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41. Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton and Anna Mikulska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The relationship between the Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Eurasia today. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) original adversary and one of its earliest members have in recent times veered sharply between cooperation—often against NATO’s interests—and competition so intense that it seemed war between them was possible. Politically, their leaders and their systems of government share a basic compatibility predicated on authoritarianism and resistance to what they claim is Western meddling in internal affairs. Militarily, Moscow and Ankara have at times cooperated closely. For instance, the two have worked to marginalize the U.S. military’s influence in Syria, and Turkey has purchased and deployed Russian S-400 air defense systems, putting its defense relationship with the United States in jeopardy. At other times, such as in the military escalation in Idlib (Syria), the Libyan Civil War, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, the two have found themselves backing different sides and had to work assiduously to prevent a direct military clash. Economically, the relationship has been historically unbalanced in Russia’s favor, but Turkey’s increasing trade in services and emergence as an important energy storage and transport hub may change this. The two economies share a basic complementarity, with few areas where they compete in the production of goods and services. This dynamic may increase the ability of their economic relationship to act as a “shock absorber” and minimize the impact of disruptions in other facets of their ties. Overall, Moscow and Ankara have worked to emphasize areas of cooperation and “compartmentalize” areas of difference. Policymakers in Western capitals will need to develop an understanding of the drivers of the Russian-Turkish relationship and their effects on Western interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

42. Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Lawson W. Brigham, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, the Arctic was largely immune to the geopolitical tensions that play out between Russia and the transatlantic partners in other regions and on other issues. Indeed, the Arctic is one area where the United States and Russia, together with the other Arctic states, have engaged in quiet cooperation on issues including search and rescue, scientific research, and the environment. Such pragmatic cooperation has been possible in part because bilateral irritants are diffused by shared and cross-cutting interests among all eight Arctic states, as well as the region’s multilayered governance regime.1 However, climate change and the Arctic’s melting sea ice have opened access and allowed for increased human activity, which, in turn, has amplified competition in the region. At stake are core national interests for the Arctic states, ranging from economic opportunities to security and stability. The region’s growing importance and level of activity, alongside the lack of trust and limited dialogue on military issues between Russia and the United States, raise the risk of conflict and instability in the region. For Russia, its part of the Arctic, including an increasingly accessible Northern Sea Route, is central to core national security concerns and an important pillar of the economy and future development. To secure its interests, the Kremlin has taken numerous actions, many of them military, in the Arctic that are of shared concern to the other Arctic nations and NATO.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

43. Partners, Competitors, or a Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic

Author:
Jim Townsend and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Arctic’s melting icecaps are changing more than the geography of the region. The diminishing sea ice and declining snow cover have allowed for new shipping lanes and growing access to natural resources, increasing geopolitical competition in the region. A defining feature of this competition is the growing interest and activity of Russia and China in the Arctic. Not only have the two countries increased their presence in the region, but coordination between them is growing. Political observers in Washington and beyond understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their interests and actions will combine and the challenges that such alignment will pose for the United States and its allies and partners. Previous CNAS research has highlighted the risks that greater Russia-China cooperation creates. This research argues that the growing partnership between Moscow and Beijing is amplifying the challenges that both actors pose. In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing. Increasing military cooperation: Through joint research and, to a lesser extent, its joint military exercises with Russia, China is enhancing its military knowledge of and insight into the Arctic. Though China’s actual military presence in the Arctic is minimal, the two countries’ cooperation is enhancing Chinese insight into Russian dual-use technology, which Beijing can use to build its military capabilities. China can learn from Russia’s dual-use and hybrid capability development in the Arctic, accelerating its efforts to erode U.S. military advantages and posing a greater threat in the event of military conflict. Russia and China may also strengthen their military relationship in the Arctic in the future, including expanding the scope of their joint exercises in the region. Ultimately, sustained or deepening Russia-China military cooperation may threaten America’s ability to deter Chinese and Russian aggression in the region.
Topic:
International Relations, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Arctic

44. Washington and the Next Arab Spring

Author:
Sarah Feuer and David Schenker
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Should protests grow more destabilizing, the United States will need to balance its values and interests regarding bilateral ties, the popular movement in question, broader regional dynamics, and competition with Russia or China. Against the backdrop of simmering protests, endemic economic challenges, the continuing struggle to contain the Covid-19 pandemic, and fallout from the U.S. Afghanistan withdrawal, The Washington Institute has launched a series of policy papers to help guide the Biden administration’s approach on democracy, reform, human rights, and political change across the Middle East and North Africa. The series addresses a range of questions: How do changes in the region over the last decade affect the new administration’s approach to these issues? How should the administration best prepare for the “new normal” of protests in the region? What are the policy tools at America’s disposal, and how might they be improved? How can Washington turn much-needed attention to new areas of focus, such as corruption and public-sector reform? What does public opinion research tell us about what the region’s publics want in their countries—and from the United States? And where might enhanced U.S.-EU coordination play a constructive role? The proposed answers will assist policymakers in advancing opportunities for reform, preserving U.S. interests, and navigating Middle East realities in the context of America’s global priorities. In the second essay of the series, Sarah Feuer, David Schenker, and their coauthors discuss the resurgence of protest activity across the region, the result of deteriorating economic circumstances and abysmal governance, worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Should protests become more destabilizing, the authors explain, the United States—before taking any action—will need to carefully balance its values and interests with respect to bilateral ties, the protest movement in question, broader regional dynamics, and competition with Russia or China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Arab Spring, Protests, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America

45. Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East

Author:
Remi Daniel
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Turkeyscope, Remi Daniel discusses several contemporary trends in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The dynamics of competition and cooperation between these two states affect the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in profound ways.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

46. Policy or Pique? Trump and the Turn to Great Power Competition

Author:
Deborah Welch Larson
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
DEBORAH WELCH LARSON analyzes Donald Trump’s policy toward China and Russia and the return of great power competition. She argues that Trump’s personalization of foreign policy undermined his trade war with China, and efforts to improve relations with Russia and that the Joe Biden administration will continue to compete but seek cooperation in areas of shared interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:
Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

48. On American Diplomacy and the Disorderly Oscillation of World Orders

Author:
Chas W. Freeman Jr.
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Editor’s Note: American Diplomacy Journal asked several foreign policy commentators to address the significance of growing chaos in many parts of the world, as failed and failing states are increasingly unable to perform the fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-state. This is one of five articles looking at those concerns. As the final decade of the 20th century began, the Soviet Union gave up its effort to become the global hegemon and dissolved into its constituent republics.[1] This ended the Cold War and the bipolar world order it had created. The USSR and the Soviet bloc were no more. The consequences of this vindication of George Kennan’s grand strategy of “containment” were both immediate and long term. A new and unfamiliar international reality began to emerge. Those who had grown up in the Cold War had come to consider the international system it created normal, but in historical terms it was sui generis.
Topic:
Cold War, National Security, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

49. Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-days war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various countries. The CSP’s new issue includes 5 articles, 2 commentaries and 1 book review. In the framework of post-war cooperation situation, the CSP’s current authors analysed the economic difficulties of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s enhancing role in the region and existing geopolitical confrontations, performance of peacekeeping activities, as well as economic cooperation opportunities emerged in the post-war period.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, War, Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Guam

50. The Origins of Russian Conduct

Author:
Clint Reach
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1947 George Kennan argued for a policy of U.S. containment of the Soviet Union based on his assessment of the origins of Soviet conduct. Because the Kremlin was ideologically bent on global domination through a zero-sum competition with the West, political accommodation was not an appropriate strategy. Fifty years after the “X” article appeared, Kennan saw in the Russian Federation a wholly different animal than its Soviet predecessor. Russia was in the early stages of democracy, and its development should be shepherded by a magnanimous West. Based on this updated view of Russia, Kennan asserted that the enlargement of NATO would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”1 Implicit in Kennan’s argument was that the nature of the new Russian regime was not inherently antagonistic toward the United States and the West. There was not an underlying ideology or feature of the new political and economic system that led him to conclude that confrontation with Russia was unavoidable or that cooperation was impossible. This assumption turned out to be one of the critical dividing lines in the debate on how to deal with the Russians after the Cold War, and it is implicitly found in discourse on Russia policy that continues to this day.2 What are the origins of Russian conduct? Has Russian domestic and foreign policy predominantly been the result of misguided U.S. and European actions? Would the Kremlin have behaved differently if these policies had been more accommodating to Russia as a separate but equal partner in European integration? As in 1947, the answers to these questions are directly tied to current and future U.S. policy toward Russia. Those who believe Russian conduct is largely a reaction to Western actions that threaten Russia’s core strategic interests are likely to promote policies guided by a sense of compromise.3 Those who believe Russia would have acted similarly even if NATO had been disbanded or if the West had been more sensitive to Russian interests likely support a tougher military and diplomatic line with Russia and will be less interested in engagement. Yet there is rarely a full examination of the underlying reasons for promoting a particular approach.4 It is often taken as a given that we can do business with Russia or we cannot. To develop an optimal strategy toward Russia, it is important to clearly articulate a reasoning for coming to one conclusion or the other. Kennan’s reasoning was that Russia in the 1990s was on a path toward becoming a member of the European project. Russian embrace of Western political norms would mitigate the potential for the reemergence of dividing lines and the need for American security guarantees in areas of historical Russian influence. The United States, however, was considering actions that would derail this process by fomenting nationalist and militaristic sentiments within Russia that might otherwise be marginalized due to the lack of a legitimate Western threat. The extent to which this turned out to be the case is difficult to determine. Since the late 1990s, there have been a number of U.S. and Russian actions outside the NATO enlargement dispute that have muddied the analytical waters. But, as Kennan said, “The attempt must be made if [Russian] conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.”5
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, History, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America