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101. Hungarian-Russian Economic Relations

Author:
Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Hungarian-Russian economic relations are based on the energy industry. Hungary’s efforts to build closer political relations with Russia after 2010 did not result in a marked increase in bilateral trade, investment, or greater Russian influence outside the energy sector. EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia and the introduction of counter-sanctions in 2014 caused a significant drop in Hungarian exports to Russia. However, this has not resulted in substantial losses to the Hungarian economy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Hungary

102. Russian and Iranian Economic Interests In Syria (Pre-2010 and intra-war period)

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. There has historically been low levels of trade and investment from both Russia and Iran with Syria, with trade in military items being a notable exception. While the trade relationship between Syria and its two main allies predates the conflict, levels of trade had been remarkably low before the crisis, in contrast to mainstream perceptions. Yet, these figures cannot be confirmed due to unavailability of a comprehensive record of the Syrian bilateral relationship with Iran and Russia. Internationally imposed sanctions have discouraged Russian and Iranian companies from doing business with Syria. Lacking any other resources, the only way that Syrian could repay debts to its allies would be to grant exclusive access to energy and natural resources. This however would reduce the public revenue needed to rebuild state institutions, and also encourage foreign rivalry over economic opportunities. As Syria lacks any coordination mechanism for post-war economic reconstruction, Russia and Iran have set their eyes on the energy sector, where Russia has the upper hand. Yet, cooperation is also possible in other sectors, such as Syria’s rail sector. In order to understand the Russian and Iranian economic relationship with Syria, two factors should be considered. First is the informal relationship between Syria and its two allies, which has taken the form of unofficial agreements and trade. These would be important when sanctions are lifted. The second factor is military exports to Syria, expected to be large, given the scale of war and Syrian reliance on Russia and Iran. Due to lack of official data, this paper will not consider both issues.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

103. PART II: Russo-Georgian Dystopia

Author:
Kaha Baindurashvili
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russian sanctions might not be that impressive, but they are extremely dangerous for Georgian unity. Russia has been destabilizing that unity since Georgia’s independence in 1991, first through its proxies— Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists and militias— and then later more openly from 2004 onwards. The Kremlin’s political aims behind the sanctions are obvious. Russian officials do not have high expectations for their numerical impact, but the propaganda accompanying them could have a more powerful impact. The Ivanishvili victory in 2012 and promised political and media tolerance has opened doors to Russian propaganda too; since then, banned Russian media outlets have started freely broadcasting in Georgia, while the anti-Kremlin, Georgian-funded, Russian-language television network PIK was shut down.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Georgia

104. CHOOSING AN ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE

Author:
Danielle L. Lupton
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
It’s been over two months since the crisis between Ukraine and Russia escalated with the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018. Since then, the global news media has devoted little attention to the conflict and references to the dispute from senior American and European policy makers have grown increasingly sparse. Despite an immediate public condemnation of Russia’s actions by the EU and NATO, European and American leaders have yet to coordinate a significant response. In short, the reaction has been underwhelming. This is problematic for three reasons. First, Russia’s latest act of aggression has been interpreted by many as a test of Western resolve and America’s commitment to its European allies. A failure to present a united front carries reputational consequences for the United States, the EU, NATO, and other European powers as well as their leaders. Second, the conflict in Ukraine is ongoing and the humanitarian consequences for civilians of this “forgotten” war—not to mention for Ukrainian democracy itself—are dire. Third, a lack of response to such acts of aggression could further embolden Putin, not just in Ukraine, but also in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Ethics, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

105. Hybrid Aggression: A Multi-Pronged Attack

Author:
Yevhen Mahda
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The author tries to show and explain some key features of Russia’s hybrid ag- gression in Europe as a multi-pronged attack. Among them are military challenges, refugee challenges, cultural, informational, gender challenges, the impact on the inner policy of Euro- pean countries. The author also shows possible ways to answer these challenges and counter the aggression.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Sanctions, Agression, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

106. A Difficult Trade-off: Can Moscow Trade Iran’s Influence in Syria for Sanctions?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Currently, Russia is trying to maintain its political and security understandings with key parties to the Syrian conflict. But one of the main obstacles facing it is the intertwining and conflicting interests of parties, which leaves Russia with limited options and narrow room for maneuvering. Furthermore, it strains its relations with these parties, as is the case with Israel, following the Russian accusation to Israel of shooting down the Ilyushin Il-20 in September 17, 2018.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Hassan Rouhani, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Syria

107. Economic Sanction Games among the US, the EU and Russia: Payoffs and Potential Effects

Author:
Dong Yan and Li Chunding
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Economic sanction of the US and EU on Russia because of Ukraine crisis in 2014 lasts for a long time and is still a hot policy topic. This paper uses a 16-country or region numerical general equilibrium model with trade cost and exogenous trade imbalance to explore this three-country economic sanction game payoffs, and simulate the effects of sanctions on individual countries. Our analysis find that all sanction involved countries will be hurt, but comparatively Russia will be hurt more, and the US and EU will be hurt less. Sanction measures of EU have larger impacts to Russia than the US measures, and meanwhile Russian counter-sanction measures will generate larger impacts on the EU than on the US. From the economic perspective, the optimal choice for US and EU is to give up sanction measures to Russia, and retaliation is Russia’s optimal choice when faced with sanction measures. Countries out of the sanction game will gain because of trade diversion effects.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

108. Russia’s National Oil Champion Goes Global

Author:
Edward C. Chow and Andrew J. Stanley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
After the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was roiled by political and economic chaos, many state-owned assets were privatized based on political connections and corrupt practices. The oil sector was a particularly attractive, but by no means the only, target for these privatizations. By the end of the 1990s, almost all of Russia’s oil production was privately owned. In spite of continued nontransparency, the oil sector began to resemble a competitive market with private investors introducing Western technology, financial accounting, and operating and management practices. It also started to attract major foreign investments. The remaining state oil assets were managed by a sleepy state enterprise named Rosneft that, in spite of its name (Russian Oil), produced less than 5 percent of Russia’s oil. Today, majority state-owned Rosneft produces almost half of Russia’s oil. Its daily oil production of 4.6 million barrels, according to its last reported quarterly results, is double that of the world’s largest oil company by market capitalization, ExxonMobil, which last reported daily liquids production of 2.3 million barrels. Rosneft’s rapid rise coincided with the rule of Vladimir Putin, who first became president of Russia in 2000. Its production increases were built largely on the backs of controversial acquisitions of assets previously held by private companies such as Yukos, TNK-BP, and Bashneft. Rosneft’s acquisition spree accelerated after Putin’s close associate and Russia’s then-deputy prime minister Igor Sechin became chairman of its board of directors in 2004. Sechin left government in 2012 to take over as Rosneft’s chief executive officer. Rosneft’s board of directors is now chaired by former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Rosneft’s transformation as Russia’s national oil champion is consistent with Putin’s policy of regaining state control over the commanding heights of the Russian economy, which is more reliant on oil income today than the Soviet Union ever was. Rosneft is Russia’s largest taxpayer and contributed a quarter of government revenue in 2014. Until recently, Rosneft concentrated mainly on consolidating its dominance over the domestic oil patch. It is also Russia’s leading refiner and is increasing natural gas production for direct sales to domestic gas users, producing 67 billion cubic meters in 2016. In 2014, Russia was hit by the twin shocks of a global oil price collapse and Western economic sanctions enacted after its aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region and annexation of Crimea. These developments affected Rosneft severely since it involved the value of the commodity it produces and sells and restricted Rosneft’s access to international financing when it was heavily indebted from the aforementioned acquisitions. A normal company might hunker down, repair its balance sheet, and wait for external conditions to improve. Instead Rosneft has done the exact opposite and expanded its international business aggressively. As part of the 2014 U.S.-led sanction efforts, Igor Sechin, as the leading figure of Russia’s largest petroleum company and his having “shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin,” was directly sanctioned. Further Russian sanctions enacted by Congress in 2017 called on the U.S. Department of the Treasury to submit a detailed report on senior political figures, oligarchs, and parastatal entities as determined by their “closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.” While the unclassified version of the report released to Congress on January 29 included Igor Sechin, the report was poorly received and largely regarded as nothing more than a “rich list” by Russian experts. However, the report also contains classified annexes, including a list of parastatal entities and supporting analysis, which by definition would have included Rosneft. Although Rosneft’s rapid international expansion is too recent to assess definitely, this paper describes some of Rosneft’s overseas ventures and explores possible motivations, economic and political, behind them.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, Gas, Transparency, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Eastern Europe

109. U.S. sanctions on Russia and its impact on India

Author:
Amit Bhandari and Chaitanya Giri
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin is in India on a two-day state visit to India, his third trip to India during Prime Minister Modi’s term. A key agreement that has just been signed is the $5 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system. However, U.S. sanctions on Russia’s top defence manufacturers will be a hurdle in closing this agreement, making payments to Russia difficult and scaring away potential Indian partners, especially those with investments in the West. Gateway House looks at India’s options for successfully concluding this agreement without falling foul of American sanctions
Topic:
International Relations and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia and India

110. A comparative study: Where and Why does the EU Impose Sanctions?

Author:
Christian Hörbelt
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The use of the EU instrument of political and economic sanctions has continually been rising since 1987. However, the sanctions are used differently according to geographic vicinity, political motivation, and which security objectives the EU promotes. Clara Portela explored the European sanction regime for the period 1987-2003 and showed that the EU has different political motivations and objectives for each region and that, in particular, geographic vicinity plays a significant role for the application for sanctions. This article relates to Portela´s analytic approach from 2005 and verifies her hypotheses for the period 2005-2015. In summary, the article shows that the EU still focuses on geographic vicinity and security relevance. Only the area of sanction application has changed, moving from Eastern Europe to the Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Mediterranean