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41. Russian views on refugees return and stabilization in Syria

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. When the major fighting in Syria had stopped, Russia immediately began a campaign of repatriation of Syrians who had fled to neighbouring countries. The Russian government developed a special programme focusing on rehabilitating infrastructure and job creation inside Syria. Its implementation was entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), working in cooperation with the Syrian authorities to assess the damage and provide necessary materials and equipment. While the programme achieved a measure of success in terms of reconstruction, the security of the returnees remained an issue. Russia has been willing to cooperate with the West for funding reconstruction efforts, so long as they relaxed their political conditionality. It also looked to the Gulf countries as an attractive, yet uncertain option.
Topic:
Refugees, Political stability, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

42. The Weaponization of Minorities in Syria and Beyond

Author:
Mohanad Hage Ali
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Syrian conflict has magnified threats to minorities with long-term implications both within and beyond Syria’s borders. The deployment of excessive firepower by the Russian and Iranian-backed Assad regime, and the concurrent rise of Islamic extremism have had both direct and indirect impacts on minorities. Local, regional, and international actors have weaponized minority groups to bolster their influence, further intensifying schisms in the Syrian social fabric and in the international community as a whole. The flow of one million Syrian refugees to Europe between 2015 and 2016 strengthened an already powerful wave of anti-immigration, nationalist populism throughout the continent and across the Atlantic. As an openly Islamophobic and, more implicitly, anti-Semitic movement, the wave has contributed to widening the scope of the Syrian conflict’s schismatic effects beyond the country’s borders.
Topic:
Minorities, Violent Extremism, Refugees, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

43. Turkish-Russian Relationships in the Context of Syrian Conflict

Author:
Alpay Ahmadov
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article is about Turkish-Russian relationshps in the context of Syrian conflict. It is known that, this conflict has aggravated due to the coinciding reasons, even led to the emergence of the challenging crisis between the sides. Simultaneously, the chain of events has demonstrated that both states, Turkey and Russia, are forced to cooperate stem from the logic of Realpolitik. The article is devoted to the analysis of the essense of this cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Arab Spring, Syrian War, Negotiation, and Realpolitik
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

44. Framing the Russian Aircraft Crisis: News Discourse in Turkey’s Polarized Media Environment

Author:
Burak Özçetin and Banu Baybars-Hawks
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the way in which the downing of a Russian aircraft by a Turkish F-16 jet on 24 November 2015 was framed by pro-government (Türkiye, Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak) and anti-government (Cumhuriyet) newspapers. Framing means selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text. News frames give us definitions and identify those responsible for an event; make moral judgements; and propose solutions to problems. The analysis of the news frames utilized by four newspapers underlines the fact that in a polarized media environment news frames are highly politicized and the distinction between news frames and official discourse is frequently blurred.
Topic:
Media, Syrian War, Crisis Management, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Mediterranean

45. Significance of Exclusion: What Does Iran’s Absence from the Istanbul Quartet Summit Mean?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Although most of the parties concerned with developments in the Syrian conflict do not expect the Quartet Summit held today in Istanbul -with the participation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Russian president Vladimir Putin, French president Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel- to make a breakthrough in the efforts to reach a political settlement of the crisis, this in its entirety does not diminish the anxiety of Iran, which is the most prominent absent at that summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Syrian War, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, France, Germany, and Syria

46. Reforming the Syrian Arab Army: Russia’s vision

Author:
Yury Barmin
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Throughout its involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has been the main guarantor of the survival of the Syrian army as an active fighting force and as a state building block. While Moscow has been investing time and effort into making the Syrian Arab Army a powerful institution, a deep reform process would need to be launched once the war is over. Russia’s role in the Syrian army reform is predicated not only on its active involvement in the Syrian war alongside the army, but also on the close links that have existed between the two countries during the Cold War. The USSR became a political and military patron for Syria in 1955, the country’s military was essentially modelled after the Red Army. The Russian role in Syria extended not only to instructions on how to use Soviet-made weapons but also to training in planning, tactics and operations1 . The extent to which Russia is ready to spearhead the reform process is not yet clear. However, it has been making attempts to increase the institutional and fighting capacity of the Syrian army. Moscow realises that while Iran mostly relies on militias inside Syria, the government in Damascus will not be able to create a viable army on its own. The real extent of change that could be performed by Russia also depends on its willingness to enact political reform in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Reform, Conflict, Syrian War, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

47. Iran in Syria: Decision-Making Actors, Interests and Priorities

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Iran has provided political, economic and military support to save a friendly government in Damascus and has become a key component of the Syrian equation. Syria’s location in the Levant places it at the heart of the Iranian national security doctrine, as Syria is key to maintaining land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing terrorism from destabilising Iran, and challenging the dominance of Iran’s rivals in Syria. However, achieving these goals in Syria is problematic in both the short and long term. Despite their agreement on preserving the Assad government, Tehran is not in full agreement with Moscow and Damascus on a post war political system, the role of Iranian forces, Syrian-Israeli relations, and reconstruction policies and contracts. Despite the strong positions against the US and the Syrian opposition, Iran is ready to compromise in Syria. Iran has become more accepting of the Syrian opposition playing a role in the future political structure, but such an acceptance is defined by their real power on the ground and conditioned by respecting Iran’s interests in Syria. Once the West is ready to accept Iran’s interests in Syria and include Iran in the UN peace process in Geneva, the Islamic Republic could relax its positions on post-war political and military structures, which would significantly contribute to ensuring a peaceful political transition in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

48. Russian military police in Syria: function and prospects

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since 2015, Syria has been a test-ground for many Russian military innovations. Among them the Russian Military Police (RMP), which quickly became one of the symbols of the Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis. After defeating the militants, the Russian stabilisation and reconciliation strategy included the deployment of forces that could provide security for civilians, negotiators, demining teams and medics. Furthermore, once the ceasefire agreement was reached in 2016, a peacekeeping force was needed to oversee its implementation. Due to domestic and international circumstances, Russia could not deploy combat troops, so the RMP was chosen for its effectiveness and low profile. The RMP provided support to the Reconciliation Centre (RC), secured humanitarian evacuations and monitored de-escalation zones. Despite certain achievements, total success was limited. Due to its size, the RMP was unable to maintain a massive presence in the governmentcontrolled areas to protect the civilian population and shape the security environment. As such, it could not be a substitute for the local and national Syrian forces that were needed to bring peace and stability in the long run.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Syrian War, Police, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

49. What’s in a deal anyway: Idlib DMZ violations harm peace process

Author:
Nicholas Norberg
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
In the backdrop of negotiations over drafting Syria’s new constitution and a transition in UN representation on Syria, the conflict in Idlib continues to simmer. Unrest in Idlib and dissatisfaction there with the internationally-recognized opposition, the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), leaves residents of Syria’s northwest excluded from constitutional committee. This is significant because the constitutional convention is increasingly viewed as a precondition for advancing the larger peace process. The constitutional committee is no place to hammer out granular differences between warring factions in Idlib, but the course of events there hold significant implications for the future of the broader peace process.
Topic:
Peace Studies, Conflict, Syrian War, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, United Nations, Syria, and Idlib

50. Moscow’s Syria Campaign: Russian Lessons for the Art of Strategy

Author:
Dima Adamsky
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This monograph argues that the Syrian experience may leave a major imprint on Russian strategic thought and operational art. It explores Moscow’s Syrian campaign and seeks to answer the following questions: How did the Russian art of strategy manifest itself? How did Moscow design the campaign and then estimate its operational performance, judged against its own ends? Which lessons has the Russian strategic community learned? How might these insights project on Moscow’s future strategic behavior? Which strategic trends are more likely than others?
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria