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111. Missile Defence and European Security

Author:
François Heisbourg, Klaus Becher, Alexander Pikayev, and Ivo H. Daalder
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
European NATO countries have been spectators to the debate about defending the US against ballistic missile attacks. While there have been national differences in Europe's reactions to the national missile defence (NMD) programme, it is obvious that most Europeans don't like it. The French seem somewhat more convinced than others that missile defence is inherently foolish and unworkable. Some British experts seem to insist more than others that any programme that might undermine NATO's nuclear deterrence and strategic unity should be avoided. And perhaps Germans, more than others, worry about perceived dangers to the ABM and other arms control treaties, and generally about relations with Russia. Most Europeans at present believe that US defence against long-range ballistic missiles is a slap in the face for Russia, a dangerous provocation for China and an inadequate response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Germany

112. Some Paradigms for the Evolving Map of Europe

Author:
Michael Emerson
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Two sets of opposing paradigms governing the map of Europe are struggling to predominate at the beginning of this second decade of the post-communist era. At the macro (continental) level the struggle is between the Common European Home versus the Europe of Two Empires–the enlarging European Union, and a Russia newly re-assertive towards its near abroad. At the micro (state or entity) level the struggle is between the Nationalising State versus the Europe of Fuzzy Statehood. This double competition of paradigms is most intense and sensitive in Borderland Europe around the frontiers between the two empires, or in their Overlapping Peripheries. It seems that the Europe of Two Empires has much more political energy these days than the Common European Home; and in Borderland Europe the Nationalising State has more energy than Fuzzy Statehood. However these trends should be of concern, since they point to the persistence of tensions and in the worst cases conflicts. A successful and stable Europe would need to see more of the Common European Home and of Fuzzy Statehood.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

113. Just Good Friends? The EU-Russian "Strategic Partnership" and the Northern Dimension

Author:
Marius Vahl
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Contrary to official claims, Russia and the European Union are not strategic partners. The economic and political asymmetries between them and the still divergent normative foundations on which their policies are based constitute considerable obstacles to strategically significant co-operation between the EU and Russia. These obstacles are likely to persist in the foreseeable future, and prevent the emergence of a real strategic partnership.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

114. Soft security problems in Northwest Russia and their implications for the outside world. A framework for analysis and action

Author:
Christer Pursiainen, Pekka Haavisto, and Nikita Lomagin
Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the traditional security dilemma based on the perception of a military threat between Russia and the West has largely given way to a variety of new challenges related to non-military security, so-called soft security threats. These threats are not merely problems internal to Russia, but constitute existing or potential problems for other countries as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

115. Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn, Richard D. Sokolsky, and David E. Mosher
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The strategic environment facing the United States has changed radically in the past decade. The United States needs to reexamine traditional ways of planning for the use of military force in conflicts that threaten vital interests and that could escalate to the highest levels of violence. Several characteristics define the new environment: Changed relationships between the major powers. The bipolar world of the Cold War has yielded to U.S. preeminence in virtually every facet of power, while Russia has become a second-tier power. China now has the seventh largest economy in the world and is modernizing both its conventional and nuclear forces—though it is unlikely to replace the former Soviet Union as the second pole in a reconfigured bipolar world. The rise of regional powers, such as Iraq and Iran. These aspiring regional hegemons are unhappy with a status quo that is preserved by American military power. The end of bipolarity has brought this antagonism to the fore. During the Cold War, regional conflicts played out within the context of the broader ideological and strategic conflict between the two superpowers, which also tamped down pressures for escalation and proliferation for fear that conflict would spiral out of control. That all ended with the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire made it impossible for Russia to continue supporting its allies abroad, who were forced to become responsible for their own security. The possibility that smaller rogue states might try to keep the United States out of a regional conflict. By credibly threatening that the fight could escalate and even involve homeland attacks on the United States or its partners, a regional pariah might hope to prevent the United States from committing forces to the conflict or hinder it from building coalitions with European and regional allies. Failing that, a regional adversary could seek to delay and disrupt U.S. deployments to the theater and hamper operations. Finally, the leadership of a rogue state may be able to preserve its regime even in defeat if it could strike the American homeland or American allies. In short, regional powers are developing the capability to conduct strategic warfare against the United States. The importance these countries place on asymmetric warfare probably has been encouraged by the American distaste for wartime casualties and worries about self-deterrence.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

116. Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy

Author:
Richard D. Sokolsky
Publication Date:
02-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
There has been a tectonic shift in the strategic landscape since the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations concluded in the early 1990s. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are defunct. America and Russia are no longer enemies and the nuclear arms race between the two countries is, for all intents and purposes, over. The threat of a surprise nuclear attack has all but vanished along with any plausible scenario between the two countries that could escalate to a nuclear war. The strategic warning time for reconstitution of a credible conventional military threat to Europe can now be measured in years. The likelihood that Russia could marshal the economic resources for clandestine production of new nuclear weapon systems on a militarily significant scale is extremely remote. The most serious security threats emanating from Russia today—poorly safeguarded nuclear warheads and materials and the potential proliferation of such material and expertise to states of concern—reflect profound weakness. Simply put, the proliferation risks attendant to a Russia in the throes of a long-term structural crisis are a far more serious security threat than SS–18 heavy missiles destroying U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a preemptive first strike.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

117. Eastern Europe — Enlarging NATO

Author:
Caspar Fithin
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Analytica
Abstract:
The prime ministers of nine East European states seeking membership of NATO will meet in Bratislava this week, to maintain pressure for a 'big bang' enlargement of the Alliance. Enlargement will be conditioned to a greater extent than before by concerns over the cohesion of Alliance decision-making and, particularly, by the military contribution new members can make. Despite Alliance aid, applicant states and new members have struggled to develop balanced and sustainable defence plans, while the NATO-19 have yet to resolve the problems posed by Russia's attitude to enlargement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia and Eastern Europe

118. A Recruiting Tape of Osama bin Laden: Excerpts and Analyses

Author:
Richard W. Bulliet and Fawaz A. Gerges
Publication Date:
10-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia International Affairs Online
Abstract:
For several months prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, a videotape calling Muslims to a holy war against forces described as Crusaders and Jews circulated underground in the Arab world. Produced on behalf of Osama bin Laden and prominently featuring his image, words, and ideas, the tape is designed to recruit young Arab men to journey to Afghanistan and train for a war in defense of Islam.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Ethnic Conflict, Government, International Cooperation, International Law, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Middle East, and Arabia

119. Turkey And The Bush Administration: The Question Marks

Author:
Alan Makovsky
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Turkey's economic crisis is naturally the leading issue in bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations, and it is almost certainly topping the agenda of today's meetings of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem with Vice President Richard Cheney and other senior officials. Of course, these meetings pose the difficult question of how much Washington should do, if anything, to bail out its strategically vital ally. But this is only one of several uncertainties characterizing U.S.-Turkish relations in the early days of the Bush administration. Because so much of Turkey's importance to the United States derives from its critical strategic location, bilateral relations are greatly affected by U.S. policies toward other states in Turkey's region. Of most concern to Turkey will be the evolution of Bush administration policy toward Iraq, Iran, and Russia, and also toward Europe's nascent bid to develop an autonomous security capacity.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Washington, Turkey, and Middle East

120. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia