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2042. Participation in a Decentralized Housing Allowance Program in a Transition Economy
- Author:
- Tatiana Lykova, Sergei Sivaev, Raymond J. Struyk, and Ekaterina Petrova
- Publication Date:
- 05-2003
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Urban Institute
- Abstract:
- When Russia's housing allowance program, the country's first means-tested program, was introduced in 1994, it was truly innovative. But there were difficulties from the start, many arising from the division of authority for setting program parameters among different levels of government and the potential for variation in the treatment of similar households in different cities. In 1996, the program's original simple basis for benefit determination was seriously impaired by the introduction of different principles for very low-income households. Moreover, local governments have exhibited a willingness to vary benefits from year-to-year, depending on political and budgetary considerations. The analysis presented here documents the impact of these variations on participation rates in a sample of Russian cities. Large inequities are obviously present in the treatment of similar households from city to city. Indeed, it is questionable whether the program as currently configured is fulfilling the social safety net function envisioned for it in the original legislation.
- Topic:
- Development, Government, and Human Welfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
2043. Russia's Winter Woes: Tariff Setting for Local Utilities in a Transition Economy
- Author:
- Sergei Sivaev, Raymond J. Struyk, Valentin Andrianov, and Emin Askerov
- Publication Date:
- 04-2003
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Urban Institute
- Abstract:
- During the past two winters, breakdowns in district heating services in Russia have grabbed international headlines. In Russia these services and water and sewerage services are the responsibility of municipal governments; these governments set the tariffs for these services. This article examines the tariff-setting process during 1997–2001 for these two services with particular emphasis on the decision process for considering tariff increases. We find that little progress has been made during the transition period in developing the legal base for rational tariff-setting procedures. Overall, tariff increases have been substantially less than the rate of inflation. Statistical analysis confirms that decisionmaking is highly politicized and that in times of extreme inflation tariff increases lag even further behind inflation, with the sector being used as a kind of shock absorber to cushion the full impacts of inflation on the population. There is an obvious acute need for leadership at the national level to address these problems.
- Topic:
- Development, Energy Policy, and Government
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
2044. Russia's Security Policy EU-Russian Relations
- Author:
- Angela Stent, Dmitri V. Trenin, Stephan de Spiegeleire, and François Heisbourg
- Publication Date:
- 03-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies
- Abstract:
- At the beginning of the 21st century, the central issue of European security is how, not whether, to integrate Russia within Euro-Atlantic institutions. The conditions are now right to move ahead towards that ambitious goal.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
2045. Russia's engagement with Justice and Home Affairs: A Question of Mutual Trust
- Author:
- Olga Potemkina
- Publication Date:
- 03-2002
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies
- Abstract:
- Does Russia need international cooperation? This question may seem rhetorical, to which one would give a positive response, but the findings of a public opinion survey conducted by the independent Russian research organisation ROMIR clearly suggest otherwise. In April 2001, a total of 1,500 Russians were polled in 160 locations in 94 villages, towns and cities, in 40 regions, territories and republics of the Russian Federation. The questions asked concerned several key aspects of EU-Russian relations and the need for increased cooperation with international organisations.
- Topic:
- Government, Human Rights, and International Organization
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
2046. Russia and the EU: The Kaliningrad Dilemma
- Author:
- Yuri Borko
- Publication Date:
- 03-2002
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies
- Abstract:
- Strictly speaking, there are two groups of problems related to this topic. Firstly, there are some particular issues arising from the enlargement process; namely the movement of goods and people between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia, including visa regime, energy supply of the region, trans-border cooperation and fisheries. To solve these problems or not to solve them is like Hamlet's dilemma “to be or not to be”. These problems have to be solved by the Union and Russia, with the participation, at least jointly, of Poland and Lithuania.
- Topic:
- Government, Human Rights, and International Organization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Poland, and Lithuania
2047. Russia's Role in the Shifting World Oil Market
- Author:
- Lynne Kiesling and Joseph Becker
- Publication Date:
- 05-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Recent changes in Russia's domestic oil industry have had dramatic effects on world oil markets, including Russia's emergence as the number two exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. These effects are occurring even though Russia is not close to fully exploiting its reserves. Russia's oil industry has large growth prospects, and this potential will allow Moscow to take a greater market share away from OPEC in the future. A number of factors will facilitate this trend. Russia's target oil price is lower than OPEC's, which gives it an incentive to continue exporting beyond OPEC's wishes. Also, Russia's oil industry is more privatized than the oil industries in Persian Gulf states, which allows it to be more entrepreneurial in attracting investment and joint ventures.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, and International Organization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Moscow, and Kabardino
2048. Russia Watch No.7, March 2002
- Author:
- Duncan DeVille, Danielle Lussier, Melissa Carr, David Rekhviashvili, Annaliis Abrego, and John Grennan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Russian support for U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism has surprised many Western observers. But this was not the only recent surprise from Moscow — Western advocates for the rule of law in Russia also had much to celebrate in the closing months of 2001. Under strong prodding by President Vladimir Putin, the Duma passed several impressive pieces of reform legislation, including an entirely new Criminal Procedure Code, a potentially revolutionary land reform law, new shareholder protections in amendments to the Joint Stock Company Law, and the first post-Soviet Labor Code.
- Topic:
- Security, Democratization, and Government
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Moscow
2049. The Prospects for Peace in Chechnya (Event summary)
- Author:
- Ilias Akhmadov
- Publication Date:
- 02-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Observers of the situation in Chechnya know that the "prospects for peace" that Akhmadov's title refers to are virtually nil, as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chechen rebel leaders continue to lock horns on how to end the hostilities that broke out in war over two years ago. Akhmadov devoted considerable time in his discussion to the problems confronting Chechnya since the development of a Bush-Putin alliance to combat "Islamic fundamentalism." He also challenged Putin's insistence that the conflicts in Chechnya are domestic and therefore not subject to international monitoring or mediation. Akhmadov opened his talk with the assertion that the destruction he had discussed at the Davis Center in January 2000 had grown more serious, with levels of physical devastation and civilian casualties on the rise and the world community more supportive than ever of armed Russian intervention. To illustrate his point that the Russian Federation is unfairly using the international war on terror to justify actions in Chechnya, Akhmadov said that two days after FBI agents found diskettes containing flying instructions which had belonged to the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, Russian FSB agents reported finding similar diskettes belonging to Chechen terrorists in the woods near a pilot-training school. Akhmadov considered the presence of such a school in those woods unlikely. He added that a high casualty rate among Chechen civilians is now officially connected to the search for members of Al Qaeda. Akhmadov reminded the audience of a speech made by Putin on September 24, 2001, in which the Russian president expressed support for the United States' war on terror and urged Chechen rebels to disarm and abandon their separatist fight. Akhmadov's response to that speech was that disarmament could not be a condition for starting peace talks. As for the November meeting between Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's envoy to Chechnya, and Akhmed Zakayev, a prominent representative of Chechnya's rebels, Akhmadov said it "left no room for illusions about their relations, or about the Russian government's position on Chechnya." The talk ended when Zakayev refused to comply with Kazanstev's request that the rebels disarm. Akhmadov addressed allegations of ties between the rebels and Osama bin Laden in the question-and-answer session, restricting himself during his talk to criticism of what he considers unwarranted BBC and CNN reports about the "thousands of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan." While Akhmadov allowed for the possibility that a few Chechens could be fighting for the Taliban, he stressed the unlikelihood that Chechens played a critical role in Taliban efforts and reported that nobody yet had been able to provide any "concrete facts to verify that Chechens are fighting for the Taliban." Putin's affirmations that Chechnya belongs to Russia apparently strike Akhmadov as oxymoronic, as indicated by his remark that "the Russian Federation wants to integrate the territory of Chechnya but not the people." To convey the extent of destruction wrought by the Chechen-Russian conflicts, Akhmadov cited data culled by Russians showing that before the first war in 1994, there were 1 million Chechens; 100,000 people were killed between 1994-6; that casualty figure has been greatly exceeded during the fighting that started in 1999. In addition, 400,000 Chechens have emigrated or become displaced persons. Akhmadov pointedly remarked that "we don't count as refugees, because that only happens during a war . . . What is happening in Chechnya is, according to Russia, 'a small, minor anti-terrorist operation.'"Finally, Akhmadov stated that impartial monitoring groups were needed to observe the conflict. He also asserted that a one-on-one dialogue with Russians was not a realistic solution and that intermediaries were needed to promote discussion between Russian and Chechen leaders. Following his prepared talk, Akhmadov replied to questions from the audience about issues including Chechen rebel fighting in Abkhazia, hostage-taking, and Russian bombing of civilian and industrial areas. In response to a question about Maskhadov's ability to rebuild the war-torn region, Akhmadov said that "neither Maskhadov nor any other Chechen can do anything with Chechnya's meager resources." He also said that the international community should aid Chechnya in future attempts to rebuild the war-torn republic and that visiting Ground Zero in New York had given him the "feeling that I had seen that [kind of devastation] somewhere before, only on a larger scale." Finally, Akhmadov answered an audience member's question about Russian and Chechen military strategy by saying that it was hard forhim to believe that "someone is sitting at a map plotting points . . . We're [Russians and Chechens] just killing each other . . . Russians see us, they kill us, and vice versa. It's a snowball effect."
- Topic:
- Security, Democratization, and Government
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
2050. Assessing Russian Democracy (Event Summary)
- Author:
- Grigory Yavlinsky
- Publication Date:
- 02-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Mr Yavlinsky began by thanking the Belfer Center for the invitation and said that the main topic of his talk will be to explore the progress of Russian Democratization. According to Mr. Yavlinsky, the process of democratization involves not only creating some set of democratic procedures, like free elections or free press. It is necessary to look behind the formal democratic institutions to ask what people applying and using them have in mind. Only after analyzing such motivations is it possible to understand how essentially democratic and legitimate institutions produce results contrary to their nature. The value of freedom of speech is nonexistent, if people have nothing to say, the freedom of action is needless if people are only willing to march in military ranks. Hence democracy can only work if the society enacting it has some basic democratic values, education, beliefs or moral principles. The democratic institutions and procedures per se are merely tools, able to transform these ideas and beliefs into reality. That is why the benefits of mere democratic procedures are so limited. It is for this reason that the economic base of any democracy is one of its crucial elements, providing for independent individuals as its basic members. In Mr. Yavlinsky's opinion, these facts represent the main challenge for Russian democracy. Russia's small and middle business enterprises are important for its democracy. Mr. Yavlinsky called them a "conditio sine qua non" for any democratic society. Only if the economy of the country can ensure the independent economic behavior of its citizens and only if these citizens have a certain level of democratic education and democratic values, only in this case the democratic procedures can work for the common benefit. From Yavlinsky's point of view the main challenge for the Russian reforms is that the country has to perform an acrobatic act, similar to riding a bicycle, where it must accomplish two operations simultaneously: the Russians have to engage in actions preparing democracy and at the same time practice this democracy with no reference to any previous historic democratic record. After presenting these general thoughts Mr. Yavlinsky moved on to a deeper analysis of the present Russian situation. He assumed that the present political elite consists of people coming from the Soviet administrative system and still thinking in Soviet categories. To achieve their goals they use a democratic cover "quasi democracy," a somewhat modernized version of the famous "Potemkin villages." Just like Stalin's constitution, which was considered to be one the most progressive democratic constitutions, the present formally democratic institutions in Russia do not constitute real democracy. Yavlinsky described the present state of political life in Russia as a controlled or managed democracy. This is a state where the democratic tools are used to achieve any result desirable for the leader of the country. The most recent example of this type of manipulation was a recent proposal drawn up by the parties close to the Russian president. According to this proposal, elections should only be considered valid if voter participation was at least 50 percent and only if one of the candidates was able to achieve more then 50 percent of the votes. In the opinion of Mr. Yavlinsky such a regulation would easily lead to an election deadlock, which would benefit the president. Mr. Yavlinsky underscored the difference between this type of controlled democracy and a totalitarian rule. While the latter destroys all the democratic institutions directly and openly, the main strategy of controlled democracy is not to destroy, but to adjust the institutions to serve the goals of the ruling elite. If any adjustment of institutions is impossible, the government prefers to replace the people controlling these institutions (like replacing the owners of the free TV stations) or substitute these institutions with new, more easily manageable organizations (as happened in the case of the Media Union, which was created to weaken the influence of the Union of Journalists). Speculating on the future of the Russian democracy, Yavlinsky stressed the special and very important role of bureaucracy in implementing this new "vertical of power." However as any bureaucracy, it will lead to more corruption. In order to keep the corruption under control, the government will have to use intense enforcement mechanisms, which might go as far as creating a police state. Of the three core democratic elements — free press, free elections, and an independent judiciary — Mr. Yavlinsky specifically spoke about the press. Yavlinsky said that the situation with the press in today's Russia is certainly not comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union. Everyone can read anything in the press, even the most incredible and slanderous information about most prominent political figures. Restricted is any systematic explanation or critical analysis of the political events. For example, state television stations have a list of people who are not to be shown on the air. The same is true for the list of forbidden topics. Certainly there still are a some newspapers who still cover critical topics (e.g. Obschaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta). However, they unfold their activities in a kind of a glass box, their presence is not really essential, and is only useful for the government in order to demonstrate to foreign observers that free press exists. As a result of such media control, the Russian population is subject to the management and manipulation of human choice. According to Mr. Yavlinsky this ability to manipulate and control is actually one of the main results of the last 10 years: it is not hard to manipulate the choice of the Russian public. Just like one could convince it to vote for Yeltsin or vote for a totally unknown newcomer Putin, you can always manipulate the public opinion. In the question and answer section Yavlinsky addressed various issues. In speaking about the best way western countries could assist Russia on its way towards democracy, Yavlinsky rejected any form of financial credits or subsidies. He is convinced that the help must be conducted in a smart way and this means in the first place the west should give up any policy of double standards towards Russia and address Russia as an honest and valuable ally. Regarding Putin's intentions, Yavlinsky mentioned two of them: the intention to make Russia a strong state and to protect his own power. The question is not whether these goals are good or bad, but rather which instruments Putin is prepared to use to implement those goals.
- Topic:
- Security and Human Rights
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia