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491. Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine

Author:
David Matsaberidze
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze the construction and transformation of the post-Soviet security perspectives of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the “near abroad,” quite often termed the “legitimate sphere” of Russian influence by high-ranking Russian officials. This inquiry covers the panorama of the foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia across the FSU, from the early 1990s through to the present, where Georgia and Ukraine’s independent and pro-Western orientation are the main issues securitized for the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the maintenance of territorial integrity has become a security priority for Georgia since the early 1990s and will most likely be Ukraine’s top concern after the Crimean occupation by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and the subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it could be claimed that post-Soviet Russian and Georgian/Ukrainian security strategy (following peaceful revolutions) represent a zero-sum game.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

492. Power Games in the Caucuses, Azerbaijan's Foreign and Energy Policy towards the West, Russia and the Middle East

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Central European University Political Science Journal
Institution:
Central European University
Abstract:
Nazrin Mehdiyeva's work is elegantly argued and timely volume on small states and energy politics; however, in looking to contribute to both of these literatures, she opens up questionable points in her book. Her main aim was to understand the conditions that allowed Azerbaijan to pursue an autonomous foreign policy after the Cold War while focusing on energy's role in the context of global energy insecurity. Mehdiyeva's structure relies on a simple and clear deductive narrative. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on small state literature and its application in Azerbaijan's institutional context; 4 focuses on Russia, the main 'antagonist' in the narrative, and 5 on the Caspian sea issue; while 6 and 7 deal with alternative allies in the form of Turkey and the United States. The last chapter concludes with the author's projection of future foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

493. Russia as Opportunist or Spoiler in the Middle East?

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The severe and fast-evolving Ukraine crisis has required a great concentration of Russia’s political efforts and is having a massive impact on Russian policymaking, including in the Middle East. This region provides the best opportunity for Moscow to reassert its status as a key player in the global arena, and the deep fall of oil prices makes Russia particularly attentive to regional conflict developments. One of the main motivations for Russia is the pronounced desire to demonstrate its capacity to thwart US policy, but another is to prove its value to China as a strategic partner. Russia’s reach remains limited but it will continue to look for opportunities to make a difference.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

494. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012)

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag). Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally. During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player. The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007. Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia. Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

495. Lessons from Russia and the Future of Sanctions

Author:
Peter Harrell
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
U.S. and European sanctions on Russia mark a significant evolution in the sanctions toolkit. Officials deployed novel types of financial and energy sanctions to create a regime that imposed significant costs on Russia while minimizing collateral impacts on the U.S. and European economies. The U.S. and European decision to create these new tools was driven by the need to take an innovative approach to sanctions against an economy twice the size of the combined gross domestic products (GDPs) of all other countries subject to significant U.S. economic sanctions and on Russian companies that play an important role in global markets. These developments, while tailored to Russia’s unique circumstances, hold important lessons for the future of sanctions policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia

496. Where the Lions Are: Gazprom's "Energetic Pliers" and Aspirations of a Eurasian Archipelago: The Geopolitics of Russia's Networked Energy Infrastructure

Author:
John Haines
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
In a recent essay, George Friedman wrote with admirable clarity about an intelligence truism that is at one and the same time elemental and frequently overlooked: “The entire principle of strategic intelligence is to ruthlessly discard the subcritical noise that is being collected in order to identify the center of gravity of events. A tiny hint may sometimes draw attention to a major process, particularly in military affairs. Finding that tiny hint, however, requires huge amounts of time and effort, and little time is left to understand the meaning. Moreover, in many cases, the process is in plain sight. The trick is to see it, and the even harder trick is to believe it.” With that charge, the objective of this essay is to look at Russia’s network of natural gas pipelines and ethnic enclaves in its near abroad in the interest of exploring whether and how the two intersect. The initial hypothesis is that ethnic separatism is instrumental to the former in two fundamental ways. First, these enclaves are located geographically along major energy pipeline routes, often at key junctures in pipeline networks. Second, they sit atop substantial shale gas reserves, the determined exploitation of which would decisively undercut Russia's natural gas oligopoly. They constitute specific, identifiable “spheres of privileged interests” in Russian foreign policy. The idea for this essay began with a conversation with a Moldovan diplomat about Transnistria, a separatist region of his country that has amassed a staggering debt—in excess of $5 billion—for the purchase of Russian natural gas. Russia's use of this debt to exert political pressure on Moldova is a story broadly understood.[4]
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Energy Policy, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Russia

497. Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia: Why geopolitics and domestic reforms are linked

Author:
Iryna Solonenko
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
This paper discusses Ukraine’s choice between maintain relations with the EU and Russia, a choice that is not merely a foreign policy choice or a choice between two integration models. Rather, it represents a choice between two normative orders or two different value systems. If Ukraine succeeds in pursuing the European model and breaking away from its tradition of a “captured state,” Russian leverage in Ukraine will also diminish. Therefore, undertaking this transformation is of crucial – if not existential – importance for Ukraine. The very survival of Ukraine’s statehood will depend on it.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

498. Prospects of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Author:
Hanna Pashkova
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The “hybrid” war of Russia against Ukraine has continued since February 2014. To date, the multiple efforts of international diplomacy, unfortunately, have not resulted either in settlement or even in a “freeze” of the situation in eastern Ukraine. The previous Minsk Agreements adopted in September 2014 (Minsk Protocol and Minsk Memorandum) were disrupted and Russian aggression in Donbas continued. On 12 February 2015, the presidents of Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia agreed on a new document, “Package of Measures for Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, which envisaged conflict settlement by the end of 2015. However, implementation of these measures was postponed to 2016 and, given the course of events, has actually become a process which is difficult to forecast and which is indefinite in time.1 It should be noted that on the one hand, the situation in eastern Ukraine has not undergone significant changes for the better – hostilities are ongoing. There are persistent fundamental differences in the positions of the two sides, Ukraine and Russia, on conflict resolution. (In particular, implementation of the Minsk Agreements in line with the Russian scenario threatens to destabilise the internal situation in Ukraine and destroy its statehood.) On the other hand, the international situation is rapidly changing; we see further escalation of international terrorism (the terrorist attacks in Paris), the “migration crisis” in the EU, Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and the gaining momentum of the acute conflict of Moscow and Ankara. This dulls the perception of events in Donbas on the part of the international community, renders these events a somewhat “background” nature in the West, and urges attempts to “freeze” the situation there at any cost, including at the expense of Ukraine’s own interests. Meanwhile, Russia proceeds with military expansion in Donbas, aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, and now there is no reason to expect a change for the better in the Kremlin’s policy. Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (which has a regional and global dimension) acquires a long-term nature with recurrent escalation and unpredictable consequences. Russian aggression – the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine – has entailed profound changes in bilateral relations: (а) the legal framework of Kyiv and Moscow relations has been destroyed; (b) institutional mechanisms of state-to-state relations have been destroyed; (c) contacts at the highest level have become impossible, political and diplomatic relations have become confrontational; (d) Ukraine has suffered huge human, economic, and territorial losses; (e) an unprecedented curtailment of economic cooperation has taken place; (f) deep alienation between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia has emerged. The previous official ideology of “strategic partnership”, “fraternal peoples”, and “neighbourliness”, embedded in many joint agreements, has lost its sense.2 A new political-ideological reality has emerged in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, a new assessment and review of the nature, ideology, and general institutional system of relations with Russia in key areas (politics, security, economy, energy, humanitarian sphere, etc.) is required, given that the main threat to Ukrainian statehood is the current government in place in the Russian Federation. There is a need to design a new conceptual model of coexistence with Putin’s Russia, which would reflect current realities and prospects of bilateral relations and would take into account the position of Western partner countries and international organisations. However, it is important to keep in mind at least two things. First, one should clearly distinguish the current Putin’s regime and the country of Russia as it is and its society. Second, in rebuffing Russian aggression, a strategic goal should be seen – to restore confidence and interest of the societies of both countries in peaceful coexistence and respect the right of each state to determine the state system in the country and its civilisation development vector.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

499. Zugzwang in slow motion? The implications of Russia’s system-level crisis

Author:
Veera Laine, Toivo Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi, and Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The upsurge in Russia’s foreign political and military activity should be understood and analysed as a reaction to several internal and external setbacks that the Russian system has suffered in recent years. As a response to these multiple challenges, the Russian leadership has switched on a crisis mode that legitimises exceptional measures in both foreign and domestic policy. Domestically, this mode has meant ‘internal mobilisation’: the creation of enemy images, assertive patriotism, growing isolationism, tighter control and more aggressive use of information resources. In the name of national unity, only the dominant version of patriotism is accepted while others are easily branded as ‘fifth column’ or ‘foreign agents’. While the internal mobilisation and portrayal of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’ seem to have improved the system’s resilience in the short term, the underlying systemic problems remain unresolved. Adding to the problem is the nature of the Russian system: instead of formal political institutions, it relies on unofficial networks of power that sustain and support the system but simultaneously limit its powers and restrict its capability to reform. As a result, the system is unable to solve the long-term structural problems it is facing. Not only is the Russian system in crisis, but more precisely, it uses and instrumentalises the crisis mode in order to legitimise and secure its power. As the system is currently unable to provide Russians with increasing standards of living, protecting them from an outside threat has become the system’s main source of legitimacy. Uncertainty and a crisis atmosphere are therefore not a phase Russia is going through but rather a more permanent feature that the regime needs in order to maintain its popularity and power. The political passiveness combined with the popular resonance of the isolationist discourse and the effective elimination of any viable alternatives to the regime indicate that the leadership will be able to hold on to its power for the time being. However, the systemic problems will remain unresolved and will gradually worsen. This dilemma is what this paper has dubbed ‘zugzwang in slow motion’.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Democracy, Leadership, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Russia

500. The “Rise” of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source of Threats or New Opportunities?

Author:
Anastasia Solmentseva
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
At the moment, the center of global economic and political gravity is rapidly shifting to the Asia-Pacific Region. This region possesses vast financial, resource-related, industrial and human potential. As the center of global development rapidly shifts to the East, Rus-sia regards the Asia-Pacific Region as the engine of the world economy, the key to which is a burgeoning China. In contemporary international relations the fast-moving rise of the PRC has become a crucial issue that concerns both Western and Russian political leaders, scholars and common citizens. The true intentions of the Chinese leadership as it pursues its foreign policy course remain quite nebulous and ambiguous. In various spheres and at a various levels of Russian society there are quite a few discussions and disputes about what, in fact, lies behind the global phenomenon of the “rise” of China, what consequences it entails for Russia, and how Moscow should organize its relations with Beijing.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Global Political Economy, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia