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1. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

2. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume III, South Asian Perspectives

Author:
Peter Topychkanov, Sanatan Kulshrestha, Yanitra Kumaraguru, Malinda Meegoda, Kritika Roy, Saima Aman Sial, Dmitry Stefanovich, and Maaike Verbruggen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This edited volume is the third in a series of three. The series forms part of a SIPRI project that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in artificial intelligence could have on nuclear weapons and doctrines, as well as on strategic stability and nuclear risk. This volume assembles the perspectives of eight experts on South Asia on why and how machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. It further explores how the adoption of these technologies may have an impact on their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional levels.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, East Asia, and Global Focus

3. The Importance of Verification and Transparency in the Nuclear-Arms Control

Author:
Miroslav Tuma
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
Miroslav Tůma in his new Policy Paper titled "The Importance of Verification and Transparency in the Nuclear-Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Process" explained how monitoring and verification procedure associated with the nuclear-arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament process is nowadays important, especially in the sphere between US and Russia, which posses 90% of nuclear weapons all over the world. The author also analysed the development of the verification procedure in this field and its future curse. Should be the engagement of verification activity in a straight line with international law? What attitude should the Czech Republic take towards this problem in the near future?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

4. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

5. The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial, even happy, event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a “Declaration of Peace, Prosperity and Unification.” This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in “The Declaration” with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending “division and confrontation” on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task before them. Among the issues this review examines are the implications of various provisions in The Declaration for two great powers with long-standing interests in and influence on the Korean peninsula: China and the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

6. Bulgaria and Black Sea Security

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria aims to support NATO’s security objectives of increasing military spending, enhancing defence capacities and developing interoperability. Bulgaria contributes to NATO’s military activities in the Black Sea region and regularly hosts and participates in exercises with NATO partners. However, Bulgaria also tries to remain on good terms with Russia by way of bilateral economic and political cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Arms Trade, Disarmament, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Bulgaria, and Black Sea

7. Expanding Nuclear Weapons State Transparency to Strengthen Nonproliferation

Author:
Jonas Siegel
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In the years since the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT nuclear weapons states have engaged in consequential transparency measures about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. The level of transparency thus far achieved, however, has proven uneven in terms of the types and amounts of information released and in terms of the frequency of those releases—and most importantly, has not contributed significantly to fulfillment of these states NPT commitments. Nuclear weapons states should reassess the scope of their transparency efforts to date and consider expanding the types of information that they reveal to provide international assurances and achieve gains in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper identifies particular steps that these states could take to fulfill the desire for greater transparency that move beyond declarations of the number and status of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In particular, it focuses on how transparency can be expanded about the operational practices and protocols that govern the day-to-day management of their military nuclear materials—their warheads, weapons components, and material stockpiles—and how transparency in this area would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, and France