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221. Russia’s war against Ukraine: Lessons on infrastructure security and new technologies

Author:
Auriane Técourt and Maria Martisiute
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In 2022, Russia hit Ukraine with a major cyberattack and unleashed a full-scale war of aggression. This includes new technologies and AI-enabled capabilities such as the Bylina electronic warfare command-and-control system. Nord Stream and the Balticconnector also fell victim to sabotage attacks by hostile actors. In this Policy Brief, it is highlighted that the EU has stepped up its resilience and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. However, the capacity to leverage innovative technologies and defensive AI remains underdeveloped. Furthermore, the protection of industrial control systems (ICS) remains unaddressed. As Russia upgrades its 2030 National AI Development Strategy, there is an urgency to integrate the security of industrial controls into the EU’s approach to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure before Moscow strikes with deadlier offensives. It is also time to start building a measured, albeit scalable, deployment plan for new technologies that may be AI-enabled for European critical infrastructure in connectivity with Ukraine and Moldova. The Paper explains that the EU has strengthened cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, but there is still room for improvement. Considering the pace at which new technologies and AI-enabled technologies are developing, the following steps would enhance the security of European infrastructure: Possible attack scenarios. Mandatory SOCs and cyber hubs. Industrial control systems (ICS). Synergies between the EU and NATO. A deployment plan for new technologies that may include AI.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

222. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

223. Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitaries in Eurasia

Author:
Kimberly Marten, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche, Nicholas Lokker, and Kristen Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
While much remains uncertain following the June 2023 mutiny of Russia’s Wagner Group and the August death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia will likely continue to work with semi-state armed formations. Russia’s degraded military capacity and constrained economic resources, especially as sanctions persist, will increase the attractiveness of these organizations as low-cost tools for advancing Russian objectives and competing against the West, including to a greater extent in Eurasia where Russia likely perceives the competition as most intense. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group created a model that other opportunistic Russian actors will likely seek to replicate. Fewer financial resources available to Russia’s military and elite could increase the incentive to establish such groups, especially if these organizations can increase opportunities to improve Russia’s reputation as a reliable security provider or access new sources of wealth for the regime. Newly created organizations would likely face high barriers to entry in areas where Wagner already operates, including Africa. Therefore, if such semi-state paramilitary organizations proliferate—a prospect that has grown more likely after Prigozhin’s death—they could focus on new regions such as Eurasia. Given Russia’s declining influence in Eurasia, a region of long-standing historical importance to Russia, such groups could undertake new actions there to curry favor with Putin and the Kremlin. There are several ways the Kremlin could use semi-state security formations to advance its interests in Eurasia, including by waging political influence and disinformation campaigns, physically protecting friendly governments, sustaining Russia’s influence as a key security provider, destabilizing unfriendly governments, and limiting any threats that Russia’s diaspora population might pose to the stability of the Putin regime from abroad. Although Russian paramilitary and semi-state organizations are in many ways an extension of the malign activities carried out by the Russian state, the proliferation and increased activity of these groups would make it more difficult for the United States and its allies to attribute such actions to the Kremlin, complicating Western response options. These groups and the opportunistic individuals who lead them could, for example, stake out positions independent of the Kremlin or even at odds with it, especially in the case of extreme ethnic nationalists who have criticized Putin for not going far enough in his actions. The proliferation of these groups would also make it difficult to discern when and under what circumstances the Kremlin might be willing to escalate on these groups’ behalf.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Wagner Group, Paramilitary, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

224. The China-Russia Entente in East Asia: Contending with Authoritarian Partnership in a Critical Region

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Evan Wright, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Closer cooperation between China and Russia is a major force driving global geopolitics. But how relations between the two authoritarian powers are shaping specific regional and functional areas remains understudied. This report helps to fill that gap for the critical region of East Asia. The China-Russia relationship has improved despite—and, in some ways, because of—Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing helps to fuel Russia’s war machine and defends the principles Moscow uses to justify the invasion. Both powers are also deepening and expanding their relationship beyond Ukraine. The pair cooperate across a range of fields, from military affairs to economics and global norms. Undoubtedly, current and potential fissures remain in the bilateral relationship. However, the leadership in both countries carefully manages these tensions to ensure they do not derail the overall relationship. Beijing-Moscow coordination extends to East Asian hot spots, including the areas around Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Around Japan, China and Russia work together to advance their respective territorial claims and pressure a rival Northeast Asian power and close U.S. ally. China and Russia use multiple military tools in pursuit of those goals, including joint aerial and naval patrols, joint exercises, and incursions into Japan’s air defense identification zone. Together, these activities put significant operational strain on the Self-Defense Forces, Japan’s military, as they respond. On the Korean Peninsula, China and Russia have turned away from multilateral cooperation to manage the North Korea threat and toward blaming democracies and reaching out to Pyongyang instead. Russia has moved closer to North Korea to help offset Moscow’s diplomatic isolation and barter for weapons. But that cooperation has not yet undermined China’s preferences or interests. Beijing maintains its own working relationship with Pyongyang while coordinating with Moscow to blunt international pressure on North Korea. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. To the south, Russia increasingly backs Beijing’s actions to pressure Taiwan as Taipei reaches out to democracies worldwide. Moscow’s support for Beijing has been particularly pronounced during major cross-Strait events in recent years. In the South China Sea, Russia tries to balance historical relationships with Southeast Asian states even as its power wanes and subservience to China deepens. For example, Russia’s cooperation on energy projects with Vietnam shows that Beijing’s and Moscow’s regional interests sometimes diverge. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. Moscow’s presence and power in East Asia have already suffered because of its disastrous war in Ukraine. Over time, Russia likely will become even more subservient to China. The China-Russia entente might therefore prove most useful for Beijing in its home region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

225. The Impact of the Ukraine War on Antarctic Geopolitics Through Fuzzy Cognitive Maps

Author:
Luiz Octavio Gaviao and Michael Bilac Barbosa de Oliveira
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the impact of the Ukrainian War on the geopolitics of Antarctica. Beyond the borders of the countries involved, the most immediate and noticeable impact of a conflict of this nature is evident in the economic environment. However, international relations are tested or shaken, exerting pressure on treaties and cooperation agreements between countries, through the reappearance of past political issues. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty sought to protect the continent from territorial pressures capable of affecting its natural balance, but this type of conflict compromises international cooperation and brings to light old interests in resource exploration in that region. This complex system, composed of cause and effect forces that involve the interests of the different countries involved in Antarctic geopolitics, was quantitatively modeled by cognitive maps, which explore artificial intelligence concepts to evaluate the behavior of these forces. The results indicated trends in relation to 12 driving forces selected from the literature and evaluated by experts from the Brazilian Antarctic Program, allowing the evaluation of the dynamics of the system over time.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Antarctica

226. Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: With Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov

Author:
Oleksii Reznikov, Mariana Budjeryn, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: A conversation with Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov: Thursday, October 17th, 2024. Speaker: Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s former defense minister, led Ukraine’s defense establishment in the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion and during the first year and a half of the war. Mr. Reznikov will discuss the successes and challenges of Ukraine’s defense effort, the role of technology and uncrewed systems, and the evolution of the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Discussant: Mariana Budjeryn, PhD, is a senior research associate with the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is the author of "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine." Co-Chairs: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is the Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of "Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine," as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

227. Countering Authoritarian Propaganda: Perceived Expertise and Persuasiveness

Author:
Isabelle DeSisto, Laura Howells, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Jacob Tucker
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
When do anti-regime messages persuade people living in authoritarian regimes to update their political attitudes? The literature on authoritarian politics has devoted considerable attention to understanding how pro-regime propaganda affects citizens’ attitudes, but far less to the converse: when and how anti-regime messaging is effective at bursting the regime’s information bubble. We argue that source credibility helps explain why some kinds of anti-regime messages influence opinions while others do not. To illustrate this argument, we draw on observational and experimental survey data collected in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We pair time-series data with three survey experiments, which together indicate that messages criticizing the regime and its policies are more persuasive when they come from people with subject-matter expertise.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Persuasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

228. The Future of Elections in Ukraine

Author:
Razumkov Centre
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The project «The Future of Elections in Ukraine: The Factor of War» was carried out by the Razumkov Centre with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ukraine in May- September 2024, during the third year of Ukraine’s full-scale war against the russian aggressor. The project included an analytical report, a nationwide sociological and expert survey, an offline roundtable involving experts in the fields of law and political science, and original articles by renowned experts in electoral law. This publication contains an abridged version of the analytical report and the main findings of the expert and sociological surveys in descriptive form. All project materials (in Ukrainian) are available in a special issue of the National Security and Defence journal (№1-2, 2024). '
Topic:
National Security, Law, Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Science, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

229. Trilateralism in the Wake of the 2022 Jolt Toward Bipolarity in the Indo-Pacific and World

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Gil Rozman argues that trilateralism reached unprecedented levels in the first two decades of the 21st century. Russia, Japan, and South Korea each sought different triangular frameworks to position themselves at the pivot of great power relations in Northeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region. However, Rozman contends that by 2024 trilateralism had shifted to reinforce bipolarity amidst great power competition. After describing three types of triangular frameworks, Rozman examines the transformation of trilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region from 2022 to 2024 (particularly in Northeast Asia), analyzes the challenges military security, economic security, and national identity gaps pose to trilateralism, and evaluates the potential impact of leadership on triangular relationships. The shift from what Rozman calls triangular pivots to alliance triangles in international relations is primarily driven by security concerns yet also by economic vulnerability and national identity gaps. For Korea, the US-Japan-ROK alliance triangle, which was solidified at the Camp David Summit, is at the center of triangular solidarity. Given the polarized international and regional environment, Rozman argues it is unlikely that leadership could reverse the current trend of alliance triangle consolidation in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Regional Politics, and Trilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

230. Russia’s digital tech isolationism: Domestic innovation, digital fragmentation, and the Kremlin’s push to replace Western digital technology

Author:
Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Digital technology has long been a key component of the Russian government’s power, and for years following the collapse of the Soviet Union there was significant technology entanglement between Russia, the West, and other areas of the world. That changed in the late 2000s and early 2010s with heightened paranoia within the Kremlin about regime security and foreign subversion—and Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has taken this to new levels. Due to combinations of intense securitization, Western sanctions, foreign businesses exiting Russia, tech “brain drain,” and other factors, digital technological isolationism is now both a reality and a desired goal for Moscow. This report examines the history of the modern Russian state’s approach to digital technology, the internet, and connection and interdependence with the West and foreign countries. It then analyzes the Kremlin’s late 2000s and early 2010s shift to a heavily securitized approach to the internet and its concerted push to develop domestic digital technology—both the successes and many failures. It then examines the 2022 Russian war on Ukraine, how the conflict and resulting events (such as sanctions and brain drain) have shifted Russia’s approach to domestic technology and digital isolation, and where different digital technology segments, such as hardware and software, stand.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Innovation, Isolationism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine