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32. Iran and the P5+1: Getting to "Yes"
- Publication Date:
- 08-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- That nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, U.S. and Germany) were extended beyond the 20 July 2014 deadline was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. The parties ha d made enough headway to justify the extension, which was envisioned in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that was signed in November 2013 and came into force in January, but given the political and technical complexity, they remain far apart on fundamental issues. Unless they learn the lessons of the last six months and change their approach for the next four, they will lose the opportunity for a resolution not just by the new 24 November deadline but for the foreseeable future. Both sides need to retreat from maximalist positions, particularly on Iran's enrichment program. Tehran should postpone plans for industrial- scale enrichment and accept greater constraints on the number of its centrifuges in return for P5+1 flexibility on the qualitative growth of its enrichment capacity through research and development.
- Topic:
- Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, and France
33. TSG IntelBrief: Economic Drivers of an Iran Nuclear Deal
- Publication Date:
- 11-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Soufan Group
- Abstract:
- There are clear and compelling economic imperatives for Iran to accept a nuclear agreement with the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) by a November 24 deadline. The Iranian public has chafed under comprehensive sanctions since 2010 and expect President Hassan Rouhani to deliver a nuclear agreement that enables the economy to recover and grow. U.S. and other P5+1 officials stress the economic opportunities for Iran that will result, including the eventual re-opening of Iran's oil and gas sector to foreign investment. Major international firms are poised to re-enter the Iranian market in the event of a nuclear deal, although firms will initially be cautious due to lingering uncertainty.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Middle East
34. Assessing a Deal or Non-deal with Iran: The Critical Issue of Iran's Progress in Weapons Research, Development, and Production Capability.
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 11-2014
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- It now seems unlikely that the P5+1 countries of the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany can reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran by the end of November. A final agreement remains a possibility, but it seems far more likely that if an agreement is not reached, the negotiations will be extended rather than abandoned all together. The question then arises as to how to judge the outcome of this set of negotiations, be it an actual agreement, an extension, or the collapse of the negotiations.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, France, and Germany
35. US and Russia Can End Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium for Medical Uses
- Author:
- Miles A. Pomper
- Publication Date:
- 02-2014
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- A new report co-authored by CNS Senior Research Associate Miles Pomper recommends steps for the United States and Russia to cooperate in ending Russian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in medical isotope production, an important step in keeping this nuclear weapons material from terrorists. Great progress has been achieved in recent years in minimizing civilian use of HEU as part of the international efforts to reduce the nuclear terrorism threat. In particular, the leading global suppliers of the molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) isotope, which is widely used in medical diagnostics, are taking steps to reduce and, in the medium time frame, completely eliminate the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Major new steps towards phasing out HEU use in medical isotopes production could be announced at the Nuclear Security Summit that will take place in The Hague on March 24-25, 2014. The Russian nuclear industry has set for itself an ambitious goal of becoming one of the three top global suppliers of Mo-99, used in 80 per cent of the medical procedures involving isotopes particularly as a diagnostic tool. Growing Russian production could help stabilize the global Mo-99 market, which faced severe shortages on several occasions in 2005-2013. According to some estimates, in 2010 during a six month period medical facilities around the world were unable to perform diagnostic procedures for several million people due to the shortage of Mo-99; the shortfall was estimated at 7 million doses. However, until recently, Russia had been bucking global trends by planning to use HEU fuels and targets rather than safer low enriched uranium (LEU) for much of this production. The ‘Ending HEU Use in Medical Isotope Production: Options for Russian-US Cooperation’ report co-authored by the Moscow-based Center for Energy for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) analyses what can be done by Moscow and Washington to harmonize the Russian producers’ plans to win a share of the global market, while at the same time facilitating the Russian nuclear industry’s transition to new market requirements for producing Mo-99 without HEU.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Medicine
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
36. Options for Canada's Future in Euro-Atlantic Organizations (2013-2030)
- Author:
- Frédéric Mérand, Nicola Contessi, Jérémie Cornut, and Dominika Kunertova
- Publication Date:
- 03-2013
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Over the next 20 years, the empowerment of individuals and new information and communication technology will reverberate in the security field with implications such as the growth of cyber-terrorism and the spread of nuclear technology to non-state actors. Power will be diffused among states and from states to informal networks, leading to a less Western-centric globalization. Demographic patterns and a growing demand for resources will have adverse consequences on defence spending and energy security. Among Euro-Atlantic states, there is broad agreement on the nature of future threats: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, regional conflicts, and cyber attacks. Russia is alone in identifying a Europe-specific phenomenon, the expansion of NATO to the East, as one of the main external military threats to its national security. While no major new conflict is predicted to arise in the Euro-Atlantic area, there will be no shortage of crises originating from outside this area, especially in the Middle East and in North Africa, requiring a response from Euro-Atlantic organizations. In the Euro-Atlantic area, it is expected that Russia will reclaim its traditional sphere of influence by intensifying efforts to strengthen regional organizations, sometimes in cooperation with China or smaller states. The Arctic may become one of the new geostrategic hotspots. A relatively cohesive club, NATO remains the most successful military alliance in contemporary history. As an inclusive, regional, and crosscutting organization, the OSCE is less central to key Canadian interests, but it provides a fairly low-cost means to establish a diplomatic foothold and contribute to building a security community in Eurasia. While NATO and the OSCE are expected to remain the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic order, one important question that underlies this report is why Euro-Atlantic-based organizations are necessary to deal with global risks. NATO's civil-military focus is likely to become more central as future multinational interventions place increasing demands on NATO capabilities. Predictions for the OSCE are more difficult to make given its protracted impasse, but the need for confidence building among disagreeing powers remains present. While Canada should not reconsider its membership in these organizations, it should support planned reforms and initiatives that will make them more relevant. Both NATO and the OSCE are moving in the right directions by taking seriously transnational, including cyber-threats. Applying lessons learned, they are likely to continue to improve coordination of civilian and military capabilities to address new risks. Energy security is also likely to move up the agenda of both organizations. To address the shift in global power, and in particular the renewed assurance of Russia, the OSCE must renew its original focus on confidence building, including through multi-track initiatives. Eschewing enlargement for the time being, NATO would be well-advised to nurture its relationship both with Russia and with new partners through political and technical cooperation. In times of austerity, both organizations will have to do more with less. Administrative reforms such as results-based management should be encouraged. At NATO, Smart Defence provides interesting opportunities for Canada to streamline defence procurement and optimize capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, and North Africa
37. Russia Still Matters: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration
- Author:
- John W. Parker and Michael Kofman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2013
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- Russia's institution of a ban on American adoptions of Russian orphans, an appalling response by the Duma to U.S. sanctions against officials involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case,1 was a clear indicator that bilateral relations will assume a lower priority in the next 4 years for both capitals. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the measure despite open misgivings by some of his own key aides and against the opposition of most of Russia's civil society. The Russian Internet response was scathing, producing an instant winner for best sick joke of 2012: “An educated American family has decided to adopt a developmentally disabled Duma deputy.”.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Middle East
38. ABM Defense Prospects of a New Russia-us 'Reset'
- Author:
- Yury Fedorov
- Publication Date:
- 10-2013
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute of International Relations Prague
- Abstract:
- The Obama administration recently suggested concluding a legally binding agreement on transparency that would confirm that American BMD does not pose a threat to Russia's deterrence forces, and also concluding a framework agreement on further cutting Russian and American nuclear arsenals. The USA may be interested in reducing the tensions with Russia over the missile defense with a view to break the deadlock on a wide complex of hard security and proliferation issues, including the hot problems of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and Iran and the North Korean nuclear programs, and also to ensure Russia's support in managing regional crises – these days, especially that in Syria.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, North Korea, and Syria
39. The Most Dangerous Country on Earth
- Author:
- Joseph Cirincione
- Publication Date:
- 11-2013
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In any given week, there is significant competition for the title of “most dangerous country in the world.” Some may believe it is Syria or Mali, Iran or North Korea, China or Russia, or dozens of others. As tragic as conditions may be in these countries, as potentially harmful as their policies may seem, no state truly comes close to the multiple dangers inherent in Pakistan today. Trends in this nation may converge to form one or more nuclear nightmares that could spread well beyond the region to threaten international security and the lives of millions. Experts estimate that Pakistan has between 90-110 nuclear weapons and enough fissile material to produce 100 more. It has an unstable government, a fragile economy, strong extremist influences in its military and intelligence structures, and Al Qaeda, as well as half a dozen similar terrorist groups operating inside the country. The confluence of these factors not only increases the potential for a nuclear escalation between Pakistan and its regional rival, India, but perhaps the even more terrifying scenario that a terrorist group will acquire fissile material, or an intact weapon, from Pakistan's burgeoning stockpiles. Both of these risks are unacceptable. The United States can and must take concrete steps to reduce the risks posed by Pakistan's unique combination of instability, extremism, and nuclear weapons…
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and Syria
40. The future of the CWC in the post-destruction phase
- Author:
- Jean Pascal Zanders, Richard Guthrie, Cindy Vestergaard, Ralf Trapp, and Yasemin Balci
- Publication Date:
- 03-2013
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- At the 17 th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) held in November 2012, the subject generating the most debate concerned the place of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in CWC meetings and whether their role should be rather passive (i.e. 'attend') or be characterised by more active involvement (i.e. 'participate'). The latter option would allow them to address States Parties at meetings or organise side events within (rather than outside) the conference building. Addressing one of the core functions of the disarmament treaty, Libya, Russia and the United States reported in detail on progress and issues affecting the destruction of their respective chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles. Despite the fact that all three countries had missed the ultimate destruction deadline of April 2012, no state raised its flag to comment, question or protest about the delays. When the negotiators of the CWC concluded their business in September 1992 and decided to forward the treaty text to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) for assent, missing the destruction deadlines was universally viewed as one of the worst possible breaches of the CWC. In practice, a robust verification regime combined with permanent in - formation sharing, voluntary transparency beyond the requirements in the Convention, and dialogue over the years yielded commonly approved decisions to extend the destruction deadlines with strict monitoring and reporting requirements. Confident that the holders of the three largest declared CW stockpiles have no malicious intent, States Parties can continue with the implementation of all dimensions of the CWC without recriminations or deadlock.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, International Organization, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and Libya