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341. Russian Diplomacy: Challenging the West

Author:
Charles E Ziegler
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
According to classical realism, diplomacy is the means by which states defend their interests and achieve their objectives short of war, using a mixture of persuasion, compromise, and the threat of force. In the quartercentury since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian diplomacy has evolved from a passive, Western-orientation toward a muscular, multilateral and assertive posture. In the immediate post-perestroika years Russian diplomacy reflected the nascent democratic character of the new Russia, and the search for a new post-Soviet identity. Since Vladimir Putin ascended to the presidency, Russian diplomacy has become highly effective at several diplomatic issues. These include: Promoting and representing Russian national interests; defending key principles of sovereignty; non-interference in internal affairs; and respect for Russia as a great power; consolidating the former Soviet space as a privileged sphere of Russian influence; and addressing Russia’s vital security concerns in the Eurasian region, including concerns with The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) expansion eastward.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, History, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Soviet Union

342. Confrontation in Eastern Europe: The Russian Challenge to the European Union

Author:
Roger E Kanet
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
In the following pages we intend to trace the factors that explain the shifts in Russian policy from the early to mid-1990s, when Russian leaders were committed to joining the international system dominated by the European Union and the United States, to the present confrontation between Russia and the West.2 Why has the relationship deteriorated as it has? I will first discuss briefly the essentially unsatisfactory nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the West; from the Russian perspective, in the 1990s, and their role in determining the central goals that have driven Russia’s evolving sense of identity and policy since Vladimir Putin came to power at the turn of the century. I will note the aspects of Western policy that seemingly led to the decision in Moscow, around 2005, that cooperation with the West on terms of equality was impossible and that Russia should forge ahead to achieve its own objectives, even if that resulted in confrontation with the West. This decision resulted in the so-called “gas wars” with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008, and more recently the intervention in Ukraine since 2013, including the absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the ongoing military support for the government of President Bashar Hafez al-Assad of Syria, an assessment of which will comprise the final substantive section of the article. All these Russian policies contributed to the growing confrontation in relations between Russia and the European Union, as did EU efforts to tie East European states more closely to the EU itself.
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, United States of America, and European Union

343. A United Nations Peace-Keeping Force for Ukraine?

Author:
Miguel Ángel Cúneo
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The war scenery in Eastern Ukraine in 2015 showed Kiev in a disadvantageous military position, in its efforts to stop the separatists’ advances in the occupied territories. At the same time, the possibilities that the self-proclaimed authorities of the “Donetsk and Lugansk Popular Republics” would honor the military clauses of the 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements were remote. Neither were the authorities in Kiev inclined to honor the political clauses for which they were responsible. This difficult situation led the President of Ukraine to present a proposal for the deployment of a peace -keeping mission under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, such an initiative was not given on that occasion, any support or follow -up.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Elections, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

344. Social Innovation and Higher Education in the BRICS (1): a background overview

Author:
Paula R. Cruz, Victor Rebourseau, and Alyssa Luisi
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
This working paper results from the first phase of the research project on “Social Innovation and Higher Education in the BRICS” conducted by the Research Group on Innovation Systems and Development Governance at the BRICS Policy Center. This research aims to contribute to both the advancement of the scholarly debate on the engagement of HEIs in social innovation initiatives, and the promotion of more inclusive and sustainable development policies in the Global South, particularly in the BRICS.
Topic:
Development, Education, Governance, Innovation, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

345. Social Innovation and Higher Education in the BRICS (2): a multiscalar governance approach with evidence from DESIS Labs

Author:
Paula R. Cruz, Alyssa Luisi, and Victor Rebourseau
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
This is the second working paper resulting from the first phase of the research project on “Social Innovation and Higher Education in the BRICS” conducted by the Research Group on Innovation Systems and Development Governance at the BRICS Policy Center. It aims to provide evidence on the ways in which social innovation labs in HEIs in the BRICS countries may operate within a complex, multiscalar governance mode, which a number of local-, national-, and international or transnational level stakeholders participate in.
Topic:
Development, Education, Governance, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

346. Crowdsourced War: The Political and Military Implications of Ukraine’s Volunteer Battalions 2014-2015

Author:
Montana Hunter
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This article explores the use of crowdsourced volunteer battalions by the Ukrainian government in response to Russian aggression in the Donbas region. It examines the weakness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, contributions of civil-society, and the creation, development, and combat operations of volunteer battalions. The use of crowdsourcing provided the emergency military force that the Ukrainian Government needed to stabilise the Donbas region in the face of the 2014 Russian-backed separatist offensive. The article concludes by raising concerns that the negative consequences of crowdsourcing war, while mitigated by actions taken by the Ukrainian Government, have the potential to return if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates.
Topic:
Civil Society, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

347. Reforming the Syrian Arab Army: Russia’s vision

Author:
Yury Barmin
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Throughout its involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has been the main guarantor of the survival of the Syrian army as an active fighting force and as a state building block. While Moscow has been investing time and effort into making the Syrian Arab Army a powerful institution, a deep reform process would need to be launched once the war is over. Russia’s role in the Syrian army reform is predicated not only on its active involvement in the Syrian war alongside the army, but also on the close links that have existed between the two countries during the Cold War. The USSR became a political and military patron for Syria in 1955, the country’s military was essentially modelled after the Red Army. The Russian role in Syria extended not only to instructions on how to use Soviet-made weapons but also to training in planning, tactics and operations1 . The extent to which Russia is ready to spearhead the reform process is not yet clear. However, it has been making attempts to increase the institutional and fighting capacity of the Syrian army. Moscow realises that while Iran mostly relies on militias inside Syria, the government in Damascus will not be able to create a viable army on its own. The real extent of change that could be performed by Russia also depends on its willingness to enact political reform in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Reform, Conflict, Syrian War, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

348. Iran in Syria: Decision-Making Actors, Interests and Priorities

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Iran has provided political, economic and military support to save a friendly government in Damascus and has become a key component of the Syrian equation. Syria’s location in the Levant places it at the heart of the Iranian national security doctrine, as Syria is key to maintaining land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing terrorism from destabilising Iran, and challenging the dominance of Iran’s rivals in Syria. However, achieving these goals in Syria is problematic in both the short and long term. Despite their agreement on preserving the Assad government, Tehran is not in full agreement with Moscow and Damascus on a post war political system, the role of Iranian forces, Syrian-Israeli relations, and reconstruction policies and contracts. Despite the strong positions against the US and the Syrian opposition, Iran is ready to compromise in Syria. Iran has become more accepting of the Syrian opposition playing a role in the future political structure, but such an acceptance is defined by their real power on the ground and conditioned by respecting Iran’s interests in Syria. Once the West is ready to accept Iran’s interests in Syria and include Iran in the UN peace process in Geneva, the Islamic Republic could relax its positions on post-war political and military structures, which would significantly contribute to ensuring a peaceful political transition in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

349. Russian military police in Syria: function and prospects

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since 2015, Syria has been a test-ground for many Russian military innovations. Among them the Russian Military Police (RMP), which quickly became one of the symbols of the Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis. After defeating the militants, the Russian stabilisation and reconciliation strategy included the deployment of forces that could provide security for civilians, negotiators, demining teams and medics. Furthermore, once the ceasefire agreement was reached in 2016, a peacekeeping force was needed to oversee its implementation. Due to domestic and international circumstances, Russia could not deploy combat troops, so the RMP was chosen for its effectiveness and low profile. The RMP provided support to the Reconciliation Centre (RC), secured humanitarian evacuations and monitored de-escalation zones. Despite certain achievements, total success was limited. Due to its size, the RMP was unable to maintain a massive presence in the governmentcontrolled areas to protect the civilian population and shape the security environment. As such, it could not be a substitute for the local and national Syrian forces that were needed to bring peace and stability in the long run.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Syrian War, Police, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

350. Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook

Author:
Elisabeth Kühn
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the rollout of the February 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, security analysts have understandably focused much attention on its implications for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, intra-alliance ties with key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, and Washington’s icy relations with Moscow. But nuclear deterrence only partially addresses NATO members’ shared concerns about Russian behavior, especially in light of Moscow’s growing propensity to undermine the alliance with nonkinetic operations and other tactics that nuclear warheads cannot easily deter. The risk of escalation sparking a wider conflict—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—between Russia and NATO is dangerously high. This is particularly the case in the Baltics, a region that would be difficult for NATO to defend because the military balance there very much favors Russia; moreover, Moscow could instigate unrest among the Russian minorities living there. To mitigate these risks and remain united, NATO members must complement deterrence with resilience and risk-reduction measures better tailored to addressing Russian behavior below the threshold of outright conventional and nuclear conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States