Search

Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Russia

111. Political Relations Between Turkey and Georgia in the Post-Soviet Era

Author:
Fatih Mehmet Sayin and Murat Doğan
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Georgia and Turkey have become important partners in the Caucasus region after the independence of Georgia in 1991. Two countries preferred to follow pro-West policies in their foreign policy against the Russian factor. They have geopolitical importance and geostrategic location for Russia throughout history. This article analyzes the foreign policies of Georgia and Turkey and examines the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline as a common foreign policy between them. The paper found out that this kind of project between Georgia and Turkey would make them important actors rising from the regional level to the global level in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, History, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Georgia, and Mediterranean

112. From Eastward Pivot to Greater Eurasia

Author:
S. Karaganov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The current stage of russia’s pivot to the east is the product of the second half of the 2000s largely as a belated economic response to the rise of asia, which opened new opportunities for the country’s devel- opment, especially for it eastern part. That rise made it possible to turn the ural region and the russian Far east from a mainly imperial burden – or a logistics base in confrontation with the West, sometimes a front line in rivalry with Japan or china – into a potential territory of develop- ment for the entire country. The expediency of making the pivot was substantiated by the fore- casted imminent economic slowdown of its main traditional partner, europe, and the deterioration of relations with europe and the West as a whole. The need for the diversification of economic ties and outside sources of development was becoming increasingly obvious. These assessments were backed up by a number of pronounced trends in the recent decade. First, these are the disintegration and crisis of the global order that the West has been trying to impose on the world since what it saw as its final victory. second is the process of relative de- globalization and the regionalization of the global economy and politics. and the third is the accelerating trend – related to the previous one – toward the politicization of economic ties, which made interdependence and dependence on one market comparatively less beneficial, if not sim- ply dangerous. Finally, the “asia for asia” trend prevailed over the “asia for the world” trend. Development in asia, especially in china, began to be increasingly oriented toward domestic and regional markets. Meanwhile, the process of spiritual and ideological emancipation of the formerly great asian civilizations, which in the past two centuries had been in colonial or semi-colonial dependence on the West, began to gain momen- tum. asian countries gained access to many achievements of the West, took advantage of the liberal global economic order that it created, became stronger, and began to claim a more appropriate place for them- selves on the world’s ideological and strategic map. The inevitability of the u.s. moving away (at least temporarily) from the role of a global hegemon, which came with a hefty price tag, became evident. Barack Obama set a course for domestic revival. however, old elites and inertia did not allow him to abandon costly and ineffective interventionism. Donald Trump strengthened the “self-isolation” trend. The u.s. has turned into a dangerous amalgam of residual intervention- ism and semi-isolationism. It is becoming increasingly evident that the u.s. seeks to create its own center, casting off some of its disadvanta- geous global commitments. a trend has evolved toward the formation of a hypothetically bipolar world through a multi-polar world with its inevitable chaos. One of its poles is based around the u.s. and the other is in eurasia. china seems to be its economic center, but the eurasian center will only materialize if Beijing does not claim the role of hegemon. however, whatever the case may be, it has turned out that once it has finally made a pivot to the east, russia has discovered many unexpected opportunities for itself.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Hegemony, Empire, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

113. Russia’s Position on Territorial Conflicts in East Asia

Author:
Dmitry Streltsov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
ruSSiA’S poSition on territorial and border conflicts in east Asia arouses great interest. Most of these conflicts have deep roots in and are consequences of the cold War, primarily stemming from legal gaps in the system of interstate borders that is based on the San Francisco peace treaty. these conflicts include disputes over the South Kuril islands (“northern territories”), the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, and the tokto (takeshima) islands. in addition, there are numerous conflicts in the South china Sea (disputes over territories including the paracel and Spratly islands) that have more complicated histories and go further back into the past, including the colonial era. russia is involved in only one of east Asia’s territorial disputes, one with Japan, and is just an observer in the rest of them. russia’s line on those conflicts is very important from the point of view of its political and economic interests, which are determined by its trade and investment relations with the countries that are parties to those disputes. Many of the most acute conflicts are sovereignty disputes over islands and sea borders. essentially, they are disputes over economic con- trol of vast water areas in the east china Sea and South china Sea, which are rich in mineral and biological resources and are part of key interna- tional maritime communication lines. For russia, however, those com- munications are not as important as they are, for example, for Japan or South Korea, or even for china. russia is more reliant on the transit facilities of its eastern ports. the latter are used in shipping along the northern Sea route and in trans- portation to and from china more than they are in handling cargo transportation between east Asia and europe along the southern route passing through the Strait of Malacca. it was no accident that russia focused on that southern route in setting the agenda for the Asia- pacific economic cooperation (Apec) summit in vladivostok in 2012. As an outside observer in east Asian territorial conflicts with none of its geographical or economic interests affected by them, russia takes a more neutral position on them than countries to which such conflicts pose a direct threat of armed confrontation. the russian position is also determined by the economic develop- ment priorities of Siberia and the russian Far east as set by its “eastward turn” doctrine. Strategically speaking, russia needs good and stable eco- nomic, and hence political, relations with all key countries involved in east Asian processes of integration, processes that encompass all east Asian countries except north Korea. however, practically all east Asian countries with which russia is determined to maintain trade and investment partnership, including china, Japan, South Korea, and key Southeast Asian states such as vietnam, are embroiled in territorial or border conflicts. obviously, by siding with one of the parties to any of these conflicts, russia would jeop- ardize its relations with the other. russia cannot afford to make friends with one country by estranging another. it needs, showing the utmost discretion and delicacy, to achieve a subtle balance in its relations with various actors and to seek at least a fragile regional status quo. neither can russia ignore the fact that, by joining ad hoc blocs or coalitions formed to deal with territorial conflicts, it would risk being drawn into a conflict that might grow into war any moment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

114. The Dispatch (Winter 2016)

Author:
David J. Bercuson, Frédérick Gagnon, Randolph Mank, Colin Robertson, Robert Huebert, Hugh Stephens, Gary Soroka, Hugh Segal, Daryl Copeland, David Perry, and Robert Muggah
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Dispatch (later called The Global Exchange) is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Winter 2016 issue includes articles on the election of Donald Trump, energy policy, Canadian defense capability, and more.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Energy Policy, Elections, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Canada, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

115. The Return of Geopolitics to Southeast Europe

Author:
Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
A few months ago, the newspapers in Southeast Europe reported extensively on an arms race in the region, sparked by Croatian attempts to acquire the US artillery system M270 MLRS and Serbia’s reaction to that event. Of�icials in Belgrade found the aforementioned move assertive and, by way of response, announced the procurement of Russian-made S-300 within the wider programme of rearming with Russian military equipment. Those who wanted to dig more deeply into trying to �ind evidence for a developing arms race cited the fact that Serbia, on the occasion of the visit of Russian President Putin, had organised a military parade to commemorate the liberation of Belgrade from Nazi occupation. That was followed by Croatia’s military parade on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the military-police operation ‘Storm’. The display of military strength, they concluded, was another sign of growing military rivalry between the two states which had the capacity to dramatically destabilise the fragile peace in the region. Those with more detailed knowledge of the region remind us that neither Croatia nor Serbia - especially the latter - had the political, economic or human capacity to engage in a military con�lict, especially given the existing international presence and strategic set-up in the region. Numerous experts rightfully pointed to the prevailing low level of cross-border political dialogue and the fact that political elites in the region had frequently used populist rhetoric to fuel the support of their electorate, focusing less on the real substance of the dispute with the neighbour. Lastly, but certainly not of least importance, was the fact that, both countries, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, had taken on international obligations to safeguard a stable military balance, thus preventing any potential escalations and destabilisation in the region. The so-called 1996 Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, derived from Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, set the basic framework for negotiations on the limitation of arms. The Amendments to that agreement, signed at the 21st OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel (December 2014), imposed full responsibility on signatory states for regional stability and arms control.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Populism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

116. Russia’s Asia Pivot: Engaging the Russian Far East, China and Southeast Asia

Author:
Bhavna Dave
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
The Russia-ASEAN summit being held in Sochi on 19-20 May 2016 to mark twenty years of Russia’s dialogue partnership with ASEAN is a further indicator of President Vladimir Putin’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, triggered also by its current confrontation with the west. Through this pivot, Moscow wants to assert Russia’s geopolitical status as a Euro-Pacific as well as Asia- Pacific power. It is a pragmatic response to the shifting of global power to Asia. It also builds on the growing Russo-Chinese relations to develop the Russian Far East, a resource-rich but underdeveloped region into the gateway for expansion of Russia into the Asia Pacific. At the same time, the growing asymmetry in achieving the economic and strategic goals of Russia and China has resulted in fears that the Russian Far East will turn into a raw materials appendage of China. Moscow lacks the financial resources to support Putin’s Asia pivot. Therefore, Russia needs to strengthen ties with other Asia-Pacific countries and ASEAN as a regional grouping so as to attract more diversified trade and investments into its Far East region. It is in this context that the Sochi summit takes on added significance. However, given Russia’s sporadic interest in Southeast Asia and its strategic role defined mainly by the limited potential of Russian energy and arms exports to ASEAN Member States, the PR diplomacy and summitry at Sochi may not deliver substantive outcomes for Russia. Nonetheless, Moscow aims to enhance its status in the east and seek business and strategic opportunities through the summit thereby compensating to some extent Russia’s loss following the sanctions imposed by the west over the annexation of Crimea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

117. After The Jarabulus Offensive: How Far Will Turkey Shift Its Syria Policy?

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The July 15 attempted coup, which exposed rifts within the Turkish military, coupled with the August 9 meeting between Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian president Vladimir Putin, and the Turkish incursion into Syria on August 24, appear to signal a change in trajectory for Turkey’s Syria policy. Since Erdogan’s ouster of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in May 2015, Turkey has already implemented some significant foreign policy shifts, including normalization with Israel and a desire to mend ties with Russia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Civil War, Peace Studies, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Syria

118. NEIGHBOURING AN UNPREDICTABLE RUSSIA Implications for Finland

Author:
Toivo Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi, and Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia has perceived itself as a great power and has sought international acknowledgement of its status for years. The fact that Moscow regards the post-Soviet space as its sphere of ‘privileged interests’ and the sovereignty of the other post-Soviet states as subordinate to Russia’s national interests is nothing new. Likewise, Russia has persistently objected to the dominant role played by the US in world politics, and the enlargement of NATO. It has attempted to influence the security policy orientation and political choices made by post-Soviet states, and other states neighbouring Russia, such as Finland. These goals are well-established and are likely to remain fundamentally un- changed for years to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia and Finland

119. The Eastern Question: Russia, the West and Europe’s Grey Zone

Author:
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
Russia under Vladimir Putin has become a revisionist power seeking to undo the post-Cold War settlement, control its neighborhood, and disrupt Western influence. By annexing the eastern Ukrainian region of Crimea and waging war in other parts of the country, the Kremlin seeks not only to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty but the European security order. The comfortable verities of the ''post-Cold War era'' are a paradigm lost. The Soviet succession continues to rumble, and a new era has begun - more fluid, more turbulent, more open-ended.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Grand Strategy, Conflict, and Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

120. The Ukraine-Russia Crisis and U.S. Policy

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Clarke Forum for Contemporary Issues
Abstract:
Steven Pifer will address how the crisis between Ukraine and Russia has developed, what it means for the West and the U.S. policy response.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America