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61. Russia’s “Return” to Asia: How Should South Korea Respond?

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 24, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002. After the summit, many speculated upon the impact this meeting would have upon the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear program. Although some experts viewed Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia as merely a form of begging bowl diplomacy, such analysis underestimates recent efforts by Russia to engage Northeast Asia. Moreover, the strategic significance of the summit is reflected in the agreement reached between the two leaders which would imply that the summit could be a watershed moment in bringing about new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and among neighboring countries. Particularly, the proposed Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project would have a strong impact on the political geography of Northeast Asia. In November 2011, South Korea and Russia held their own summit in St Petersburg where the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline project was reconfirmed. Moscow even expressed its willingness to build the pipeline, passing through North Korea, at its own expense. Such a very active participation from Russia though could provoke certain competition with China in the region. The future course of this project is expected to be decided during the negotiation process between Russia’s Gazprom and South Korea’s KOGAS. Yet in South Korea, domestically, this issue of building a gas pipeline could be controversial in many ways. There are concerns regarding security matters related to North Korea as well as a lack of trust in Russia. At the same time, the responses from the United States and China must be taken into account. As 2012 is the year of leadership change for many countries in the region, it is also possible that the project will become unnecessarily politicized and eventually jeopardized. Therefore, South Korea should carefully prepare an action plan for realizing this project in order to take advantage of this opportunity amid changing dynamics in the region. In recent years there has been much talk of the United States “returning” to Asia, but Russia is also making its own return. This gas pipeline project shows how Russia intends to use its vast energy resources to facilitate its ambition to play a new role in Northeast Asia. This Issue Briefing addresses the impact of Russia’s reengagement and how South Korea should respond by considering both the positive and negative effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and South Korea

62. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea?

Author:
Sung Bae Kim
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only a few months ago, a third inter-Korean summit and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks both seemed likely. With contacts for an inter-Korean summit under way since last year and the Chinese proposals for the Six-Party Talks having been warmly accepted by the United States and North Korea, the prospects were positive. The sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010, however, destroyed this optimism. A two-month multinational investigation, led by South Korea, uncovered clear evidence of North Korea’s involvement, and the South Korean government imposed strong and comprehensive sanctions against the North on May 24. The punishments included the suspension of inter-Korean trade, the resumption of psychological warfare operations, and strengthening naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In response, North Korea announced that it would sever all inter-Korean relations and threatened war with the South. The whole situation on the Korean Peninsula has been deteriorating day by day, worsening already high tensions so that even military clashes seem potentially possible. The prospects for the Six-Party Talks are now also very negative. The Cheonan incident has proved to be a black hole absorbing all other critical issues. Kim Jong-il 's visit to China in May 2010 seemed to signal that the Six-Party Talks might be resumed, but this possibility could not appease Seoul’s fury over the sinking of the Cheonan. Diplomatic efforts for the resumption of the talks have been replaced with new moves to initiate additional sanctions against North Korea. Of course, the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is after all an urgent problem with both regional and global consequences, cannot be forever tied to the Cheonan incident. After a cooling-off period, diplomatic mediations to resume the Six-Party Talks can be restarted by China. But the concern at this time is that North Korea, in light of the Cheonan incident, might insist on excluding South Korea from the talks. Given the current situation, is there any possibility for an inter-Korean summit? A summit might, paradoxically, be the only means of exit from the crisis. Interestingly, in 1993, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis had broken out and military tensions were extremely high, a proposal for an inter-Korean summit was accepted. The meeting was only canceled because of Kim Il-sung's sudden death on July 8, 1994. Today, for inter-Korean relations to resume, a whole new framework is needed, given that all existing North-South agreements have been nullified. Such a rebuilt relationship can only be achieved through a third inter-Korean summit. Moreover, progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is impossible until the current state of North-South relations is improved. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume that occurs, they would end up at best as a diplomatic battle between the two Koreas. In the end, the only solution is an inter-Korean summit, which could achieve a breakthrough both in relations between North and South and on the nuclear issue at the same time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conference, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

63. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

64. Debunking Chinese Thinking on a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium. There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent. However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement. If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

65. On the Rocks: Korea and Japan Divided over the Dokdo Issue

Author:
D. Bong Youngshik
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
No serious observer of postwar relations between South Korea and Japan doubts that there is a bilateral issue between the two nations that is more persistent and volatile than their feud over the sovereign status of the two minuscule islets of Dokdo. This commentary examines the history of disputes over Dokdo, and attempts to argue that the starting point for a solution lies in the pragmatic and prudent approach, not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiments. Since the end of World War II, Dokdo has been under the effective administrative control of the South Korean government. The Japanese government has protested at various official levels since then, arguing that the islets, which it calls Takeshima, belong to Japan in accordance with historical evidence and international law. The diplomatic feud over the territory did not flare up during the Cold War, because both countries involved in the controversy made security cooperation against the communist threat in Northeast Asia their top priority. It was only after concerns over the external regional security environment were lifted with the end of the Cold War that Japan began to fortify its claims to Dokdo in a far more assertive and diversified manner. South Korea responded to this change by making periodic departures from its traditional line of defense of “quiet diplomacy”—that is, taking the view that because its sovereignty over the islets is indisputable and its control over them remains complete, South Korea has no strategic interests in aggressively and emotionally reacting to Japan’s escalatory territorial policy. To do so would only reinforce Japan’s claim that there does exist an unresolved territorial issue between the two countries and the sovereign status of Dokdo is undetermined, when in fact South Korea’s position is the opposite.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

66. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

67. A Shrimp amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea's Regional-power Status

Author:
David Shim
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Recent developments in South Korea's foreign and security policies as well as major structural adjustments in the military alliance between the United States and South Korea indicate a new self-understanding on the part of South Korea in terms of playing a more assertive role in regional and even global affairs. Alongside its involvement in the so-called Six- Party Talks—a multinational framework to disarm a nuclear North Korea—South Korea's civil-military engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon demonstrates that the government's foreign policy posture is not only focused on Northeast Asian affairs but is also intended to engage in other international security hot spots. However, although it has considerable material resources and capabilities— in neorealist terms constituting the power base of a state actor—South Korea is widely seen as a minor player in world politics. By means of a specific set of indicators—pretension, endowment, influence, recognition—this paper seeks to answer the question of whether South Korea is a regional power. The methodological approach used to evaluate its position will be based on analytical frameworks and typologies compiled from the literature on regional powers. Following the introduction of this approach, different concepts of the term regional power and the selection of the methodological instruments are presented. The subsequent section analyzes the selected set of indicators with regard to South Korea's potential status as a regional power. The concluding chapter evaluates the findings and raises further questions related to the regional-power concept.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, South Korea, and North Korea

68. The Rise and Fall of KEDO: A Case of Multilateral Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Joel Wit, Robert Carlin, and Charles Kartman
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
When the South Korean fast ferry Hankyoreh sailed out of North Korean waters into the cold wind and waves of the East Sea on the morning of 8 January 2006, it carried a sad and somber group of South Korean workers, ROK officials, and personnel from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). These were all that remained of a decade long multinational effort transforming what in 1994 had been only a paper notion into a modern construction complex of steel and concrete. KEDO's profile on the North Korean landscape was unmistakable, its impact on Pyongyang profound. Yet, real knowledge and understanding about the organization in public and official circles in South Korea, Japan, and the United States was terribly thin at the beginning, and rema ins so to this day.
Topic:
Communism, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea

69. The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This study finds that North Korea's nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea's trade with its two principal partners.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

70. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:
Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Dealing with North Korea resembles the board game Snakes Ladders (known in the U.S. as Chutes Ladders). The first half of this year was an especially long snake/chute. Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests, and its general bellicosity, not only undid last year's slight gains in the Six-Party Talks (6PT), but were a strange way to greet an incoming U.S. president avowedly committed to exploring engagement with Washington's traditional foes. But what goes down must, eventually, come up, even if each time some may fear it is a case of – to change the spatial metaphor – one step forward, two steps back. As of autumn, things on the peninsula are looking up somewhat – at least relatively, if not in any absolute sense.
Topic:
International Relations and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, and North Korea