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31. El lugar de Venezuela en las restricciones chino-estadounidenses: una mirada desde la prensa española en el marco de la invasión rusa a Ucrania

Author:
Iván Luis Alonso Peláez
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo hace un recorrido histórico para conocer cuál ha sido el papel de Venezuela en el marco de las relaciones chino-estadounidenses, especialmente los cambios ocurridos a partir de 1999 con los gobiernos de Hugo Chávez y Nicolás Maduro. Acorde con lo descrito por la abundante bibliografía sobre el tema, se constata que se ha producido un cambio de roles en el que China progresivamente ha ido ocupando en Venezuela el espacio comercial preferente que tradicionalmente había ostentado Estados Unidos desde el restablecimiento de la Democracia en 1958. A través de un análisis informativo utilizando como fuente un grupo de textos periodísticos publicados en los seis principales diarios de circulación nacional editados en España, se valora cómo la invasión rusa a Ucrania promueve un todavía incipiente deshielo en el curso de las sanciones impuestas por Washington a la industria petrolera venezolana.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Energy Crisis, Newspapers, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

32. Defunding the War Against Ukraine: Economic Strategies for Countering Russian Aggression

Author:
David Cortright and Anna Romandash
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
The sanctions imposed by the United States and many of its allies on Russia since 2022 have been unprecedented. The current financial, economic, trade, and other restrictions aim to constrain Russia’s ability to continue its aggression. Imposed by most developed countries, the sanctions and export controls have the potential to diminish Russia’s war-making capacity, weakening state finances and eroding its military technological base. The measures have imposed significant costs on Russia, but to date they have not achieved their objectives due to Russia’s elaborate circumvention and preparatory strategies and the lack of compliance by many countries and companies. The success of sanctions as a means of constraining Russian aggression will depend on closing channels of evasion and tightening the enforcement of these measures. This report reviews the sanctions and export controls enacted to date and the effects they are having on Russia’s industrial economy. It also examines the principal gaps in sanctions enforcement that Russia has exploited. It identifies actions by companies and countries that are profiting from sanctions circumvention and are enabling Russia to continue its illegal war and annexation of Ukrainian territory
Topic:
Sanctions, Exports, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. A Strategic Challenge: A Peddling Peril Index Analysis of Countries’ Restricted Russia Trade

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
National trade control systems and sanctions enforcement across the globe have been particularly challenged by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the unexpected types and number of goods to control, the need for rapid control of those items, and Russia’s determination to thwart others’ trade controls. The Russian situation demonstrates that even countries with strong strategic trade control systems have vulnerabilities. • In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the results of the Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2021/2022 provide a method to assess a total of 31 countries identified by their respective roles in the transshipment of restricted goods or the supply of dual-use goods used by the Russian military. • The purpose of this study is to identify patterns in these countries’ scores and lessons in finding ways of thwarting Russia’s success in violating sanctions and export controls.
Topic:
Sanctions, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

34. Electronics in the Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, filled with Western electronics, continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran 2, are produced and assembled at JSC Alabuga facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with assistance from Iran. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga,1 and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. Information in internal Alabuga documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, show a remarkable ability to acquire sophisticated electronic components from the West and build modules aimed at defeating Ukraine’s ability to jam Shahed-136 drones and require Ukraine and its allies to keep deploying additional or more advanced jamming systems. The detailed information on the Shahed-136’s electronic components, with part numbers and manufacturer, provide a valuable opportunity to thwart exports of these specific parts to Russia and its partner Iran, which has to date supplied most of these electronic parts to Alabuga for use in the Shahed-136 drone. Starting next year, however, Alabuga has committed to outfit Shahed136 drones with electronic components it acquires on its own. The danger posed by Alabuga should mobilize governments to apply sanctions and other restrictive measures to Alabuga and the associated companies revealed in the documents. Sanctions on Alabuga would not only be helpful in disrupting Alabuga and associated companies’ procurement efforts, but they would cause stress to a giant drone factory that has to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones on a tight schedule, with little previous experience with drone production, hundreds of new employees on its payroll, and under financial pressure to prove itself as a capable supplier to the military.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Drones, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

35. Substitute to War: Questioning the Efficacy of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Brent Lawniczak
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Western nations enacted harsh sanctions against Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, sanctions are rarely successful and policy makers should not expect sanctions to coerce Russia into a withdrawal. This article examines several concepts including the instrumental effectiveness of sanctions, the significance of state identity, the pitfall of mirror imaging, and aspects of prospect theory as they relate to the effectiveness of sanctions. Additionally, the weakness of sanctions used for moral signaling and the notion of sanctions as an act of war are considered. Recommendations are offered should policy makers continue to view economic sanctions as an attractive policy choice.
Topic:
Sanctions, State, Identity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

36. Un año después...

Author:
Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
Este artículo pretende inducir una reflexión sobre las consecuencias de la guerra de Rusia en Ucrania, que ya dura nueve años, particularmente después de la invasión total el 24 de febrero de 2022, y su impacto en el escenario geopolítico internacional.
Topic:
Security, War, Sanctions, Global South, Alliance, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. Seoul Searching: Lessons from South Korea's Experience with Sanctions against Russia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and the West have found themselves enmeshed in an expansive economic war as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While the conflict on the ground in Ukraine is undoubtedly—and tragically—the primary front of Russia’s aggression, and where its aggression reaps its most dramatic horrors, Western powers have joined with a wide swathe of the international community to support Ukraine’s resistance and hold the Kremlin to account. But as with the kinetic war in Ukraine, the conflict did not begin one evening last February. It was first launched by Russia in response to Ukraine’s pro-Western, anti-corruption Maidan Revolution that raged through the winter of 2013–2014, ultimately resulting in the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych after he sought to capitulate to the Kremlin and refuse protesters’ and the wider Ukrainian public’s demands for continuing the country’s pro-European and pro-Western agenda. Russia was the first power to use sanctions and trade restrictions in the conflict, namely against Ukraine in 2013.[1] Russia also first sought to use Ukraine’s future to bring the international economic order into the scope of its fight even before Yanukovych’s ouster.[2] However, economic and technology restrictions on Russia have been at the core of the wider West’s strategy of support for Ukraine throughout that period. The target of these tools has changed significantly, initially aimed at deterring Russia from further aggression after 2014 to seeking to restrict its state capacity and ability to wage the war since 2022. But their global impact and Putin’s attempts to undermine the international order through his own weaponization of Russia’s economy and its commodities base have left the world in a new era of international economic competition, and other powers, great and small, are being impacted in ways unforeseen. States are, in turn, also learning lessons from this new era of economic warfare for the future, and the risks they might face from such conflict. This paper examines the impact on one often overlooked but deeply affected country, the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). Seoul has a unique position in the economic war in that it was arguably the largest Western ally that did not join the sanctions regime against Russia after Putin’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014. In fact, as we will see, a number of crucial economic ties between Russia and South Korea grew significantly thereafter; although this was also the case for a number of countries that induced sanctions—Germany’s gas linkages with Russia in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are perhaps the best known example. This paper will examine Seoul’s strategic considerations in doing so, and the reasons that the West did not put substantial pressure on South Korea to join the sanctions regime at the time. Seoul did, however, join the sanctions regime fully in 2022. The domestic political considerations in South Korea played a key role in that shift and will also determine how the policy’s effectiveness is judged and, in turn, how South Korea may be positioned for future similar economic conflict between the West and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and South Korea

38. A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
European officials are frustrated at India’s apparent fence-sitting over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, for Indian policymakers, maintaining a workable relationship with Russia is central to counterbalancing Chinese hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. India also depends significantly on Russia for arms supplies, including advanced systems that help it keep pace with China. Despite this, India has for some time been slowly decoupling from Russia and strengthening its relations with the West, especially the US. Europeans should be aware of how India defines its own strategic positioning, and support India where possible as they negotiate the tricky issues relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Arms Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and India

39. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

40. Germany, Russia, and Energy Politics

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fifth and final brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Kalev Stoicescu examines another of Germany’s key bilateral relationships—with Russia. Relations between Germany (or historical German and German-led states) and Russia have greatly influenced the Baltic region for centuries. In recent years, what the Baltic states see as Germany’s over-reliance on Russian gas supplies, even as they themselves have tried to secure energy independence from Russia, has been a source of tension. The Nord Stream pipelines, which Germany claims are a business project, but which the Baltic states regard as a security risk, have been particularly problematic. But at the same time, the Baltic states recognise that Germany has since 2014 adopted a resolute approach towards Russia regarding sanctions; even if they are sceptical that Berlin’s ambiguous policies towards Moscow, being both firm and conciliatory, will change Russia’s behaviour. With the appointment as foreign minister of Annalena Baerbock, who has opposed Nord Stream 2 and strongly criticised Russia’s misconduct, Olaf Scholz’s new government may stand closer to Baltic perceptions and interests and become a more principled and difficult counterpart for Russia. The Baltic states might be encouraged to trust Germany more in its dealings with Russia, but the new government must first prove itself in its words and actions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and Baltic States