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21. Russia’s Strategy and Interests in MENA Conflicts: An Overview

Author:
Luigi Narbone
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As 2019 comes to close, Russian mercenaries are allegedly shifting the balance of forces in Libya, helping General Haftar to reignite his efforts to take Tripoli. Only a few weeks ago, Russia’s brokered ceasefire had successfully stopped Turkey’s advances in the Syrian northeast, pushing Kurdish forces away from the Turkish border and allowing the return of Bashar Al Assad’s forces to the region from where they had been absent since the beginning of the conflict. Similarly, in Idlib, Russia’s position will be essential to determine the course of the conflict.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, Syria, and Idlib

22. The Last Option: Impact of the Battle for Idlib on the Syrian Conflict

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Idlib has been the delayed battle in the Syrian conflict throughout its various stages, but this seems to be coming to an end, as many indicators reveal. For example, Russia, for the time being, is keen to resolve Idlib’s issue which would reinforce the specter of military intervention. Moscow indicates that there are no options left for the parties to the Sochi agreement, pointing also to the difficulty of implementing its terms. The 10 points-agreement has not achieved its purpose for five months, given the terrorist organizations’ control over the area, in particular al-Nusra Front. This happens amid lack of actions from the Turkish side, which has threatened, more than once, to deter those who jeopardize the agreement, which compelled it to agree, ostensibly, with the other parties on launching a military offensive in Idlib. Despite the challenges and consequences of this option, it is the scenario that looms large over the Syrian scene at present.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

23. Steadying the New Status Quo in Syria’s North East

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A tumultuous month in north-eastern Syria has left a tense standoff among the regime, Turkey and the YPG, mediated by Russia and, to some degree, still the U.S. All parties should respect the ceasefire as the regime and YPG negotiate more stable long-term arrangements. What’s new? The U.S. withdrawal announcement and subsequent Turkish incursion in north-eastern Syria shattered an awkward but fairly stable stalemate that had persisted for several years. A Russian-brokered ceasefire and partial reversal of the U.S. withdrawal have restored the impasse, but in far more fragile form. Why does it matter? The ceasefire leaves the biggest question unanswered: who will govern and police the north east? As the Syrian regime, Turkey and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) all stake potentially irreconcilable claims, and the U.S. stays put at the area’s oil fields, the emerging dispensation is highly volatile. What should be done? All sides should respect the ceasefire. The U.S. should protect its Kurdish and Arab partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces and prioritise stability in the north east in discussions with Russia and Turkey. The YPG should reassess its exclusive reliance on U.S. protection and pursue mutually beneficial arrangements with Damascus.
Topic:
Syrian War, Negotiation, Crisis Management, and YPG
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

24. October 2019 Issue

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O'Farrell, Seth Loertscher, Damien Spleeters, Michael Shkolnik, and Alexander Corbeil
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our cover article, Seth Jones examines the Russian military campaign in Syria. He writes: “Russia has done what many thought was impossible in Syria. It has helped Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reconquer most of the country’s major cities and nearly two-thirds of its population. Moscow adopted a military approach that combined well-directed fires and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy. But it also used extraordinary violence against civilians and provided diplomatic cover when Syrian forces used chemical weapons. Moving forward, Russia faces considerable challenges ahead. Syria is a fractured country with an unpopular regime and massive economic problems; terrorist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida persist; and Israel and Iran remain locked in a proxy war in Syria.” Our interview is with Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan. He discusses DHS’ recently published new Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence and how DHS is intensifying efforts to counter the threat of far-right terror. Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O’Farrell, and Seth Loertscher examine a recently declassified collection of 27 personnel records for Islamic State fighters, both local and foreign. The forms were acquired by the Department of Defence in Syria in 2016 and are now available to view on the Combating Terrorism Center’s website. According to Milton and his co-authors, the forms “demonstrate how extensive the breadth of information collected was in some cases … [and] show that the Islamic State acquired information useful for understanding the radicalization process, encouraging accountability among its fighters, managing the talent in the organization, and vetting members for potential security concerns.” Damien Spleeters outlines how his organization Conflict Armament Research helped prosecutors secure a guilty plea in the prosecution of Haisem Zahab, an Australian extremist with contacts into the Islamic State and whose research in Australia into rockets “indicates [according to the prosecution] significant commonality” with the Islamic State’s weapon production program in Iraq and Syria. Michael Shkolnik and Alexander Corbeil examine how Hezbollah “virtual entrepreneurs” have in recent years used social media to recruit Israeli Arabs and West Bank-based Palestinians to attack Israelis.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Syrian War, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria

25. The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia

Author:
Gregory Waters
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces' capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

26. Reforming the Syrian Arab Army: Russia’s vision

Author:
Yury Barmin
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Throughout its involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has been the main guarantor of the survival of the Syrian army as an active fighting force and as a state building block. While Moscow has been investing time and effort into making the Syrian Arab Army a powerful institution, a deep reform process would need to be launched once the war is over. Russia’s role in the Syrian army reform is predicated not only on its active involvement in the Syrian war alongside the army, but also on the close links that have existed between the two countries during the Cold War. The USSR became a political and military patron for Syria in 1955, the country’s military was essentially modelled after the Red Army. The Russian role in Syria extended not only to instructions on how to use Soviet-made weapons but also to training in planning, tactics and operations1 . The extent to which Russia is ready to spearhead the reform process is not yet clear. However, it has been making attempts to increase the institutional and fighting capacity of the Syrian army. Moscow realises that while Iran mostly relies on militias inside Syria, the government in Damascus will not be able to create a viable army on its own. The real extent of change that could be performed by Russia also depends on its willingness to enact political reform in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Reform, Conflict, Syrian War, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

27. Iran in Syria: Decision-Making Actors, Interests and Priorities

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Iran has provided political, economic and military support to save a friendly government in Damascus and has become a key component of the Syrian equation. Syria’s location in the Levant places it at the heart of the Iranian national security doctrine, as Syria is key to maintaining land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing terrorism from destabilising Iran, and challenging the dominance of Iran’s rivals in Syria. However, achieving these goals in Syria is problematic in both the short and long term. Despite their agreement on preserving the Assad government, Tehran is not in full agreement with Moscow and Damascus on a post war political system, the role of Iranian forces, Syrian-Israeli relations, and reconstruction policies and contracts. Despite the strong positions against the US and the Syrian opposition, Iran is ready to compromise in Syria. Iran has become more accepting of the Syrian opposition playing a role in the future political structure, but such an acceptance is defined by their real power on the ground and conditioned by respecting Iran’s interests in Syria. Once the West is ready to accept Iran’s interests in Syria and include Iran in the UN peace process in Geneva, the Islamic Republic could relax its positions on post-war political and military structures, which would significantly contribute to ensuring a peaceful political transition in Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

28. Russian military police in Syria: function and prospects

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since 2015, Syria has been a test-ground for many Russian military innovations. Among them the Russian Military Police (RMP), which quickly became one of the symbols of the Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis. After defeating the militants, the Russian stabilisation and reconciliation strategy included the deployment of forces that could provide security for civilians, negotiators, demining teams and medics. Furthermore, once the ceasefire agreement was reached in 2016, a peacekeeping force was needed to oversee its implementation. Due to domestic and international circumstances, Russia could not deploy combat troops, so the RMP was chosen for its effectiveness and low profile. The RMP provided support to the Reconciliation Centre (RC), secured humanitarian evacuations and monitored de-escalation zones. Despite certain achievements, total success was limited. Due to its size, the RMP was unable to maintain a massive presence in the governmentcontrolled areas to protect the civilian population and shape the security environment. As such, it could not be a substitute for the local and national Syrian forces that were needed to bring peace and stability in the long run.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Syrian War, Police, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

29. Moscow’s Syria Campaign: Russian Lessons for the Art of Strategy

Author:
Dima Adamsky
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This monograph argues that the Syrian experience may leave a major imprint on Russian strategic thought and operational art. It explores Moscow’s Syrian campaign and seeks to answer the following questions: How did the Russian art of strategy manifest itself? How did Moscow design the campaign and then estimate its operational performance, judged against its own ends? Which lessons has the Russian strategic community learned? How might these insights project on Moscow’s future strategic behavior? Which strategic trends are more likely than others?
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

30. Framing the Russian Aircraft Crisis: News Discourse in Turkey’s Polarized Media Environment

Author:
Burak Özçetin and Banu Baybars-Hawks
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the way in which the downing of a Russian aircraft by a Turkish F-16 jet on 24 November 2015 was framed by pro-government (Türkiye, Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak) and anti-government (Cumhuriyet) newspapers. Framing means selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text. News frames give us definitions and identify those responsible for an event; make moral judgements; and propose solutions to problems. The analysis of the news frames utilized by four newspapers underlines the fact that in a polarized media environment news frames are highly politicized and the distinction between news frames and official discourse is frequently blurred.
Topic:
Media, Syrian War, Crisis Management, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Mediterranean