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71. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

72. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity

Author:
Seongho Sheen
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

73. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

74. Toward a Smart Alliance: The ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Asia is the region where a quarter of the total of American products is consumed, major bilateral allies exist, various networks of mul-tilateral institutions operate, and new powers are rising. President Obama, during his first Asia trip, tried to emphasize that America is an Asia-Pacific power that will continue its commitment through a renewed East Asia strategy of “power of balance.” Now at the crossroads of China’s foreign policy of “har-mony,” Japan’s new concept of “fraternity,” and South Korea’s catchphrase of “pragmatic for-eign policy,” the United States needs to refresh its role which has been defined as a “regional stabilizer.” People in Asia are eager to see Pres-ident Obama’s new approach to his East Asia strategy, because he inherited from his prede-cessor a triple crisis in the areas of security, soft power, and economy. President Obama’s recent Asia trip has certainly attracted the minds of many people in Asia with his concepts of strong “partnership,” and a positive-sum Asian future, as expressed in his address at the Suntory Hall, Japan. As the communication power of a network becomes more important in 21st century international politics, President Obama’s Asia trip means a lot with his efforts for public diplomacy. Putting aside images and metaphors, the strategic orientation of the United States’ East Asia strategy still needs to be more specified. People in Asia are concerned about four areas: 1) how the United States will cooperate with a rising China in producing a consensus in many sensitive and difficult areas such as mili-tary competition, economic interdependence, climate change, and ideational orientation; 2) how the United States will redefine the role of bilateral alliances which should go beyond the task of military cooperation, stretching to re-gional security and non-traditional security issues; 3) how the United States will facilitate the creation and the development of multila-teral cooperative institutions by actively par-ticipating in them; 4) and how the US will deal with security threats such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, cross-Strait relations, East Asian nationalism, and, most of all, regional power transition. So far, the United States seems to be more focused upon recovery from the economic crisis and getting help from various Asian partners in this effort. That leaves open the question of how to redefine the United States’ role in the rapidly changing environment of Asian international relations. Despite a relatively short stay in Seoul for about 20 hours, President Obama confirmed his commitment to South Korea with renewed words and statements: he underscored the importance of the KORUS FTA not just from an economic perspective, but also from a stra-tegic standpoint; he promised to provide con-tinued extended nuclear deterrence; he basi-cally agreed with South Korea’s approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through a more comprehensive deal; and he highlighted new areas of cooperation at the global level such as climate change, Afghanis-tan, economic recovery, and the development of the G-20. South Koreans expect that the KORUS FTA will be the stepping stone for strengthening bilateral economic and strategic relations, recovery of both countries’ econo-mies, and improving interdependent regional economic relations. Regarding the North Ko-rean nuclear crisis, it seems that there is still a lot more to be done in making North Korea give up completely its nuclear program. This will require more intense and creative dialo-gue between Seoul and Washington. As North Korea has not made any strategic decision regarding its nuclear program and any future national strategic orientation, its return to the Six-Party Talks will only just be the beginning in yet another difficult series of negotiations. South Korea, as a strong American ally and a potential global middle power, will continue to work closely with the United States. The two countries need to search for new tasks and functions for bilateral cooperation in a world of rapidly changing international relations, where “smart” alliance and “21st century international statecraft” are required.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

75. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea

Author:
Scott Snyder, Bonnie Glaser, and John Park
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea. There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests. Chinese analysts are generally less concerned with North Korea's immediate economic prospects than they were last year, reporting severe but stable conditions. Inflation has subsided and market mechanisms have largely replaced government rations as the primary means for securing a livelihood. In contrast to last year, when Chinese analysts were consumed by the seeming zero-sum choice between stability and reform facing the North Korean leadership, North Korea's slightly improved economic situation seems to have allayed the immediacy of Chinese concerns about North Korea's economic stability. Chinese experts report no fundamental change in North Korea's economic policies following the 2002 reforms. Chinese analysts provide conflicting assessments of whether government attempts to prohibit selling of grain in markets are succeeding and the extent to which the grain rationing system is working. Chinese DPRK specialists are encouraged that the DPRK has haltingly adopted some agricultural and market reforms and allowed greater autonomy to individual factories and enterprises. But they acknowledge that North Korea has not yet allowed farmers to act independently of their work teams, a step China took as early as the late 1970s that raised productivity sharply. Chinese analysts anticipate that reforms will continue as long as they do not threaten central government control. Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured. There are numerous indicators that the Chinese examine to assess stability trends in North Korea. These indicators are grouped in the following manner: 1) factionalism in the regime and potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership; 2) political controls and ideological education; 3) influences from the outside; 4) the general public's loyalty to the Kim family; 5) crimes and illicit activities; 6) the economy, food supply, and economic reform; and 7) Kim Jong Il's health and the leadership succession. Chinese analysts see few signs of immediate instability in any of these areas at present, but they worry that the potential for instability may grow. In the event of instability in North Korea, China's priority will be to prevent refugees from flooding across the border. If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea. China's strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the United Nations (UN) in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability. Contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform at least three possible missions in the DPRK: 1) humanitarian missions such as assisting refugees or providing help after a natural disaster; 2) peacekeeping or “order keeping” missions such as serving as civil police; and 3) “environmental control” missions to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Sino-DPRK border and secure “loose nukes” and fissile material. There is apparent new willingness among Chinese institute analysts and PLA researchers to discuss the warning signs of instability in North Korea and how China might respond if the situation gets out of control and threatens Chinese security. Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion on stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material. Other analysts maintain that such discussions are premature.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

76. A Chance to Rein In North Korea

Author:
Nicholas Eberstadt
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
With a newly elected South Korean president willing to join the United States in standing up to North Korea, the Bush administration now has a unique opportunity to put pressure on Kim Jong Il to abandon his country's nuclear program and desist from its human rights abuses. In this article, AEI's Nicholas Eberstadt asks whether the administration will seize the opportunity.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

77. Looking Back and Looking Forward: North Korea, Northeast Asia and the ROK-U.S. Alliance

Author:
Hyeong Jung Park
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Following the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, South Korea and the United States entered into a period of dissonance and even mutual repugnance. It began with differences in North Korea policy in 2001, and expanded into other areas. The Bush administration's mismanagement ignited a surge of anti-Americanism in South Korea, which in turn led to a round of Korea-bashing in the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

78. Forming a Cross-Regional Partnership: The South Korea-Chile FTA and its Implications

Author:
Sung-Hoon Park and Min Gyo Koo
Publication Date:
06-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
University of British Columbia
Abstract:
CRTAs have become a main feature of South Korea's newly found enthusiasm for a multi-track FTA strategy. In this study, we examine the rise of South Korea's aggressive FTA initiatives, with a special focus on the first cross-Pacific FTA, namely the South Korea-Chile FTA, and draw implications for South Korea's other RTA initiatives. South Korea's motivations to pursue CRTAs are complex. These include economic, political and diplomatic/leverage motives. South Korea's policy departure from its long-standing support for the multilateral trading system began with its FTA negotiations with Chile, a country located on the opposite side of the globe. Aside from the South Korea-Chile FTA, South Korea has been negotiating a number of other CRTAs. Most importantly, South Korea and the US began to negotiate a bilateral FTA in June 2006, the successful conclusion of which will have significant economic and strategic repercussions not only for South Korea but also for its neighboring East Asian countries. The economic and strategic motivations of the political leadership, as well as the new bureaucratic balance of power centered on the Office of the Minister for Trade, have played a significant role in South Korea's dramatic rush toward RTAs. Although South Korea's pursuit of RTAs does not necessarily mean that it has completely abandoned the multilateral trading system, the policy departure is increasingly becoming obvious and significant.
Topic:
Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, and Chile

79. North Korea: Negotiations Work

Author:
Leon V. Sigal
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
In a laudable about-face, President Bush has decided at last to accept North Korea's longstanding offer to suspend production of plutonium by shutting down and sealing its reactor and reprocess- ing plant at Yongbyon, halting construction of a larger reactor and not restarting a newly refurbished fuel fabrication plant. In so doing, he is rejecting the counsel of American hardliners who have kept the United States from making and living up to earlier agreements while managing to convince much of America that it is North Korea that has been the one at fault. By negotiating in earnest, Bush has achieved an important goal for U.S. and Asian security.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

80. Waiting for Goldilocks: Getting Japan’s Foreign Policy Just Right

Author:
Richard J Samuels
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Generations of American parents have read their children a story called "Goldilocks and the Three Bears." It is the story of a young girl who wanders into the bears’ home in the woods. Goldilocks sits on chairs that are too big and too small, before find- ing one that is “just right.” She rejects bowls of their porridge as being too hot and as too cold, until she finds one that is “just right.” Like most children’s stories, Goldilocks is metaphorical. Americans use it to describe the process of finding just the right balance between alternatives that are too extreme. This metaphor captures the challenges awaiting Abe Shinzo, Japan’s new prime minister very nicely—particularly in the areas of foreign and secu- rity policy. His predecessor, Koizumi Junichiro, had already been like Goldilocks in his extended effort to find just the right policy toward North Korea. In his 2002 visit to Pyongyang he explored engagement, only to adopt toward a harder, more confrontational line. If the first was too hot and the second too cold, Abe is left with the responsibility to find a policy toward the DPRK that is “just right.” North Korea’s nuclear weapons test in October 2006 and its July 2006 missile tests certainly do not make this any easier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea