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31. Somalia, Redux: A More Hands-Off Approach

Author:
David Axe
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The two-decade-old conflict in Somalia has entered a new phase, which presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States. The elections of new U.S. and Somali presidents in late 2008 and early 2009 provide an opportunity to reframe U.S.-Somali relations. To best encourage peace in the devastated country, Washington needs a new strategy that takes into account hard-learned lessons from multiple failed U.S. interventions. The old strategy favoring military force and reflexive opposition to all Islamists should give way to one emphasizing regional diplomacy and at least tacit acceptance of a government that is capable of bringing order to Somalia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Somalia

32. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

Author:
Clint Watts, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa draws on recently declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, original field work by CTC personnel, and careful country studies. The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, al- Qa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction. This report assesses al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn of Africa by identifying the organizational challenges al-Qa’ida faced in managing the jihad in the Horn. We also examine the individual motivations of the Somali clans and people that largely resisted al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts in the region. After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism forces. We conclude this study by identifying concepts and techniques that may be applicable in other regions based upon al-Qa’ida’s experiences in the Horn. Our primary conclusion is that the U.S. and its coalition partners should prioritize counterterrorism efforts on weak states–not failed ones. Both types of states demand attention but require different policy solutions. Effective and sustainable counterterrorism in failed states requires engaging with sub-state authorities to give them the means and the motivation to resist foreign intrusion. In weak states, successful counterterrorism policies must address core institutional and governance problems that render such states unable or unwilling to fully deal with the threat. Perversely, U.S. support to state and local counterterrorism efforts can create incentives to tolerate low levels of terrorism, a problem best addressed by conditioning aid on counterterrorism effort rather than on the presence of a threat.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, and Somalia

33. Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa`ida From 1989-2006

Author:
Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Though it has long been known that al-Qa’ida has suffered from disunity at the leadership level, analysis of documents declassified from the Harmony Database allow us to gain a fresh insight into the engine driving those conflicts and illuminate the vulnerabilities that these conflicts have created for the organization. Al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. Al-Qa’ida’s preference for branding, the military incompetence of its autocratic leaders, and the unanticipated ferocity of the United States’ response to the attacks of 9/11, have together left the brand managers the only ones standing. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida has not been able to threaten American interests; it has. But its real strength has never been as a fighting force, but rather its ability to transform what have traditionally been the local or national concerns of Islamist activism into a vision of apocalyptic inter-civilizational conflict. This report, grounded in the data from the Harmony documents, charts the history of this transformation and of the internal divisions that surrounded it. The Harmony documents shed light on cohesion problems that have been bedeviling Salafi Jihadi organizations going back more than thirty years. While the branding-versus-bureaucracy crux outlined above has consistently been the driving force, at different points in the development of al-Qa’ida the scope and consequences of this leadership struggle have changed. During the first phase, from the founding of the organization at the close of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the return of the leadership to South Asia after its misadventures in Africa, al-Qa’ida had failed in both areas, creating neither an effective guerrilla organization nor a consistent jihadi message. In the second phase, from al-Qa’ida’s re-establishment in Afghanistan to its dispersal from that refuge by American-led attacks, al-Qa’ida was able to exploit the relative security provided by its uneasy alliance with the Taliban to develop and begin to “market” its anti-American message. Though it was during this period that it was able to carry out the large-scale acts of terror for which it is famous – the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in Africa and the attacks of September 11, 2001 – internal divisions over the decision to target the United States severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacity. During the third and current phase, which began with the United States’ response to 9/11, al-Qa’ida as a centrally-controlled bureaucracy all but disappeared, with most of its key military and strategic leaders dispersed, captured or killed. In this period al- Qa’ida Central has been largely reduced to a media organization, while the Iraq war has created a market for its message, a field in which jihadis with little or no connection to the remnants of al-Qa’ida’s central bureaucracy can take up (and thus alter) the al-Qa’ida banner.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia

34. Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?

Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Nearly four years after 9/11 , hardly a day passes without the "war on terrorism" making headlines, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and now London holding centre stage. But away from the spot light, a quiet, dirty conflict is being waged in Somalia: in the rubble-strewn streets of the ruined capital of this state without a government, Mogadishu, al-Qaeda operatives, jihadi extremists, Ethiopian security services and Western-backed counter-terrorism networks are engaged in a shadowy and complex contest waged by intimidation, abduction and assassination. The U.S. has had some success but now risks evoking a backlash. Ultimately a successful counter-terrorism strategy requires more attention to helping Somalia with the twin tasks of reconciliation and state building.
Topic:
Terrorism and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, United States, Iraq, Indonesia, Middle East, London, and Somalia

35. Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State

Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For the first time since the last UN mission left the country in 1995, there is considerable international interest in Somalia, centred on the possibility that the country may become part of the global war against terrorism. The U.S. government suspects that al-Qaeda may have used Somalia as a staging area or safe haven in the past and remains concerned – though less than in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks – that it could do so again because of the country's highly fragmented internal security situation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, Terrorism, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, United Nations, North Africa, and Somalia

36. The Aid and Reconstruction Agenda for Afghanistan

Author:
Michael E. O'Hanlon
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
With the Taliban and al Qaeda largely defeated, a temporary coalition government taking power in Afghanistan, the Freedom Bridge near Uzbekistan finally open to relief efforts, and foreign donors promising significant aid more generally, the future looks increasingly promising for the Afghan people. But many challenges remain, even beyond the immediate priority of completing the military operation. Without rapid delivery of sufficient food, shelter, and medical supplies, Afghanistan could still experience a humanitarian catastrophe this winter. Without great care to shore up the coalition government, it could fail, just as state-building efforts have failed with disastrous consequences in places such as Angola, Rwanda, and Somalia in recent years. Without sufficient delivery of reconstruction aid, Afghanistan could remain mired in the same poverty and chaos that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Uzbekistan, Rwanda, Somalia, and Angola