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Begin New Search Topic Weapons of Mass Destruction Political Geography Russia

11. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, North Atlantic, and Moscow

12. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

13. Beyond Geopolitics: Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?

Author:
Gustav Lindstrom
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 2010 Gstaad Process meeting was held in Switzerland from 16-18 September. Entitled “Beyond Geopolitics – Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?”, the event was organised by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) with the financial support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). Additional partners and contributors were the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey (California) and the PIR Center (Moscow).
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

14. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

Author:
Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Despite heightened expectations for significant change in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy— the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review changes little from the past. The NPR's declaratory policy retains the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons first in a variety of circumstances, including in a first strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia and chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attacks from states such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and North Korea

15. Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Author:
Gregory L. Schulte
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The United States has a great interest in the success of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), given the important role it can play in reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Stalled investigations of Iran and Syria have put the credibility of the IAEA at stake. The agency detected neither Iran’s hidden uranium enrichment facility near Qom nor the reactor being constructed by Syria near al Kibar. These examples underscore the importance of strengthening the agency’s verification capability, by both increasing its authority and sharing more information. The IAEA can also help shape the global growth of nuclear power, ensuring the highest levels of safety and security, while discouraging the spread of sensitive technologies that can be misused to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA Board of Governors’ recent decision to establish a nuclear fuel bank in Russia is a step in the right direction. Success requires a new “Spirit of Vienna”—a willingness of delegates to work toward consensus on even difficult topics—surrounding the agency’s important role in nonproliferation. It also requires a conscious effort by the new Director General to remove the politics from IAEA business and return the agency to its technical mandate.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Syria, and Vienna

16. The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space

Author:
Peter Van Ness
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
An arms race in space among the major powers would be immensely dangerous, destabilising and expensive. Russia, which has a long history in space technology dating back to Sputnik in 1957, does not have the resources or the political will to sustain such a race. But China does. This is principally an issue between the United States and China. Some analysts say that it is too late to conclude a treaty to ban weapons in space, but others argue that, if not a treaty, then perhaps a code of conduct might work. It is in the interests of both the US and China — and the world! — that the weaponisation of space be stopped. On 28 June 2010, President Obama announced a New National Space Policy with a central goal 'to promote peaceful cooperation and collaboration in space', and he invited arms control proposals to help make that happen. Now is the time. Australia, enjoying close relations with both the US and China, could play an important role in encouraging the major powers to reach such an agreement.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

17. Hello Missile Defence–Goodbye Nuclear Sharing?

Author:
Trine Flockhart
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
It appears likely that NATO's new strategic concept, although largely only confirming the status quo on nuclear policy, will also set out the bold decision to adopt a Ballistic Missile Defence System.Through this combination the new strategic concept looks set to herald radical change in long cherished principles about nuclear sharing and to directly address sensitive issues of Alliance cohesion and deterrence posture.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

18. Nuclear Follies

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
If the Russian army makes the bold decision to invade Germany, we can just nuke those damn communist soldiers into oblivion with the 200 tactical nuclear weapons we deploy in Europe. Oh, they're not communists any longer? Oh, Germany and Russia have excellent relations at the moment? Oh, the Cold War has been over for two decades? So, why do we still have tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe?
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

19. Controlling the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The replacement for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev signed in April 2010, marks the first legally binding arms control agreement to be reached in nearly twenty years. At the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in May 2010, where the topic of nu clear disarmament will be discussed, the elimination of nuclear weapons will be viewed as a practical possibility. While this prospect can be easily dismissed as an optimistic or flee ting trend, it should instead be harnessed as a means to bolster international security, or at least not to make matter s worse. This requires both sound insights into what is and is not possible, and in Washington, sensitivity to an increasing number of contentious political views regarding nuclear controls.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

20. Preparing For A Second Nuclear Age

Author:
Ian Johnstone, Christine Wing, Bruce Jones, Elsina Wainwright, and Fiona Simpson
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
At the time of finalizing this report, the US and Russia have signed an agreement on a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), just days before the opening of a high-level Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. After years of divisiveness and lack of progress, it is tempting to conclude that the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime is on the upswing.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and Washington