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22. There is No Easy Solution To The Western Balkans' Disinformation Challenge
- Author:
- Daniel Sunter
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- The Western Balkan countries are currently among the most vulnerable to an intentional, Kremlin-supported campaign of disinformation within the European region. The vulnerability of the Western Balkans is exacerbated for several reasons: the countries are not completely integrated into European and EuroAtlantic structures; they harbor the legacy of ethnic and religious tensions from the conflicts of the 1990s; the region continues to experience dysfunctions within its information space; and it is plagued by the unresolved Kosovo issue. Tackling a problem of this magnitude demands a comprehensive approach by governments and media associations supported by the international community
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Disinformation, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Balkans
23. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda
- Author:
- James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America
24. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next
- Author:
- Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America
25. Moscow’s Disinformation Offensive During COVID-19: The Case of Lithuania
- Author:
- Richard Weitz and Aurimas Lukas Pieciukaitis
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Russian media outlets have waged a comprehensive disinformation campaign throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Both the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) and the EU External Action Service (EEAS) have identified numerous stories in Kremlinlinked accounts that have sought to discredit the policies and performance of Western democracies, while conversely painting Russian actions in a most positive light. According to the GEC, throughout the pandemic, “the full Russian ecosystem of official state media, proxy news sites, and social media personas have been pushing multiple disinformation narratives.”
- Topic:
- Health Care Policy, Media, Repression, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Disinformation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Central Asia, and Lithuania
26. The Sino-Russian Disinformation Axis During the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Author:
- Richard Weitz
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- For the first time, the European Commission has identified the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with Russia and other actors, as responsible for conducting “targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, its neighborhood, and globally” (European Commission, June 10). In the past, PRC media management normally focused on censoring undesirable narratives at home while employing positive messaging to promote favorable images of China’s policies abroad. This contrasted with the more combative international approach traditionally adopted by Moscow. During the current COVID-19 crisis, however, PRC propaganda has followed the Russian practice of not only advancing positive reviews of its own actions, but also promoting negative messages about other states. The PRC and Russian foreign ministries have jointly complained that “certain [i.e., Western] countries, out of ideological bias and political needs, have been spreading disinformation, distorting history, attacking other countries’ social systems and development paths, politicizing the pandemic, pinning labels on the virus, and restrict[ing] and oppress[ing] foreign media for doing their job” (PRC Foreign Ministry, July 25). Their information departments have agreed to cooperate against the West’s media policies, including by executing joint digital media projects (Russian Foreign Ministry, July 24).
- Topic:
- Pandemic, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Health Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
27. Alternative Approaches to Information-Age Dilemmas Drive U.S. and Russian Arguments about Interference in Domestic Political Affairs
- Author:
- Pavel Sharikov
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- This paper investigates differences in Russian and American approaches to challenges of the information age, and explores some destabilizing effects on bilateral relations. The governments and societies in Russia and the United States base political and economic decisions about the development and use of information technology on different principles; in a globalized, interconnected world Russia’s collectivistic approach clashes with American individualistic approach. This exacerbates numerous problems in Russia-U.S. relations, including reciprocal allegations of information attacks as a form of interference in domestic affairs. Alternative approaches to information-age dilemmas make Russia and the United States particularly sensitive to different ways of using information technology to impact electoral processes and domestic politics, with little understanding of each other’s narratives and national priorities.
- Topic:
- Elections, Information Age, Disinformation, and Election Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
28. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives
- Author:
- Małgorzata Zawadzka
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equip- ment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia’s “soft underbelly”, territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO’s or the European Union’s presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the Au- gust war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow’s surprise international public opinion did not follow the Kremlin narration of the events’ course. Rus- sia lost the war on information and is unable to dispose of the occupant-aggressor image.
- Topic:
- Hegemony, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Georgia
29. Russian information offensive in the international relations
- Author:
- Ryszard Szpyra
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The information war is beginning to play a dominant role in international relations. It is important because it occurs intensively in peacetime and determines the results of international clashes. This article aims to identify offensive elements in Russian theoretical and doctrinal views on the role and content of the information offensive in international relations. To meet this aim, a comparative analysis of research studies, documents and official statements was carried out. The study sets out to investigate how Russia assesses the usefulness of the information offensive for conducting international policy. The study revealed that the information war and information warfare in modern conditions in the Russian scientific debate occupy a prominent place. Regardless of the declared defensive nature of the Russian information offensive, both the scientific and doctrinal views emphasise the value of the information offensive for conducting international policy. Russia takes the information offensive in international relations very seriously and treats it as one of the main forms of international confrontation. This has serious consequences for countries close to Russia as it creates a new threat to their national security in peacetime
- Topic:
- International Relations, National Security, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia
30. Disinformation from China and Russia during the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Author:
- Agnieszka Legucka and Marcin Przychodniak
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic has become another opportunity for China and Russia to conduct disinformation campaigns. Activities include overt and covert propaganda directed at the EU, NATO and the United States. Both countries are seeking to strengthen their international position, primarily in relations with the EU and the United States. The disinformation activities of Russia and China also result from the desire to disrupt European cooperation, which is a challenge for Poland.
- Topic:
- NATO, European Union, COVID-19, and Disinformation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Poland, and United States of America