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361. Yemen: Fear of Failure

Author:
Ginny Hill
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Yemen presents a potent combination of problems for policy-makers confronting the prospect of state failure in this strategically important Red Sea country. It is the poorest state in the Arab world, with high levels of unemployment, rapid population growth and dwindling water resources. President Saleh faces an intermittent civil war in the north, a southern separatist movement and resurgent terrorist groups. Yemen's jihadi networks appear to be growing as operating conditions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia become more difficult. The underlying drivers for future instability are economic. The state budget is heavily dependent on revenue from dwindling oil supplies. Yemen's window of opportunity to shape its own future and create a post-oil economy is narrowing.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Economy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

362. D4. Former Pres. Jimmy Carter, Notes on Meetings with Hamas Leaders and Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad, and Observations Regarding the Peace Process, Atlanta, GA, 22 April 2008 (excerpts)

Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
From 13-22 April, former U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter held high-profile meetings with political and civil society leaders in Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The trip occasioned heated debates in the U.S. and Israeli media, largely because Carter planned to meet with Hamas leaders, particularly Khalid Mishal, who agreed in the course of their Damascus talks to put Hamas's position on final status talks with Israel in writing, which Carter formally unveiled at the end of his trip (see excerpts). Initially, Carter intended to make the trip part of a larger delegation led by Nelson Mandela to raise awareness of the urgent need for Israeli-Arab peace and the interlocking nature of the region's conflicts. After Israel denied the group's request to meet with senior officials during the tour to protest the planned meeting with Mishal, the delegation canceled its trip, and Carter opted to go on his own on behalf of the Carter Center. Israel agreed to receive him but denied permission for him to travel to Gaza to meet with Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh. Carter instead met with Hamas officials in Ramallah, Cairo, and Damascus. Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, Vice PM and FM Tzipi Livni, and opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Palestinian pres. Mahmud Abbas, turned down requests to meet. Carter was received 4/13 on behalf of Israel by Pres. Shimon Peres, who reprimanded him for having "caused many problems in recent years with your comments and meetings," and 4/14 on behalf of the PA by PM Salam Fayyad. During the trip, he alsomet with the PA's negotiation advisers, various Israeli MKs, Israeli and Palestinian student groups, U.S. security envoy Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asad, Jordan's King Abdallah, and Saudi Arabia's King Abdallah. The State Dept. urged (4/10) Carter against meeting with Mishal, arguing that it went against U.S. policy of isolating Hamas. Carter responded that peace could not be achieved without including Hamas and stressed that he was traveling in a personal capacity. The following excerpts from Carter's "Trip Report" cover his meetings with Hamas leaders and President Asad, and his overall impressions regarding the status of the peace process. The full text is available online at www.cartercenter.org.
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Cairo, and Damascus

363. PolicyWatch #1416: OPEC Deliberates: A Saudi Opportunity

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Today, oil ministers from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meet in Vienna to discuss a possible production cut. Originally planned for November, the meeting was brought forward because of falling oil prices. With the perilous state of world financial markets, seldom has an OPEC meeting been so critical for both itself and the world. Although hard hit by falling revenues, oil market conditions give Saudi Arabia the opportunity to show strong leadership, most likely by limiting any production cut. But the oil-consuming nations would prefer no cut at all, so any reduction would discomfit relations between Washington and Riyadh. The kingdom was unhelpful as prices rose above $100 per barrel months ago, and both presidential candidates have called for independence from foreign -- implying Saudi -- oil.
Topic:
Oil
Political Geography:
Washington, Middle East, Arabia, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

364. PolicyWatch #1425: Interfaith, Oil, and Afghanistan: Where Saudi and U.S. Interests Diverge

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Saudi king Abdullah is in the United States this week to discuss issues of considerable interest to both countries. Tomorrow and Thursday, he is in New York City for an interfaith meeting he is sponsoring and which President Bush will be attending. On Friday and Saturday, the Saudi monarch will be at the White House, where he will be the sole Islamic or Arab representative at a summit of major economic powers discussing the world financial crisis. In a separate meeting with President Bush, he is expected to report on Saudi mediation efforts with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite some common interest in all these areas, perspectives differ significantly on issues such as radical Islam and the price of oil. The United States, particularly during a time of presidential transition, should be careful not to concede ground on continuing points of disagreement.
Topic:
Economics and Oil
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

365. Volume 1, Issue 12 - Full Issue

Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
More than one-third of the remaining 255 detainees at the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay are Yemenis, representing the single largest national contingent. Since the detention facility opened in early 2002, Yemenis have consistently comprised a sizeable percentage of the population. Other countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, have successfully repatriated many of their nationals, but Yemen has been unable to convince the United States to release detainees into its custody. There is even widespread speculation in both the United States and Yemen that the Yemeni government does not actually want the detainees back and is content to let them remain in U.S. custody. The Yemeni government, however, maintains in private its stated, public goal to return the detainees to Yemen, charge those it has evidence against and release the rest. For the United States, this has been insufficient, and it has repeatedly sought assurances from the Yemeni government that it will set standardized restrictions before any individuals are released. Part of this hesitation stems from security concerns about what would happen to the detainees once they are returned to Yemen.
Political Geography:
United States, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

366. Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

Author:
Christopher Boucek
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the aftermath of a wave of deadly terrorist attacks that began in 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign. Central to Saudi counterterrorism efforts has been the use of unconventional “soft” measures designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. The primary objective of this strategy is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government asserts is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam. The impetus for this soft approach came in large part from the recognition that violent extremism cannot be combated through tradition security measures alone. This Saudi strategy is composed of three interconnected programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation, and post- release care (PRAC). Although only in operation for the past four years, the Saudi strategy—es- pecially the rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs—has generated very positive and very intriguing results. To date, recidivist and rearrest rates are extremely low, at approximately 1 to 2 percent. Similar programs designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are increasing in popularity, with a number of countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization pro- grams. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance in the fight against violent radical Islamist extremism.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Terrorism, and Governance
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia

367. Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

Author:
Christopher Boucek
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the aftermath of a wave of deadly terrorist attacks that began in 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign. Central to Saudi counterterrorism efforts has been the use of unconventional “soft” measures designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. The primary objective of this strategy is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government asserts is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam. The impetus for this soft approach came in large part from the recognition that violent extremism cannot be combated through tradition security measures alone. This Saudi strategy is composed of three interconnected programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation, and postrelease care (PRAC). Although only in operation for the past four years, the Saudi strategy—especially the rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs—has generated very positive and very intriguing results. To date, recidivist and rearrest rates are extremely low, at approximately 1 to 2 percent. Similar programs designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are increasing in popularity, with a number of countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization programs. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance in the fight against violent radical Islamist extremism
Topic:
Security, Islam, Counter-terrorism, and Radicalization
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia

368. Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi’a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi’a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open‐ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi’a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi’a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi‐Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi’a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi’a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high‐casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi‐Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect’s extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi’a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower‐key approach.
Topic:
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

369. State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong

Author:
Alexander Orakhelashvili
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Abstract:
The proper way of addressing the impact of normative hierarchy on state immunity is to adopt the normative-evidentiary approach cleansed of preconceptions motivated by certain risk factors that possess only theoretical significance. The European Court stated in Al-Adsani on the hierarchy of norms issue without properly examining most of its crucial aspects. The Joint Dissenting Opinion of six judges has exposed the weaknesses in the Court's reasoning. Still, some national courts, especially the House of Lords in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, have taken the Al-Adsani ruling as axiomatic, and accepted its outcome without enquiring into whether the line of reasoning the European Court had pursued was consistent or supported with evidence. The outcome is an unfortunate thread of judicial decisions, which do not properly examine the impact of the hierarchy of norms on State immunity, and consistently uphold the impunity of the perpetrators of torture as well as the denial to victims of the only available remedy.
Political Geography:
Europe and Saudi Arabia

370. Foreign Direct Investment in the Middle East: Major Regulatory Restrictions

Author:
Svitlana Khyeda
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Insight Turkey
Institution:
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Abstract:
This article focuses on the comparative analysis of major regulatory restrictions on foreign investment in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, countries that are representative of the Muslim Middle East: the Egyptian legal system has served as a pattern for many of the Middle Eastern countries, Shari'a is the primary source of law in Saudi Arabia as in some other Middle Eastern countries and Turkey is a Muslim secular state which adopted more modern version of the civil code system.
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt