keep the United States strong and competitive. In addition, it could undermine U.S. credibility on the issue of nuclear proliferation—especially when it comes to dealing with regimes such as Russia, China, and North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

38. The Nuclear Problem of the Korean Peninsula: Is There a Way to Break the Impasse?

Author:
V. Denisov
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula is escalating and is increasingly difficult to resolve. the six-nation mechanism for negotiating a solution, which brings together Russia, China, the United States, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, has remained stalled for more than five years. Agreements enshrined in the sextet’s Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 have never been put into practice. Relations between the two Koreas are as sour today as ever, and time and again tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul reach extremely dangerous proportions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

39. How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons

Author:
James Fergusson
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Political leaders and defense planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, are cognizant that worsening security in Northeast Asia could lead to additional states, including the ROK, to consider and even develop nuclear weapons. In particular, Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in May 2014 that another nuclear bomb test by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) would be “crossing a Rubicon” and would make it “difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
South Korea

40. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea