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251. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:
Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

252. Russia or the West – Which Should Jerusalem Choose?

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

253. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

254. Online Warfare: Russian Policy on International Information Security

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia in April this year updated its policy on international information security (IIS). Compared to the previous version of the document from 2013, Russia points to the possibility of an inter-state conflict as a result of activities in cyberspace. Russia also promotes the concept of “sovereign internet” and aims to increase its influence in the field of global regulations concerning the development of the network. The publication of the document confirms the priority for information security in the national security strategy and in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Security, Internet, Non-Traditional Threats, Information Technology, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

255. A Crash Test: EU Strategic Autonomy in the Foreign Policy of France

Author:
Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
France uses the idea of EU strategic autonomy as a tool in its own foreign policy. France’s aim is to redefine the Union’s partnership with the U.S. and NATO. Hence, the activity of President Emmanuel Macron in emphasising the differences between the positions of the U.S. and the EU, especially in relations with China and Russia. Macron’s rhetoric worries other European countries and hides the real problems in EU security policy, such as insufficient financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the lack of a clear definition of strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, France, and United States of America

256. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2020-21

Author:
M. Patrick Hulme and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, is increasingly critical as new and long-standing hotspots— including the Taiwan strait, Korean peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea—become more volatile. The need for confidence-building measures is clear, and a central tool of confidence building is defense transparency. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security, including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, and the major external powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, North Korea, Korea, East China, and United States of America

257. Protocooperation as a Model for the Russia-UAE Partnership

Author:
Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 marked the Russian Federation (RF) return as a key player in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, the relations between Russia and the UAE are of utmost importance for both entities, for the region, and globally. This article seeks to fill a gap in scholarly knowledge by answering questions about the nature of the emerging cooperation between Russia and the UAE. How Russia seeks to use the UAE to expand its sphere of influence in the MENA region and how the UAE uses this cooperation to achieve its foreign policy goals. The article applies protocooperation (an analogy to the ecological relationship) as a model for the Russia-UAE partnership. The RF is strengthening its position in the MENA regarding the UAE as a key partner for regaining its political, economic, and military influence in the MENA region. Russia-UAE’s partnership aims at achieving conjunctural geopolitical interests benefiting from diminished Western, mainly the US, presence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Gulf Nations, and UAE

258. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

259. The Origins of Russian Conduct

Author:
Clint Reach
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1947 George Kennan argued for a policy of U.S. containment of the Soviet Union based on his assessment of the origins of Soviet conduct. Because the Kremlin was ideologically bent on global domination through a zero-sum competition with the West, political accommodation was not an appropriate strategy. Fifty years after the “X” article appeared, Kennan saw in the Russian Federation a wholly different animal than its Soviet predecessor. Russia was in the early stages of democracy, and its development should be shepherded by a magnanimous West. Based on this updated view of Russia, Kennan asserted that the enlargement of NATO would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”1 Implicit in Kennan’s argument was that the nature of the new Russian regime was not inherently antagonistic toward the United States and the West. There was not an underlying ideology or feature of the new political and economic system that led him to conclude that confrontation with Russia was unavoidable or that cooperation was impossible. This assumption turned out to be one of the critical dividing lines in the debate on how to deal with the Russians after the Cold War, and it is implicitly found in discourse on Russia policy that continues to this day.2 What are the origins of Russian conduct? Has Russian domestic and foreign policy predominantly been the result of misguided U.S. and European actions? Would the Kremlin have behaved differently if these policies had been more accommodating to Russia as a separate but equal partner in European integration? As in 1947, the answers to these questions are directly tied to current and future U.S. policy toward Russia. Those who believe Russian conduct is largely a reaction to Western actions that threaten Russia’s core strategic interests are likely to promote policies guided by a sense of compromise.3 Those who believe Russia would have acted similarly even if NATO had been disbanded or if the West had been more sensitive to Russian interests likely support a tougher military and diplomatic line with Russia and will be less interested in engagement. Yet there is rarely a full examination of the underlying reasons for promoting a particular approach.4 It is often taken as a given that we can do business with Russia or we cannot. To develop an optimal strategy toward Russia, it is important to clearly articulate a reasoning for coming to one conclusion or the other. Kennan’s reasoning was that Russia in the 1990s was on a path toward becoming a member of the European project. Russian embrace of Western political norms would mitigate the potential for the reemergence of dividing lines and the need for American security guarantees in areas of historical Russian influence. The United States, however, was considering actions that would derail this process by fomenting nationalist and militaristic sentiments within Russia that might otherwise be marginalized due to the lack of a legitimate Western threat. The extent to which this turned out to be the case is difficult to determine. Since the late 1990s, there have been a number of U.S. and Russian actions outside the NATO enlargement dispute that have muddied the analytical waters. But, as Kennan said, “The attempt must be made if [Russian] conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.”5
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, History, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

260. Russian pipelines and EU energy security: Utilizing the externality elements of the EU’s regulatory framework

Author:
Michalis Mathioulakis
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Russia and the EU have been entangled in the harsh effects of asymmetrical interdependence and the security threats it generates. Russia’s economy is linked directly to the form and volume of trade directed from the EU towards the Russian economy, while the EU economy is linked to the flow of Russian gas and oil directed towards European businesses and households. Growing concerns on EU’s dependency on energy imports led the European Commission to release its Energy Security Strategy (2014), aiming to secure stability and abundancy of energy supply while simultaneously examining the effects of discrepancies from Russian gas imports to the European energy systems. In contrast, Russia’s primary concern is to secure the necessary energy revenues that could enable Moscow to project and exercise its hard power to areas with strategic interest by striving to gain greater leverage within the European energy markets. Russia’s security objectives in relation to its energy export capacity are expressed primarily through materialisation of two major natural gas pipeline systems, namely the Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream pipelines. This paper by Michalis Mathioulakis, Research Associate of ELIAMEP; Energy Strategy Analyst and Academic Director of the Greek Energy Forum, examines the strive between the two international actors in redetermining their future relations and the role of Russian gas pipelines and the EU’s regulatory framework in shaping the two actors’ common future.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, and Regulation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia