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51. Turkey's Role in the Russian-Ukrainian Negotiations

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on 29 March in Istanbul demonstrates that Turkey is assuming the role of an intermediary. Its policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is backed by the majority of the Turkish public, which gives President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more freedom to manoeuvre. Acting as an intermediary in the conflict may allow Turkey an opportunity to start improving the strained relations with the European Union and the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine

52. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

53. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

54. Dialogue for OSCE Renewal - Shifting Security Back to the People

Author:
Bradley Reynolds and Johanna Ketola
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The OSCE is the largest regional security organization globally, but a common understanding of the institution and the security it seeks to promote has been in decline since roughly 2008. The war in Ukraine and renewed Russian invasion in February 2022 have led many to ask how to sustain the OSCE past 2022. One of the conflicts at the core of the OSCE’s current and existing malaise is the question of what the OSCE of today symbolizes. Ahead of the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2025, we argue that better incorporation of the perspectives of civil society on the ground may help revive a genuinely comprehensive vision of the OSCE. This approach would allow for shifting away from compartmentalized security and open discussion for different perceptions or how to combine different perceptions of security
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Peace, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

55. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

56. Meeting Antarctica’s diplomatic challenges: Joint approaches for Australia and the United States

Author:
Evan T. Bloom
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report describes current security and environmental policy challenges related to Antarctica and proposes options for Australia and the United States to address them. It assesses the current and potential future actions of strategic competitors like China and Russia, and proposes policy responses. It suggests ways in which the US and Australian governments can work more closely to protect and promote the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), advancing support for an approach to governance that the two nations have felt for decades is in their respective national interests. This requires both countries (as well as others) to make a clear-eyed assessment of current and future fault lines and move more quickly to address political and environmental challenges that have implications well beyond Antarctica. In particular, this involves determining when it’s necessary to counter the ambitions of strategic competitors, such as China and Russia, in the Antarctic context, and when cooperation may be the more appropriate objective. The current Antarctic governance regime, while far from perfect... achieves a great deal that’s in the long-term national interests of Australia and the US. The ATS shouldn’t be dismissed as out of date; it can still be effective in addressing core regional concerns of both countries. Both countries can use their influence to insist on the implementation by all countries of ATS rules and can invoke those rules to fight for environmental protection and policies that support scientists. It’s unlikely that a more effective set of treaties could be negotiated today. Australia and the US should spend more time at both senior and working levels to coordinate positions and on outreach to other governments on Antarctic issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Antarctica

57. Don’t Leave the Russian People Behind

Author:
Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
When McDonald’s opened its restaurant on Moscow’s Pushkinskaya Square in 1990, a line of thousands of Russians eager to have a taste of the West snaked around several blocks. The company’s recent decision to suspend its operations in Russia is a sad symbol of the rapid deterioration of Russia’s links to the West caused by Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. As we watch the increasingly horrific spectacle of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians dying in a senseless war, it may be difficult to think also of the Russian people. Nevertheless, in our support for Ukraine’s fight against its aggressor, we should not overlook their plight. Putin undoubtedly has supporters at home even as he engages in a war proving disastrous for his own country, but even more Russians are victims of a ruthless and relentless dictatorship. In the short term, they are unavoidably suffering as the global community levies harsh sanctions against the Putin regime. In the longer term, that same community should be prepared to offer the Russian people a way back. As a public diplomacy officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the early 1990s, I saw how many Russians welcomed the prospect of living as people in much of the rest of the world. In those years, a diplomatic tit-for-tat barred Russian nationals from working inside the embassy. American officers consequently not only carried out normal diplomatic functions, but also cleaned offices and cars. One great benefit of the do-everything-yourself period was answering all the phones ourselves, as it put us in direct contact with scores of average Russians. In the public affairs offices, we fielded calls from artists, writers, broadcasters, and educators proposing joint ventures with American counterparts. These budding entrepreneurs had mastered the term “joint venture” but not always the modalities required for a successful business partnership. Sadly, many of these ventures never materialized, but the ideas and enthusiasm were everywhere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

58. Was NATO Expansion Really the Cause of Putin’s Invasion?

Author:
Ken Moskowitz
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
In March, 1999, while serving as the press attache at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, I hosted a full-day international conference to mark the 50 years since NATO was established. Speakers included the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council Volodymyr Horbulin, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, U.S. Principal Deputy to the Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States Ross Wilson, the chairman of the British parliamentary committee on national security, and Sergei Karaganov, a leading Russian expert on foreign policy and now a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin. One could argue that the goal of such a conference sponsored by the American Embassy was to promote NATO expansion, particularly to urge Ukraine to join the Western alliance. But that is not how I remember it. Typically, U.S. government public diplomacy like this does not bluntly advocate, but rather presents information or views that would be new to our local audiences. A more forceful NATO appeal for membership for eastern European countries, including Ukraine, emerged from the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

59. Remembering Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1991 Coup

Author:
Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Monday, August 19, 1991. The morning started like most of my days as a press officer at Embassy Moscow. I rose early, made coffee, and turned on the TV to check the news. The similarity of routine quickly vanished. Instead of the news, Soviet state TV was broadcasting the Swan Lake ballet, often a sign in the Soviet Union that something was amiss. Through the open window, I heard a strange, rumbling noise coming from the direction of the Ostankino TV tower, located just a few minutes from my apartment complex. I thought they might be having technical difficulties. Thirty-one years ago, there were no home computers or cell phones to help me unravel what was going on. I went to my car in the outside parking lot and started the half-hour drive south to the embassy. It was only then that I saw the Soviet military tanks, which rolled alongside the busy morning traffic past the embassy in central Moscow to their nearby destinations, including the “White House,” the Russian Parliament building, not far from the back of the embassy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Coup, Memoir, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America

60. Ukrainians to Putin’s Empire: Hell No!

Author:
Dick Virden
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Watching Ukrainians bravely risk life and limb for their country, I’m reminded of what I saw during assignments as a diplomat in Poland and Romania. For more than four decades after World War II, those countries—and the others of Eastern Europe—were governed mainly by Soviet puppets. I recall friends tapping their shoulders to mock the epaulettes of collaborators playing for the other side. These were oppressed lands then. Political rights were scant, and stagnant economies made regime claims of a socialist paradise transparent nonsense. The government had long since lost the respect of the governed, what Chinese call the mandate of the people. U.S. policy in those days was to try to keep hope alive by quietly encouraging those opposed to the communist regime and using the leverage we had to help them gain greater space to operate. For example, our diplomats sought to identify independent-minded leaders to include in our Fulbright, International Visitor, and other exchange programs. We chipped away at the regime’s information monopoly through short-wave radio, personal contact, and distribution of uncensored material such as bootleg copies of Newsweek. And we appeared at events like the annual opening of the academic year at the Catholic University of Lublin, then the only independent institution of higher learning in Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Memoir, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Soviet Union, and United States of America