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102. A Russian View on Landpower
- Author:
- Keir Giles and Major General Aleksandr V Rogovoy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on the Russian military as a potential cause for concern in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong conventional land forces, and how they may be used. With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the Paper presents a valuable insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially critical juncture for European security.
- Topic:
- Security, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea
103. Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock
- Author:
- Stefan Forss and Col. (Ret) Pekka Holopainen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- The Nordic states, just as other regions of Europe which neighbor Russia, are engaged in an urgent reexamination of their security and defense posture. Events in Ukraine in early-2014 threw into sharp focus a local lack of capability following decades of drawdowns and focus on crisis management operations instead of territorial defense. After an unpleasant awakening, countries in the region have turned their attention to the heightened security risks they face and their lack of preparedness for them.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia
104. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012)
- Author:
- Richard Rousseau
- Publication Date:
- 04-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
- Abstract:
- Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag). Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally. During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player. The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007. Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia. Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union
105. Why “no-fly zones” or “IS-free zones” are not a solution in Syria
- Author:
- Hrair Balian
- Publication Date:
- 08-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
- Abstract:
- There is a renewed push to establish “no-fly” and “IS-free” zones in Syria. An external military intervention to establish such zones, even with the good intention of protecting civilians, is likely to precipitate more chaotic fighting and further harm civilians. Instead, the international community should build a minimum consensus among the “Friends of Syria”, Russia, and Iran to accommodate the interests and concerns of Syria’s external stakeholders, and reconcile the existential fears of various communities and regime supporters in Syria with the aspirations of the country’s majority Sunni population. Once these fundamental issues are addressed, a political solution to the Syrian crisis will become possible.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Civil War, Military Strategy, and Air Force
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria
106. Russia’s policy in the Middle East imperilled by the Syrian intervention
- Author:
- Pavel K. Baev
- Publication Date:
- 11-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
- Abstract:
- The military intervention launched by Russia in Syria in September 2015 has altered the character of this protracted civil war and – quite remarkably – has both advanced and jeopardised Russia’s positions in the Middle East. This risky experiment in power projection constitutes a continuation of traditional Russian policy in this rapidly transforming region, but is also a departure from the strategy of careful manoeuvring aimed at exploiting the confusion in U.S. and European policies. Quite possibly the main drivers for this proactive move were either domestic factors or issues related to the confrontation with the West caused by Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The present analysis, however, deals only with the Middle Eastern contexts, aims and consequences of this enterprise.
- Topic:
- Civil War, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria
107. Russia's Arctic: A Necessary Space for Dialogue
- Author:
- Andrew Yerkes
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- Over the weekend of November 21st, 2015, Russia flew 141 sorties over Syria, hitting 472 targets in eight different provinces throughout the country.[1] While the deployment of the Russian Air Force over Syria has been in full affect since last September, the events of November 20th proved to be unique. Two of the TU-160 blackjack bombers that participated in the weekend’s campaign took flight not from a base in southern Russia, but rather from Olenegorsk Airbase on the Kola Peninsula of the Russian Arctic.[2] The two bombers traveled southwest along the coast of Norway, skirting United Kingdom airspace, turning east through the straits of Gibraltar, and achieved their goal of firing cruise missiles on Syria from the eastern Mediterranean. After their mission was complete, they flew northeast over Iran and the Caspian Sea to their home base in Engles, Saratov Oblast, in Southern Russia.[3] In total, the flight lasted 16 hours, with the aircraft traveling 8,000 miles, while motivating Norway[4] and Britain,[5] among other nations, to scramble fighter jets in the process. Presumably, the Russians chose such a circuitous route along the edges of Europe to demonstrate its long range bombing capabilities. In doing so, the Russian Federation also showed the rest of the world that its capabilities might rival those of the United States, proving that Russia too could attack targets all throughout the world. This use of an Arctic airbase for active bombing missions also marks a turning point in history; not even during the Cold War did the Russians demonstrate Arctic-based military capabilities with such expansive reach.[6] While this mission did not focus on targets within the Arctic, the use of an Arctic base for active bombing missions draws attention to Russia’s military buildup in the region...
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Syria, Arctic, and United States of America
108. Expanding Nuclear Weapons State Transparency to Strengthen Nonproliferation
- Author:
- Jonas Siegel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- In the years since the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT nuclear weapons states have engaged in consequential transparency measures about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. The level of transparency thus far achieved, however, has proven uneven in terms of the types and amounts of information released and in terms of the frequency of those releases—and most importantly, has not contributed significantly to fulfillment of these states NPT commitments. Nuclear weapons states should reassess the scope of their transparency efforts to date and consider expanding the types of information that they reveal to provide international assurances and achieve gains in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper identifies particular steps that these states could take to fulfill the desire for greater transparency that move beyond declarations of the number and status of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In particular, it focuses on how transparency can be expanded about the operational practices and protocols that govern the day-to-day management of their military nuclear materials—their warheads, weapons components, and material stockpiles—and how transparency in this area would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, and France
109. Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine
- Author:
- David Matsaberidze
- Publication Date:
- 03-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Connections
- Institution:
- Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
- Abstract:
- This paper aims to analyze the construction and transformation of the post-Soviet security perspectives of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the “near abroad,” quite often termed the “legitimate sphere” of Russian influence by high-ranking Russian officials. This inquiry covers the panorama of the foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia across the FSU, from the early 1990s through to the present, where Georgia and Ukraine’s independent and pro-Western orientation are the main issues securitized for the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the maintenance of territorial integrity has become a security priority for Georgia since the early 1990s and will most likely be Ukraine’s top concern after the Crimean occupation by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and the subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it could be claimed that post-Soviet Russian and Georgian/Ukrainian security strategy (following peaceful revolutions) represent a zero-sum game.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia
110. Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine Crisis: Treading a Fine Line?
- Author:
- Emilbek Dzhuraev
- Publication Date:
- 09-2015
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Connections
- Institution:
- Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
- Abstract:
- For over a year now, the crisis in and over Ukraine has been a stable fixture among the top issues of concern and deliberation internationally. The subject has become a point of polarized debate, with most contributions favoring one side or the other between the collective “West” and Russia. Similar to most trending debates, especially those as divided as this, the discussion has tended to simplify the issue by lumping everything into singular categories, be they “Russian imperialism,” “American conspiracy,” “Ukrainian fascism,” or “the new Cold War.” However, the matter is far more complex. This essay offers a mostly non-aligned analytical overview of the positions of five Central Asian countries on the subject. What these countries’ stances elicit is the complexity of the problem and the many-sided effects and challenges the involved and surrounding parties need to face, where it is far from obvious why a country takes this or that stance, or—even more tellingly—why it appears to vacillate. From such an overview, a number of more general conceptual rewards can be derived.
- Topic:
- Imperialism, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia