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21. Maneuver and Manipulation: On the Military Strategy of Online Information Warfare

Author:
Tim Hwang How
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
How should the defense community best organize to combat modern campaigns of propaganda and disinformation? Without a broader strategic concept of the nature of the challenge posed by these techniques, current efforts and investments run the risk of simply chasing the latest tactics without establishing enduring security. This monograph offers a way forward, proposing a cohesive strategic framework for thinking about modern information warfare and its effective conduct.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

22. Grand Strategy is Attrition: The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict

Author:
Lukas Milevski
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. The Army Role in Achieving Deterrence in Cyberspace

Author:
Jeffrey L. Caton
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
publication cover In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the DoD Cyber Strategy which explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe. It is important for the U.S. Army to identify and plan for any unique roles that they may provide to these endeavors. This study explores the evolving concept of deterrence in cyberspace in three major areas: • First, the monograph addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature. • Second, it examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in cyberspace deterrence? This section provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts in cyberspace as well as in the broader context of strategic deterrence. The section also addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict. • Third, the monograph provides recommendations for changing or adapting the DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Non State Actors, Cybersecurity, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

24. What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Crimea

25. IFPA National Security Update 10: The Military Applications and Use of Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines artificial intelligence (AI),with a focus on its status, military applications, benefits, and shortcomings; competition with China and Russia to develop AI technologies; the Trump Administration’s AI Executive Order; and the need for the United States government to develop strategies and acquisition approaches to harness/leverage more effectively the AI innovations and applications being developed primarily in the U.S. commercial sector. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. IFPA National Security Update 7: The 2019 Missile Defense Review - Strengths and Weaknesses

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review (MDR) and subsequent budget requests, including the key findings of the MDR, a net assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, positive elements and shortcomings. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

27. NATO at 70: enter the technological age

Author:
Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary, it has re- turned nearly all the way to its original deterrence and defence roots. While it remains in the busi- ness of collective security and crisis management, for the past five years – since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – Article 5 tasks have come to dominate the agenda of the commanders, plan- ners and policy makers. As for the years ahead, the challenges come in three forms. The first is to finish the transition to common defence. 2019 is not 1949; the nature of the technologies that determine winners and los- ers has changed. And while NATO has adapted admirably in many ways, it has work left to do, par- ticularly in addressing cyber vulnerabilities. The second challenge is also related to technolo- gies, and it is to start preparing for the next gener- ation of partly or fully automated warfare, which will make use of artificial intelligence (AI). The re- search and development is well under way, on the part of the Allies as well as potential adversaries. A lot less thinking is taking place with regard to how defence politics – the way Allies agree on plans and guide operations – will be affected. That is a mistake. The changes which automation will bring to NATO deliberations will be no less dramatic than those which will happen on the battlefield. The third challenge is more immediate and po- litical in nature: it is to keep the Alliance unified inthe face of unprecedented soul-searching on the part of the biggest Ally, the United States. And while by virtue of its size and dominance Wash- ington tends to be self-referential, reactions from the rest of NATO member states do make a dif- ference, both positive and negative. Their track re- cord over the past two years has been mixed.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

28. The necessary adaptation of NATO’s military instrument of power

Author:
Jan Broeks
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of a series of actions taken by Russia: Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; Russia’s military posture and provocative military activities, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violations of NATO Allied air- space, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nu- clear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nucle- ar dimension. In parallel, growing instability in our southern re- gion, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are chal- lenging our security. These factors can all have long- term consequences for peace and security in the Eu- ro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe. Yet it is mainly Russian military actions that have brought deterrence and collective defence back to the fore- front of NATO’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

29. Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a “Low Tension” Environment

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s military posture in the Arctic is informed by the changing geopolitical environment, and can no longer be considered in isolation from the country’s growing tensions with the West. In this sense, the period of “Arctic exceptionalism” – in which, by convention, the region has been treated as a zone of depoliticized cooperation – is coming to an end. Certainly, the Russian Arctic is not exceptional for Moscow in military-operational terms. Russia’s leadership has accorded the same threat perception to the Arctic as it has to other theatres of operation. It seeks consistent control over foreign military activity in the Russian Arctic, and ensured access for Russian armed forces, particularly the Northern Fleet. Russia’s military build-up in the Russian Arctic and the Kremlin’s intentions are, at least for now, defensive in nature. Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) primarily aims to ensure perimeter defence of the Kola Peninsula for the survivability of second-strike nuclear assets. Russia’s “Bastion” defence concept consists of the projection of multi-layered sea denial and interdiction capabilities. Another Russian priority is to ensure the Northern Fleet’s access to, and passage along, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. This has hitherto been achieved through military infrastructure along the NSR. However, due to the receding ice, Moscow will seek to enforce “border control” over a larger portion of its Arctic area in the future. The revamping of dual-use border control infrastructure and facilities is deemed a priority for safeguarding Russia’s vision of national security in the AZRF. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has deployed substantive force and capabilities along its northern border in the AZRF. Parts of the armed forces, such as the Arctic Brigade, are now Arctic-capable and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. The Northern Fleet has been repurposed with the Arctic environment in mind, and has been provided with Arctic-specific military technology and training. Russia acts as a status quo power and a reluctant rule-follower in the Arctic, partly because international law there plays in its favour, and partly because it is in Russia’s interest to do so. Despite growing tension, cooperation between Russia and other Arctic nations is likely to endure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Arctic

30. NATO at 70: what defence policy and planning priorities?

Author:
Patrick Turner
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO at 70 shows no sign of slowing down. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by a growth in the challenges to which we must respond, and a high tem- po of decisions and adaptation. NATO’s ability to adapt to the changing security environment has always been a core strength – but this ability has been and will continue to be put to the test. In the last five years, since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been going back to basics. Its core purpose of defending Allies has come back to the fore. But not to the exclusion of other tasks and priorities such as: NA- TO’s operations and missions, for example in Afghani- stan, Kosovo and Iraq; our broader contributions to the international fight against terrorism; or our work to build partner capacity. This Policy Brieffocuses on NATO’s efforts to strength- en its defence posture. The NATO shorthand for our efforts to improve our collective defence is deterrence, defence and dialogue (the “three Ds”). These are un- derpinned by responsiveness, readiness and reinforce- ment (the “three Rs”), as well as strengthened national resilience to attack. More investment and commitment by non-US Allies in line with the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the shorthand for which is cash, capabilities and contri- butions (the “three Cs”), provides the crucial enablers for the three Ds and the three Rs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America