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11. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons from the Western Balkans

Author:
Tefta Kelmendi
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a new momentum for the European Union to review its political and security strategy for the neighborhood. Its enlargement policy – which has become yet another divisive issue in Europe over the past years – is now forced back into the EU’s foreign policy priorities. With Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova officially requesting membership in the EU, deciding how to go about it has become an even greater challenge. Over the past 20 years, we have evidenced a failure of the EU to show results in the Western Balkans – both in terms of driving democratic reforms and the rule of law, as well as in delivering on its promises in the accession process. The war in Ukraine might be the EU’s last chance to reinvigorate its enlargement policy and reposition itself geopolitically in eastern and southeastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

13. War, Peace, and (in)Justice in the Nuclear Age

Author:
Ulrich Kűhn
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has created a watershed moment for Europe. The coming weeks and months will decide what kind of peace and security order will shape the old continent. The prominence of nuclear weapons will likely increase in the years ahead. Mutual deterrence between NATO and Russia will be the military component to what may soon turn out to be a new Cold War dividing Europe. While this is already bad news news, Ukraine’s fate has again exposed the system of nuclear deterrence as highly unjust and precarious. The consequences of that sorry state of affairs might soon create additional injustices on a global scale. A realistic view must come to the conclusion that we do not have the time to fight another Cold War
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. Energy and Geo-Economics: Evidence Underpinning Russian Intervention in Syria

Author:
Nada El Abdi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. The interests in Syria are numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. We argue that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, to curb extremist proliferation, and to take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political and economic power in the Middle East.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

15. A Decade of War in Syria: Current Situation and Possible Outcomes/Una Década de Guerra en Siria: Situación Actual y Posibles Desenlaces

Author:
Andrea Cocchini
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This year 2021 marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the armed conflict in Syria which, triggered by graffiti against the government of the al-Assad family, turned into a civil war with at least 390,000 dead, involving numerous States in the Middle East, as well as the major global powers, with their own specific geopolitical interests. This article therefore aims to provide an account of the current situation in Syria and the objectives that these powers still have in this country. Once the two main reasons for intervening in the conflict disappeared, the true nature of this war came to the surface, embedded in the broader contests of historical rivalry between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran on the other. Apparently, none of them really wants to end it, without compensation. / En este año 2021 se cumplen diez años del comienzo del conflicto armado en Siria que, desencadenado por unos grafitis en contra del gobierno guiado con mano autoritaria por la familia al-Assad, se ha convertido en una guerra con, al menos, 390.000 muertos, que ha acabado involucrando a numerosos Estados de Oriente Próximo, así como a grandes potencias, cada una portadora de intereses geopolíticos concretos. El presente artículo pretende dar cuenta de la situación actual de Siria y, en particular, de los objetivos particulares que mantienen en el país diversos actores. Después de que desaparecieran las dos razones principales esgrimidas para intervenir en el conflicto, quedó de manifiesto su auténtica naturaleza de guerra subsidiaria y sectaria, que se inserta en las más amplias contiendas entre rivales históricos como los Estados Unidos y Rusia, por una parte, y Arabia Saudí, Turquía e Irán, por otra, y que ninguno entre ellos parece tener interés en acabar sin recibir compensaciones.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Proxy War, Operation Inherent Resolve, and Euphrates Shield
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and United States of America

16. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

17. Georgian Ethnopolitical Conflicts as a Subject of Confrontation between the USA and Russia

Author:
Ekaterine Lomia and Loid Karchava
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Since 2009 Russia has increased its military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pursued the policy of ‘creeping annexation in the occupied territories of Georgia. Today, 20% of Georgian territories are occupied by the Russian Federation. The Russian-baked separatists continuously erect barbed-wire border posts in one of the occupied regions of Georgia-South Ossetia and detain Georgian people, under the pretext of ‘illegally crossing the border’. Fundamental rights of the local population are violated daily since the occupants install barbers through people’s houses, gardens, and cultivated lands. Innocent citizens are forced to leave their homes, belongings, and cultivated lands that are left beyond the occupants’ demarcation line. The paper argues that along with other global challenges of the world, the USA-Russia clashes of interests are also found with the Georgian conflicts. While Washington hugely supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and welcomes its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Russian Federation, on the contrary, prevents the aforementioned process and directly opposes Georgia’s integration into NATO. The USA condemns Russia’s creeping annexation of Georgian territories and continuously calls on Russia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country. Furthermore, the USA-Russia relations have considerably deteriorated following Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Self Determination, Military Intervention, Conflict, Borders, and Territory
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Georgia, North America, and United States of America

18. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

19. Russian Aerial Operations

Author:
Anton Lavrov
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Before the start of the military intervention in Syria in 2015, even top Russian generals were uncertain what the result would be. Shortly before the start of the intervention, the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) received hundreds of new airplanes and helicopters and new “smart” precision weapons. Almost all of them had never been tested in real combat. The pilots and commanders also did not have combat experience and were trained by textbooks filled with outdated concepts and tactics. The five years of war in Syria have been the most intense period of transformation for the RuAF since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Russian military not only gained an unprecedented amount of experience, but also made substantial improvements in tactics and strategy.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

20. The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria

Author:
Charles Bartles and Lester Grau
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Syrian Civil War produces a new set of problems involving extended urban combat, intense fights for key resources (oil fields, water, and lines of communication and supply), conventional combat among irregular units, ethnic and religious cleansing, a large number of foreign combatants with varying motivations, and contending outside powers fighting a proxy engagement. The Russian Federation is not an expeditionary power, and its entry into Syria on the side of the regime has strained its logistical resources. From the beginning of the Syrian campaign, it was clear that Russian involvement was initially envisaged to be through the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). Although the Syrian government was on the verge of collapse, and the Syrian military was on its hind legs and a shell of its former self, there was a sufficient number of Syrian ground units that were mission capable. With this understanding, the VKS was to be the principal supplier of Russian combat power aimed at disruption of the command and control and leadership of the groups fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime through the provision of reconnaissance and target destruction. In particular, Russia’s priority was the destruction of the Western-backed, moderate opposition groups, since it saw these as the greatest immediate threat to Assad. The Islamic State (ISIS) and other Sunni extremist groups were targeted, but sat lower on Russia’s priority list. As with other such operations, «mission creep” soon resulted in Russia’s involvement quickly expanding past the provision of aerospace support to planning, and, in some cases, conducting ground operations. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, confirmed this expansion of Russian involvement in a December 2017 interview. Russia’s ground-based contingent in the Syrian campaign involves a diverse set of forces and capabilities. Some of the key features of this expanded ground force mission included a Russian model of military advisors, integrated and modernized fires, mobility and countermobility operations, a featured role for military police, use of coastal defense, spetznaz, and private military company (PMC) forces. Russian ground forces have benefitted from the opportunity to provide combat experience to a large number of professional soldiers, conduct battlefield testing of new systems and observe the impact of different terrain on tactics. The forces opposing the Syrian government provide a different opponent than the “enemy” encountered in normal Russian peacetime training and much of the “Syrian experience” is discussed and dissected in Russian professional military journals.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria