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851. Stability and Peace in the Caucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabagh: Keynote Address

Author:
Brenda Shaffer
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
"We have gathered together in this very picturesque village setting, esteemed negotiators both from the past and the present, honorable diplomats and officials, professional facilitators and researchers on both conflict resolution and the Caucasus from many places, including Germany, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, U.S., France, Iran and Turkey. Many of the primary diplomats responsible for the recent breakthroughs in the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh are currently present in this room, or on their way. They have been fulfilling their mission passionately and selflessly.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, America, Europe, and Asia

852. Sea of Instability: Caspian Politics and Pipelines (Event Summary)

Author:
Thomas Goltz
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Journalist Thomas Goltz gave a seminar on April 10 entitled, "Sea of Instability: Caspian Politics and Pipelines," and jointly sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program and the Davis Center for Russian Studies. Goltz provided his own unique perspective on the Caspian Region and its complex geo-political situation. He did this by means of a twenty-minute video presentation entitled "Oil Odyssey 2000" (of the epic delivery of the first barrel of oil, via the planned route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, on three-wheeled motorcycle) and a subsequent talk on the events that took place following the trip. Video summary: The documentary (needs to be seen to be believed) candidly charts the events surrounding the attempt to transport the first barrel of "Caspian crude" from Baku to Ceyhan. The video follows 26 intrepid travelers as they wind their way (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey) through the Caucasus on wheels. While the group has its fair share of misfortune (breakdowns, border crossing issues and even an unfortunate accident), the film clearly shows how the people along the way are very excited by the prospects of the pipeline — almost every stop looked like a party! A public relations coup de grace for everyone involved, Oil Odyssey manages to cover the Caucasus — from the larger-than-life leaders to the everyman to the ex-patriots (and shows how they are all willing to jump through hoops in the name of crude!) — in its imagined mystery and hardened reality. Seminar presentation: In a brief follow-up to the video, Goltz added that partially as a result of delivering the first symbolic barrel of Caspian crude: the Turkish oil establishment became more serious about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; a Sponsors' Group put down approximately $25 million to fund the basic engineering studies for the pipeline (engineers are currently mapping and examining the route), which will conclude in May/June. Support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has been building among the oil companies. One year ago, Goltz reminded, the Clinton administration was repeatedly sending delegations to England to lure John Brown (of BP Amoco) into sponsoring Baku-Ceyhan project. This year, the roles have been reversed, with John Brown sending delegations to Washington to convince the new U.S. administration not to change official policy on the pipeline or the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (which might open up a new route for Caspian oil). Goltz noted other factors that have increased the lure of Baku-Ceyhan, including significant finds of natural gas at the Shah Deniz oil fields, raising the possibility of the construction of a parallel pipeline (without extra engineering cost) and the discovery of "historic levels" of hydrocarbon levels in the Kazakh section of the Caspian sea (Kashagan). This, followed by the unexpected announcement by Nursultan Nazarbayev (President of Kazakhstan) to commit a significant portion of the oil from this field to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, has also raised interest. Rumor also has it that there is a split between the Russian Federation and the Russian oil oligarchs operating in the Caspian, who might want BTC as an option for exporting their product. Goltz identified both regional and local security as important concerns both in policy towards the pipeline and in the region on the whole. On a regional level, there are the continuing Caucasus conflicts (in Ossetia and Abkhazia, for example). On the local level, there are the drastically reduced social conditions outside of the capital cities. Goltz notes that the rural/urban dichotomy in the Caucasus is perhaps more pronounced now than ever before, citing Yerevan as the most extreme example. Goltz noted that the current debate on Armenia is focused on when it will go from a dying state to a dead one — in other words, when there is no one left, because of massive emigration. Goltz also pointed to the Russian Federation's decision to impose the visa regime upon Georgia as a potential catalyst for regional change. He theorizes that the estimated 500,000+ Georgians will now de facto become loyal towards the Russian state as it is providing them with the means to live. The same process of out-migration is occurring in Azerbaijan, where an entire generation of youth has left the provincial cities for Russia to try and make a living. According to Goltz, the oil companies are picking up the "social slack" in an attempt to compensate for this phenomenon. They are providing services (schools, wells, drinking water, etc.) in what Goltz terms "enlightened self-interest" — as they do not want to see a revolution on their hands. Q A Session: In response to a question about where the final pipeline will actually end up (i.e. is there a chance it will go through Armenia because of the Bush administration's design), Goltz recalled the initial stages of the Baku-Ceyhan project in 1992, when Armenia was prepared to drop the issue of "genocide" under the Ottoman Empire to have the pipeline go through its territory. Even though that didn't happen, Goltz pointed out that Turkish and Armenian officials do have some sort of a dialogue, and that the U.S is indeed promoting the dialogue heavily. Even though he views this exchange as positive, Goltz expressed no real hope for an impending resolution. Goltz expressed doubt that the pipeline might be moved, as logistically so much has already been done to get the project to its current engineering phase that drastic changes would ultimately reshape the entire endeavor. Goltz explained BP's turnaround on Baku-Ceyhan as being simply a matter of the number crunchers in London deciding that the Caspian region will play a serious role in BP's future (as it views itself over the next two decades). When asked if the Armenian route is purely geographically better, Goltz answered that of course the easiest route would be across Karabagh and Armenia — every inch you shorten the pipeline, the more money you save (cutting out swaths of pipeline). However, we can't simply eliminate all of the politics surrounding the situation that prevent this scenario from taking place. Goltz noted that there is a general need to separate U.S. policy from that of the mega-nationals (oil companies). He hinted that there is more enthusiasm on the part of oil companies right now, and not the U.S. government. And if the Russian Federation had been able to get their act together in the late 80s / early 90s and hadn't broken contracts and deals made on Siberia, the oil companies wouldn't have traveled down to Baku in the first place. Of course now corruption in Azerbaijan is forcing some companies to reconsider their position. While Iran would be geographically easier (to transport oil) than even Armenia, there remains the issue of which Iran are you dealing with (there are many levels). It is far easier to work in Azerbaijan, where once you have Aliyev's support, anything will get done. When the topic of presidential succession arose, Goltz mentioned that Ilham (President Aliyev's son) has not mentioned anything about running for presidential office in 2003. In fact, Goltz offered that the most likely scenario would involve someone else assuming office first, so that this person could make all the mistakes and then Ilham could come to the 'rescue'. Goltz also discounted the "certain chaos" that will supposedly occur after Aliyev is gone. Instead he feels there will be a credible succession, most likely led by someone who is studying abroad and interacting with the West. n response to a question regarding apparent discrepancies in statements make by President Aliyev and his son on issues as Armenia and Russia, Goltz offered the point that Azerbaijan is essentially a friendless state. It has to keep as many balls up in the air as possible — leading the Mr. Aliyevs to say whatever is necessary to keep other nations involved and interested in Azerbaijan. Things such as Section 907 and the embargo of Armenia, both of which prevent the U.S. and the E.U., respectively, from becoming true friends of Azerbaijan, bolster this position. Goltz dismissed the idea that underground movements in Azerbaijan will rise up to lead the large refugee population to recapture Armenian-occupied territory. In his opinion, while the refugee population wants its land back, it also simply wants peace. Goltz feels that Aliyev successfully neutered much of the pro-war opposition by having the three current peace proposals translated into Azeri, published in the newspapers and forcing his opponents in parliament to debate the possibilities. Unfortunately, the Azeri government has ignored the refugees, both financially and socially. The refugees are an uprooted and socially displaced group that lacks ties to formal Azerbaijan — this is one of the reasons why there are so many young men leaving for Russia to find work. At the same time, however, the only people talking about war are power-thirsty politicians from Baku who have never been to the regions and are not in touch with current refugee sentiments. Refugees are more concerned with living day-to-day than they are with mounting an armed attack on occupied territory. When asked about the refugee population's thoughts on the possibility of resettlement, Goltz agreed that the people are, by necessity, settling down. As each year passes, they take more steps towards solidifying their current living situation simply as a means of survival. Of course, in all refugee situations, governments are reluctant to endorse permanent settlement as it means forsaking their occupied territory. There is a strong resentment towards the U.S. — as it has been involved in many of the processes (democratization, etc.) that have changed Azerbaijan significantly from its former communist self, yet there have been no obvious improvements in the average person's living situation. The people are becoming frustrated with the "let's wait a little while longer" approach, as there has been no sign of trickle-down from oil investments and foreign aid.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

853. Russian Democracy: Is There a Future?

Author:
Michael McFaul
Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
MELISSA CARR : On behalf of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, I would like to welcome you to our seminar. Michael McFaul is going to lead us in a discussion entitled, "Russian Democracy: Is there a future?" This is a topic that SDI has been following through our publications and programs for over ten years now. SDI's current thoughts on this topic are outlined in our publication, Russia Watch. The lead article, "Buttressing Russia's Democratic Freedoms" outlines some of our thoughts on this topic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

854. Russia's Southern Neighbors

Author:
Aleksandar D. Jovovic
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
The Institute for the study of Diplomacy hosted the spring 2001 meetings of the Schlesinger Working Group on the topic of Russian foreign policy towards its neighbors in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The potential for further conflict along Russia's periphery is real. Russia (experiencing an economic upswing and more assertive political leadership) is mired in a series of border problems as well as unresolved internal security challenges in Chechnya and continues to be a central actor in the entire Caucasus region. The civil war in Afghanistan continues to export Islamic extremism to Russia's important Central Asian neighbors. If a dramatic security downturn took shape in any of these borderlands, it would test the competence, political will, and strategic common sense of Putin and his team. Russia's government has already demonstrated its willingness to charge headlong into an internal conflict, and Putin's initial popularity has soared as a result. To provide a starting point for the discussion, the working group examined the following issues: External political and security challenges facing Russia in the near to medium term. Russia's interests and willingness to remain engaged in developments along its frontier. Prospects for strategic surprises and unanticipated events along Russia's southern border. Implications of Russia's behavior and region- al developments on US interests and capabilities.
Topic:
Security and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Chechnya

855. Fear, Security and the Apocalyptic World View: The Cold War's Cultural Impact and Legacy

Author:
Paul S. Boyer
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Clarke Forum for Contemporary Issues
Abstract:
In 1967, Louis Halle published a book called The Cold War as History. If that title seemed jarring and premature in 1967, it would simply appear obvious and conventional today. The Cold War is receding from our collective consciousness with breathtaking rapidity. Cold War encyclopedias are appearing; an Oxford Companion to the Cold War will doubtless arrive at any moment. To the college freshmen of 2000 — seven years old when Ronald Reagan left the White House — the Cold War is merely a chapter in a textbook, an hour on the History Channel, not lived experience.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Communism
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

856. Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn, Richard D. Sokolsky, and David E. Mosher
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The strategic environment facing the United States has changed radically in the past decade. The United States needs to reexamine traditional ways of planning for the use of military force in conflicts that threaten vital interests and that could escalate to the highest levels of violence. Several characteristics define the new environment: Changed relationships between the major powers. The bipolar world of the Cold War has yielded to U.S. preeminence in virtually every facet of power, while Russia has become a second-tier power. China now has the seventh largest economy in the world and is modernizing both its conventional and nuclear forces—though it is unlikely to replace the former Soviet Union as the second pole in a reconfigured bipolar world. The rise of regional powers, such as Iraq and Iran. These aspiring regional hegemons are unhappy with a status quo that is preserved by American military power. The end of bipolarity has brought this antagonism to the fore. During the Cold War, regional conflicts played out within the context of the broader ideological and strategic conflict between the two superpowers, which also tamped down pressures for escalation and proliferation for fear that conflict would spiral out of control. That all ended with the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire made it impossible for Russia to continue supporting its allies abroad, who were forced to become responsible for their own security. The possibility that smaller rogue states might try to keep the United States out of a regional conflict. By credibly threatening that the fight could escalate and even involve homeland attacks on the United States or its partners, a regional pariah might hope to prevent the United States from committing forces to the conflict or hinder it from building coalitions with European and regional allies. Failing that, a regional adversary could seek to delay and disrupt U.S. deployments to the theater and hamper operations. Finally, the leadership of a rogue state may be able to preserve its regime even in defeat if it could strike the American homeland or American allies. In short, regional powers are developing the capability to conduct strategic warfare against the United States. The importance these countries place on asymmetric warfare probably has been encouraged by the American distaste for wartime casualties and worries about self-deterrence.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

857. Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Under Yeltsin and Putin

Author:
Robert O. Freedman
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, its main successor state, Russia, emerged in a greatly weakened geopolitical position. Complicating Russia's problems was a politically weak and often physically sick President Boris Yeltsin. Concerned about its "soft underbelly" in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, regions that were threatened by radical Islam, Moscow focused its Middle East efforts on Turkey and Iran, both of which had a considerable amount of influence in the two regions. Moscow sold nuclear reactors and sophisticated military equipment to Iran, as the two countries developed a tactical alliance. Russia had a more mixed relationship with Turkey, alternating between confrontation and cooperation. Russia also sought to get the sanctions lifted against Iraq, a development that would strengthen the greatly troubled Russian economy as well as help Russia politically. In the case of Israel, Moscow developed very close cultural, economic, and military ties, although there were a number of ups and downs in diplomatic relations. Under Putin, there was a more centralized control over Russian foreign policy as the new Russian leader sought to have a more assertive foreign policy for his country, and became much more active than Yeltsin had been in promoting Russian interests in the Middle East.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Arabia

858. Special Policy Forum Report: Partners in Need: Russia and Iran's Strategic Relationship

Author:
Brenda Shaffer
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In April, Brenda Shaffer, research director of Harvard University's Caspian Studies Program and visiting fellow at The Washington Institute in 2000, addressed The Washington Institute to mark the publication of her Policy Paper, Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran. The following is a rapporteur's summary of her remarks. Russia and Iran see themselves as strategic partners, and therefore their relations are based on an overall security conception. It would be a misperception to assume that because Washington and Moscow share concerns about Islamist radicalism that Russia would necessarily decide to cooperate with the United States on Iran. It would also be a misperception to think that Russia wants to sell arms to Iran solely in order to make money and that the United States can induce Russia not to make these sales by offering a better economic deal.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Washington, Middle East, and Arab Countries

859. Special Policy Forum Report -- Managing U.S.-Turkish Relations

Author:
Mark Parris
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Turkey is important . . . The new administration, based on what it has said and done since January, understands this." "One reason [for Turkey's importance], of course, is its location and the issues that come with that geography-big issues; issues that have literally made or broken past administrations' foreign policies: Russia; the Caucasus and Central Asia; Iran; Iraq; post-Asad Syria; Israel and the Arab world; Cyprus and the Aegean; the Balkans; the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI); drugs, thugs, and terror. I would submit that no administration can achieve its objectives on any of these issues unless the Turks are on the same page.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Israel, Arab Countries, Syria, and Cyprus

860. Turkey And The Bush Administration: The Question Marks

Author:
Alan Makovsky
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Turkey's economic crisis is naturally the leading issue in bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations, and it is almost certainly topping the agenda of today's meetings of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem with Vice President Richard Cheney and other senior officials. Of course, these meetings pose the difficult question of how much Washington should do, if anything, to bail out its strategically vital ally. But this is only one of several uncertainties characterizing U.S.-Turkish relations in the early days of the Bush administration. Because so much of Turkey's importance to the United States derives from its critical strategic location, bilateral relations are greatly affected by U.S. policies toward other states in Turkey's region. Of most concern to Turkey will be the evolution of Bush administration policy toward Iraq, Iran, and Russia, and also toward Europe's nascent bid to develop an autonomous security capacity.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Washington, Turkey, and Middle East