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21. Kosovo's Fragile Transition - Europe Report N°196

Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Kosovo has taken first state-building steps, but the international community has not met its commitments to provide adequate support. A rule-of-law mission (EULEX), the EU's biggest ever European security and defence policy (ESDP) operation, was agreed in February 2008 but has only started to deploy. The International Civilian Office (ICO), projected to supervise independence, is a shell. The UN still functions in part as an interim administration, negotiating arrangements for Kosovo Serbs with Belgrade. The Ahtisaari plan, on the basis of which 47 states have recognised Kosovo, has been undermined by the international organisations meant to help implement it. The EU and U.S. are struggling to come to terms with Russia's attempts to portray its support for breakaway regions in Georgia as a mirror image of what they did in Kosovo. Most urgent now is for the EU to make EULEX fully operational before year's end and use its leverage with a Belgrade government that wants membership to begin to make pragmatic accommodations to Kosovo's new status.
Topic:
Development, Sovereignty, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Kosovo, Balkans, and Georgia

22. Restoring Georgia's Sovereignty in Abkhazia

Author:
David L. Phillips
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This report evaluates the international community's response to the conflict in Abkhazia. It recommends a package of immediate measures to the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to prevent the escalation of violence. As part of a multi-year strategy, it also suggests steps that Georgians, Abkhaz, and international stakeholders can take to lay the ground for future negotiations. In addition, the report proposes a diplomatic initiative by the United States and the European Union (EU) that would restore Georgia's sovereignty, while preserving the interests of Abkhaz.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, Sovereignty, and War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Georgia, and Abkhazia

23. Assesment of the Finnish-Russian Border: The Case of Vaalimaa Border Crossing Point

Author:
Vadim Kononenko and Jussi Laine
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The “Friendly EU Border” project, as a part of which the present report has been prepared, commences from the assumptions that external EU borders represent an important aspect of the EU's policies in the field of security and of Justice and Home Affairs. Finland, a country with a long external border with Russia, has been a member of the EU since 1995. Thus, Finland's experience is pertinent for other EU Member States that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, most of which share their external borders with third countries outside the EU. The EU membership has certainly affected the operations of the Finnish border control, but – perhaps even more notably – the Finnish border control expertise has had a crucial influence on the way border control has been developed on European scale.
Topic:
Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Asia

24. Migration and Cultural Interaction across the Centuries: German History in a European Perspective

Author:
Dirk Hoerder
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
German Politics and Society
Institution:
German Politics and Society Journal
Abstract:
Once upon a time, German studies seemed to be an easy field to define. Like fairytales, the resulting stories were addressed to a faithful audience—but here, an audience of adults, true believers in the nation and nation state. Today, by contrast, we understand that defining area studies is, in fact, a highly complex task involving overlapping regions and social spaces, and analyses of borderlands, interpenetrations, and métissage, as well as of processual structures and structured processes. Even geographies have become “processual.” The origins of area studies are often traced to the U.S., the hegemon in the Atlantic world's academe, and the emergence of American studies in the 1930s. Nevertheless, something like area studies also emerged in Europe in the late nineteenth century, juxtaposing 1) a country and its colonies; and 2) a country and its neighbors. The former were inferior societies, the latter competitors in world markets and, repeatedly, enemies in war. Area studies—after a preceding period of knowledge acquisition as reflected in early mapmaking— became colonial studies, competitor state studies, enemy state studies—in each case transnational, transterritorial, and transcultural. Unable to deal with the concept of “trans,” i.e., with fuzzy borders and shifting categories and geographies, scholars in each bordered country set their own society, their Self, as the “yardstick.” The Other, the delimited opposite, was meant as a background foil before which their respective own nation was to appear as the most advanced and to which—knowledge and interest are inextricably linked—the profits from worldwide trade and the spoils from colonial acquisitions were naturally due (Folien- or Spiegeltheorie). Since then, motivations for country studies have become more complex but they basically are framed still by bordered territories, “national culture,” national consciousness or identity, nation-state policies, and international relations. Once the ideology of “nation” is abandoned, the blindfold removed so to say, it appears that German-language people may be studied in America or Russia—or Africans, Poles, and Turks in the German-language societies (plural!).
Topic:
Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, America, Europe, Turkey, and Germany

25. Coming Soon to a Country Near You: Kosova Sovereignty

Author:
Daniel Serwer
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Why does the United States support Kosovo's independence, even putting at risk its relations not only with Serbia but also with Russia? And how does Washington plan to contain the consequences? It is often assumed that Washington's position is based on a sense of moral obligation, deriving not only from the mistreatment of Albanians under the Milosevic regime but also from American promises since. While this fact or unquestionably weighs on the side of the Kosovars, it is not I think decisive. Understanding Washington's support for Kosovo's independence requires an analysis of the consequences of further delay as well as the consequences of moving ahead, even in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution.
Topic:
Government and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, and Balkans

26. Biological Weapons Threats from the Former Soviet Union

Author:
Sonia Ben Ouagrham
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Since September 11th, the American anthrax-laced letters and the war in Afghanistan have revived the interest of government officials, researchers and the general public to the state and security of former biological weapon (BW) facilities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In the popular press, reports of the general economic crisis and the political unrest that characterize FSU countries tend to emphasize the proliferation threat from these countries. Very little is said, however, about the nuances of this threat, its nature and degree of probability. Some reports tend to overestimate the number of employees at former BW facilities, thus inflating the risks of brain drain. While at the same time, other major sources of proliferation, such as the diversion of pathogens or the illicit transfer of specialized equipment are usually ignored. The present paper aims to characterize more precisely the threat stemming from former BW facilities in the FSU by determining what type of resources are available at former BW facilities and to what extent they are accessible to states of concern or terrorist groups. Although the existing open source information enables us to determine more clearly the categories of personnel, the type of equipment and material that pose the greatest proliferation threat, it does not measure properly the extent of the threat, i.e. an inventory of past and present facilities, expertise, equipment and material. Nevertheless, we can conclude that specialized knowledge, equipment and dangerous pathogens are available at former BW facilities in the FSU and can become accessible to state or non-state actors wishing to start or develop covert BW programs. This is particularly true in Central Asia, where economic and security factors, associated with the geographic characteristics of this region all converge to form a chain of proliferation: seekers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related technologies, potential suppliers and deliverers.
Topic:
Sovereignty and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, America, and Central Asia

27. Relics of Cold War: Europe's Challenge, Ukraine's Experience

Author:
Oleksiy Melnyk, Ian Anthony, and Alyson J. K. Bailes
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In 1989, the year when the death knell sounded for the Communist bloc in Europe and for the 'cold war' which it had pursued with the West, a total of 6–7.6 million personnel depending on the method of counting (2.5–3.7 million from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and 3.5–3.9 million from the Warsaw Treaty Organization, WTO) stood in arms within the European theatre. This included some 915 000 forces stationed outside their national borders inter alia from Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the same area there were 80 400 main battle tanks, 76 300 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), 67 700 heavy artillery pieces, 11 160 combat aircraft and 2615 attack helicopters—as well as many millions of smaller and lighter weapons. Aimed at each other as part of the East–West strategic confrontation, the USA and the USSR in 1990 deployed 10 563 and 10 271 strategic nuclear warheads respectively, while the United Kingdom possessed 300 and France 621. In addition, significant proportions of European territory (especially in the 'front-line' states such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, GDR) were taken up by military bases, exercise areas and other facilities such as airfields and pipelines. Large sectors of industry and of scientific, technological, and research and development (R) work were devoted to the needs of military defence. The resources involved were shut out from peaceful, civilian use more emphatically than would normally be the case today, because the bitterness of the strategic confrontation—and the associated risks of espionage and subversion—imposed a degree of secrecy often creating a situation where the citizens of a given state did not know what was happening on their own territory.
Topic:
NATO, Politics, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. Khatami In Moscow Boosts Russian-Iranian Arms Cooperation

Author:
Brenda Shaffer
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian president Mohammed Khatami will conduct an official visit to Russia on March 11 through March 15. This constitutes the highest-level visit of an Iranian official to Russia since 1989. There could be an intensification of cooperation between Russia and Iran during Khatami's visit — including on arms sales. In addition to military issues, the delineation of borders along the Caspian Sea will be a focus of discussion. Following talks in Moscow, Khatami will visit St. Petersburg and Kazan, the capital of the autonomous Russian republic of Tatarstan.
Topic:
International Relations and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Moscow

29. Buck Rogers or Rock Throwers?

Publication Date:
10-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
About 150 participants, including an international gathering of experts, examined whether and how technology may be leading to a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of warfare, a shift that has been generally categorized as a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA).They concluded: The United States is the far—and—away leader in this drive. In fact, the United States is the only country intent on achieving a high technology RMA. No country is likely to match the United States in the broad—based technological sophistication of its military capabilitiesor even to try. US successes in developing RMA capabilities will drive potential adversaries toward asymmetric responses including weapons of mass destruction and information warfare. Some countries probably would be able to pose serious operational and strategic challenges to the United States by acquiring military technologies and capabilities that were in their eyes, "good enough." Also, countries can exploit "sidewise" technologies—old by US standards but still new to many other countries—to pose significant security threats and complicate US military operations. These technologies, if employed in a "novel" operational manner rather than high-end technologies, could drive development of the next RMA. Participants believe that—of the countries considered for discussion—China, Russia, India, and Australia have the greatest potential to achieve an RMA, should they decide to pursue the option.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, International Political Economy, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Australia

30. Will the EU use Northern Dimension to solve its Kaliningrad dilemma?

Author:
Lyndelle Fairlie
Publication Date:
08-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
A Northern Dimension for the European Union is now taking shape. Originally a Finnish initiative, it tries to take a regional view of the Baltic area which includes member states, EU applicants such as Poland and the Baltic states and Russia. The Northern Dimension specifically mentions the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad. There is very little time left to develop an Action Plan which the EU Council can adopt at the December Helsinki summit. This essay addresses the question of whether or not the EU will use Northern Dimension to solve its Kaliningrad dilemma.
Topic:
International Relations, International Organization, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia