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1041. Russia's Dangerous Nuclear Legacy

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
The state of Russia’s civilian nuclear power should be cause the entire planet to shudder: Radioactive waste deposal sites are full to the bursting point, and many reactors are outdated and fail to meet even the most basic of safety standards. In short, as one reads between the lines, a new disaster is pending. The now-famous disaster in Japan has taken on tragic proportions and caused massive public health problems. Explosions in Japanese atomic power plants are forcing world experts to question once more the future of nuclear energy, as well as the existing and engineered safety level for various nuclear facilities around the world. Is nuclear energy “outdated”? Is it a source of energy that should be abandoned out of safety concerns? The time has arrived once again for a cold-eyed and careful assessment of nuclear energy security in the world. This is especially pressing in the case of Russia. Currently, 10 plants and 32 nuclear units are online within the territory of the Russian Federation. In considering the larger picture of Russia’s energy generation, inherent risks, and dismal safety record, neither modern nuclear reactors nor uranium-based fuels should be considered as a panacea for the country’s energy development. There are severe limitations in the development of the Russian modern nuclear energy. These are well noted in the scientific community and the mainstream media.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Public Health, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

1042. US-Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda

Author:
Anton Khlopkov
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States and the Russian Federation have engaged in bilateral and multilateral nuclear security efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities in the region. This cooperation contributed to nuclear security globally and developed various tools, mechanisms, and approaches that need to be fully utilized by the international community. As new nuclear security challenges emerge, the implementation of sustainable nuclear security measures is constrained by limited expertise and resources, particularly in some key regions. For this reason, the application of US-Russian expertise and experience in cooperative threat reduction is essential to successful implementation of the global nuclear security agenda. Researchers investigate nuclear security challenges in other countries and regions—specifically in Southeast Asia and the former Soviet states of Central Asia—and examine possible ways by which the lessons learned from US-Russian nuclear security cooperation over the past two decades can be a
Topic:
Security, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Safety
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Post-Soviet Europe

1043. The Return of Old Putin and the New Future of Russia

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin who cautiously entered the Kremlin upon his inauguration in March 2000 is now returning to the presidential office with more craft and determination this May 2012. Going by the announcements of Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Putin received 63.75% of the votes, defeating Gennady Zyuganov (17.19%), Mikhail Prokhorov (7.82%), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (6.23%), Sergey Mironov (3.85%) and others to become the next president of the Russian Federation. It had been predicted that Putin would either win by a narrow margin after the second round of voting receiving around 40% of the votes, or he would have had an easy victory receiving around 50% of the votes. His victory though was an overwhelming one, with nearly 64% of the votes. There were controversies nevertheless regarding election fraud. The international election monitoring team dispatched by Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) raised concerns over a number of issues such as questions over the neutrality of Vladimir Churov, the chair of CEC and restrictive media regulations for opposition candidates. Despite these concerns, it would be virtually impossible for opposition candidates to overturn the results. In expectation of such controversies, the Russian government made efforts to minimize criticism of election fraud by installing webcams in ballot boxes. However, rectifying the lack of a fair judgment system should be regarded as a task of utmost urgency if Russia’s election system is to develop. Still, the disputes over election fraud will go on for some time as will the street demonstrations against Putin that appeared after his victory.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Leadership, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

1044. What Can the United States Learn from Russia's Relations with ASEAN Countries?

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Neither the current US administration nor US academics recognize Russia as a major Asian power. Although Russia faces many obstacles to becoming a credible Asian actor, Moscow is making resolute diplomatic overtures to secure its Asian standing. Stephen Blank argues that these activities merit US attention because they enhance understanding of Asian international relations and offset the pronounced ethnocentrism of so much American writing on the subject.
Topic:
International Relations and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Asia, and Moscow

1045. First Joint Russian-U.S. report on Cyber Conflict

Author:
Karl Rauscher and Andrey Korotkov
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
In the spirit of the reset of relations between Moscow and Washington, Russian and U.S. security and cyber experts undertook to model new cooperative behavior for dealing with the most challenging security topic of our age: cybersecurity. Until now, the conventional wisdom has been that setting the “rules of the road” for cyber conflict would be both tedious and extraordinarily difficult. In this first effort, the joint team demonstrated that progress can be and is being made. This paper presents five joint recommendations that are immediately actionable and, if implemented, would be effective in preserving key humanitarian principles of the Laws of War. The progress demonstrated here can serve as a catalyst for further progress to achieve that goal. This joint paper presents the consensus findings of the Russian and U.S. experts on the Rendering of the Geneva and Hague Conventions in Cyberspace. The work is a product of a Track 2 bilateral program that seeks to open dialogue, build sustainable trust and have a positive impact in the most difficult, most critical areas for international security. In recent history, Russia and the United States have had an outsized influence on international issues. When these two countries can agree on a common approach to any particular problem, other countries are prone to listen seriously. For that reason, top experts from Russia and the United States agreed to tackle the problem of cybersecurity together. The hope is that other countries will join in this process.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Washington, and Asia

1046. Cyberspace Governance: The Next Step

Author:
Adam Segal
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
After years of dismissing the utility of international negotiations on cyberspace, U.S. officials now say that they will participate in talks to develop rules for the virtual world. But which norms should be pursued first and through which venues? As a start, the United States should issue two “cyber declaratory statements,” one about the thresholds of attacks that constitute an act of war and a second that promotes “digital safe havens”—civilian targets that the United States will consider off-limits when it conducts offensive operations. These substantive statements should emerge from a process of informal multilateralism rather than formal negotiations. Washington should engage allies and close partners such as India first and then reach out to other powers such as China and Russia with the goal that they also issue similar statements. Washington should also reach out to the private corporations that operate the Internet and nongovernmental organizations responsible for its maintenance and security.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, International Cooperation, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Washington

1047. Ex oleo bellare? The Impact of Oil on the Outbreak of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Author:
Tim Wegenast and Georg Strüver
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
According to conventional wisdom, strategic natural resources like oil are harmful to international peace. Nonetheless, there is little empirical quantitative work on the link between resource abundance and interstate conflicts. Analyzing the impact of oil on militarized interstate disputes on a monadic level of analysis, this paper shows that oil in fact influences the conflict potential between countries. Results of logistic regressions suggest that a high absolute oil production is associated with an increased risk of dispute initiation. Per capita oil production, in contrast, does not seem to influence a country's propensity to start militarized conflicts. We also find that while very small oil-rich countries are more frequently the object of military actions, large oil producers seem to be generally spared from foreign attacks. We conclude that specific causal mechanisms such as an increased military capacity or the indulgence of the international community (rather than domestic political conditions inherent to the rentier state) might be particularly useful to explain our findings.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Oil, War, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Russia and Georgia

1048. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

1049. Chechens I Used to Know

Author:
Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The National Interest
Institution:
Center for the National Interest
Abstract:
The typical vision of Chechnya: a violence-filled land of terrorists fighting for independence from the Kremlin's iron grip. The reality is a land torn between nationalism and a Russian civic identity.
Topic:
Nationalism and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, and Chechnya

1050. Howling Down Lord Lansdowne

Author:
Margaret MacMillan
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The National Interest
Institution:
Center for the National Interest
Abstract:
Our risk-averse culture regards the Great War with pity and horror. Adam Hochschild too adopts this war-is-hell view. But nationalism, patriotism and camaraderie motivated Europe's citizens to take up arms.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe