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91. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

92. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:
Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

93. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

95. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

96. The caucasus: peace negotiations and the global energy transition

Author:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has set in motion new security and power dynamics across the wider Black Sea region. The conflict, which continues to overwhelmingly preoccupy the Kremlin created a power vacuum in the South Caucasus and, in the aftermath of the recent series of wars over Karabakh, opened up space for peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These negotiations may not only lead to a normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani ties following three decades of conflict but also open the possibility for reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, with ample economic, political, and security effects for the entire region. Russia’s aggression has also created energy supply shortages in Europe, drawn the South Caucasus closer to the continent, and rushed the energy transition in many instances. Azerbaijan is becoming an ever more important energy supplier to European customers. At the same time, Baku is investing in key renewable energy projects, with an eye to becoming a major clean electricity exporter, and is set to host the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in November 2024. This panel discussion brings together two of this year’s Black Sea Program Title VIII research fellows to present their findings on the South Caucasus in the context of new security arrangements, peace negotiations, and the global energy transition. The research fellowships are granted by the US State Department for the Middle East Institute’s Black Sea Program
Topic:
Renewable Energy, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

97. 1,000 days of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine

Author:
Philip Breedlove, Iulia-sabina Joja, and Matthew Czekaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Wednesday, November 20, marks a somber anniversary for Ukraine: 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country. Though the Ukrainians continue to hold out with Western assistance against Russian attacks, the past two-and-a-half years have been devastating for the country and its people. Ukraine now faces another winter at war as momentum appears to be shifting in Russia’s favor. What can the US and its allies do to ensure hostilities end as favorably as possible to Ukraine and in line with American strategic national interests? MEI scholars General Philip M. Breedlove and Dr. Iulia-Sabina Joja join host Matthew Czekaj to discuss the state of the conflict and what’s at stake for the region and the global community.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

98. Explaining Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction: what, how and when?

Author:
Tinatin Akhvlediani
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in colossal human loss. According to the World Bank, this has already in 2023 amounted to 26 000 civilian casualties, the displacement of around 3.7 million people internally within Ukraine and around 5.9 million externally in Europe and beyond. The war has pushed 7.1 million people into poverty and reversed 15 years of economic development. This is reflected in the drastic increase in inequality, particularly among women, children, people with disabilities and elderly. This CEPS Explainer aims to review what is at stake, how Ukraine’s reconstruction has been addressed thus far, and what conditions and timelines are necessary for scaling up efforts. It looks at the immediate and long-term needs for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, examines the existing framework for coordinating and implementing rebuilding efforts, describes potential funding sources and analyses the financial support already committed for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Finally, it reviews Ukraine’s ability to effectively absorb reconstruction funds and outlines the basic conditions required for scaling up reconstruction.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Recovery, Economic Development, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

99. The Berlin Pulse 2024/2025 (full issue)

Author:
Hanno Pevkur, Stephanie Zonszein, Majed Al-Ansari, Halyna Yanchenko, and Boris Pistorius
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
Welcome to the eight’s edition of The Berlin Pulse! As every year, we compare international expectations of Germany with public opinion in Germany. But this year’s edition is special, as it comes off the press with one part of our representative survey conducted right after the polls have closed in the United States and the German coalition collapsed. Thanks to our editors Julia Ganter and Jonathan Lehrer, this issue underlines that Germany must decide what image it wants to project and what international expectations it wants to meet. Bangladeshi analyst Shafqat Munir and Russian opposition politician Andrei Pivovarov want Germany to live up to its moral aspirations and support the revival of democratic values in their countries. Israeli journalist Mairav Zonszein argues that precisely Germany’s reputation as a defender of democratic norms complicates its arms support to Israel, calling on Berlin to ensure its weapons are not used in human rights violations. Meanwhile, Ukrainian politican Halyna Yanchenko urges Germany to supply more arms to help end Russia’s illegal war of aggression. These expectations illustrate that Germany’s international standing as a partner in upholding international law, human rights and democracy is currently at stake. Berlin faces a complex balancing act, striving to avoid perceptions of selectively applying international law. Estonia’s Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur argues that half-hearted actions will not suffice – or as he puts it, ʻDo we want Ukraine to survive, or do we want it to win?ʼ The German population has a strong opinion on many of these issues. While 57 per cent of German respondents still want Berlin to support Ukraine militarily only 25 per cent want military support for Israel. Despite these dilemmas, it is encouraging that 46 per cent of German respondents want their country to be more engaged on international crises. It is the highest level since we started surveying this in 2017 and it shows that, after three years of war in Ukraine and a year of war in the Middle East, Germans want change and want to see Germany driving change. Thanks to our partner, the Pew Research Center, we know that Germans and Americans have trusted each other to make a change in international politics over the past four years. But our new figures, conducted after the US election, show that this partnership may be threatened: 79 per cent of Germans think President Donald Trump will damage transatlantic relations. But only 35 per cent of Germans think that Germany should step in to lead the West. It is time to decide, Germany. What kind of international player do we want to be, in which areas do we want to go all in? The following pages can help us make difficult decisions in difficult times.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Taliban, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, India, Germany, and United States of America

100. WEER 2023 | Ukraine at War: Why did it happen, when will it end? (Full Issue)

Author:
Henryk Litwin, Yevgeniya Gaber, Mykola Riabchuk, Ola Hnatiuk, and Aliaksei Kazharski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
From June 28th to June 30th, 2023, the nineteenth Warsaw East European Conference “Ukraine at War” took place. It was attended by a diverse group of scholars from Belarus, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, the United States, Finland, and Estonia. The conference opened with an inaugural lecture titled “Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters?” delivered by Professor Marius Janukonis, Director of the Strategic Management and Analysis Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. The closing presentation, titled “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Where Are We Now and What Next?”, was prepared by Professor Yevgeniya Gaber from Ukraine, representing the Atlantic Council in Turkey. The highlight of the conference was three round table discussions. On the first day, Professor David Sacko moderated a discussion on “Ukraine at War. Security in the Region.” On the second day, there was an exchange of views on “Rebuilding Ukraine. Key Challenges for the War and Post-War Period,” led by Dr. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz. Finally, on the closing day of WEEC, Professor Mykola Riabchuk chaired a round table titled “The Toxic Spell of ‘Imperial Knowledge’ and Challenges of Decolonization.” Throughout the event, there were 13 panel discussions during which 41 papers were presented. The titles of the panels reflect the breadth of thematic discussions during the conference, listed in the order they occurred: 1. Around Ukraine. Post-Soviet Space Before and During the War 2. Challenges and Diagnoses of the Future 3. Consequences of the War 4. Public Diplomacy 5. Russia towards the War 6. Ukraine – Sources of Resistance 7. Ukraine and Security Problems in the Continental Dimension 8. Ukraine in the Eyes of Russia. Ukraine in the Eyes of Europe 9. War Migrants 10. Belarusian Memory Policy. Report on “European Network for Belarus” project 11. Migration from Post-Soviet countries in Poland: trends, challenges, and prospects 12. War Narratives in the Media. Unfortunately, only a portion of the conference participants submitted their article texts to the organizers based on their presentations. Therefore, only partial materials from WEEC 2023 are published here. Readers will find the concluding lecture by Prof. Yevgeniya Gaber and a report on the round table discussions “The Toxic Spell of ‘Imperial Knowledge’ and Challenges of Decolonization,” comprising texts from the participants, containing the main theses of their presentations. Additionally, 10 articles from panel participants are included. While this compilation may not provide a comprehensive account of the conference, it serves as evidence of its thematic diversity and provides a glimpse into this significant event for Eastern European studies.
Topic:
History, Geopolitics, Colonialism, Ideology, Decolonization, Totalitarianism, Vladimir Putin, Armed Conflict, Identity, Soviet Union, Public Diplomacy, Forced Migration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Eastern Europe