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1. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:
Michele Nones
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Russia’s War in Ukraine Series: War and Industry

Author:
Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has needed huge volumes of weapons and ammunition for a war that is inherently asymmetrical, largely relying on the capabilities that it had—Soviet and domestically produced weapons—and on donations from partner countries. However, it has become clear that the approach is inadequate, especially if there are interruptions in supplies from outside, and that the restoration of Ukraine’s own military-industrial complex is vital to ensuring its security and defence capability, independence, and victory. In the fourth brief of the series, Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi discusses how ammunition and equipment supply shortages provided the impetus for the revival of the national defence industry and for the repurposing of civilian industry to meet the wartime needs of the armed forces. He also highlights the importance of harnessing the potential of Ukraine’s vibrant high-tech innovation ecosystem, and attracting foreign investments to expand the country’s defence industrial base and integrate it with the European defence industry.
Topic:
Markets, Weapons, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

6. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
Topic:
Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South

7. The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have for some time recognized, as NATO doctrine provides, five operational domains—air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space.1 Each of those arenas fully fits with the understanding of a domain as a “specified sphere of activity” and, in each, militaries undertake critical wartime actions. But in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, certain key operational activities have been undertaken by the private sector as part of the conduct of warfare.2 By way of example, private-sector companies have been instrumental both in providing effective cybersecurity and in maintaining working information technology networks. As part of such efforts, these firms have established coordinated mechanisms to work with relevant government actors. These operational and coordinated activities by the private sector demonstrate that there is a “sixth domain”—specifically, the “sphere of activities” of the private sector in warfare—that needs to be included as part of warfighting constructs, plans, preparations, and actions if the United States and its allies are to prevail in future conflicts. As will be elaborated below, that sphere of activities focuses mainly on the roles of information and critical infrastructures, including their intersections—ranging from the transmission and protection of information to the assurance of critical infrastructure operations. Many of the United States’ activities in the sixth domain will take place in the United States homeland. However, while “defending the homeland” is listed as the first priority in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, insufficient attention has been paid to the actions that will be required of the private sector beyond just the defense industrial base as part of accomplishing an effective defense.3 Likewise, when US military forces are engaged in overseas combat, private-sector companies in allied countries (as well as US companies operating overseas) will be critical for the effectiveness of US forces, as well as for the allies’ own militaries. In short, establishing an effective strategy for the private sector in warfare is a key requirement for the United States and its allies.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia suffered more combat deaths in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined, according to a new CSIS analysis of the force disposition and military operations of Russian and Ukrainian units. The average rate of Russian soldiers killed per month is at least 25 times the number killed per month in Chechnya and 35 times the number killed in Afghanistan, which highlight the stark realities of a war of attrition. The Ukrainian military has also performed remarkably well against a much larger and initially better-equipped Russian military, in part due to the innovation of its forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Innovation, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

9. Deciding the future: the Australian Army and the infantry fighting vehicle

Author:
Albert Palazzo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The aim of this report is to inform government decision-makers and the public on the ability of Project LAND 400 Phase 3—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition—to meet the needs of Australia. I examine a number of factors that provide context for the government’s upcoming decision, whenever that may take place. Those include how IFVs fit into the Australian strategic environment, the ease with which the ADF can deploy them, their vulnerability to threats, and the ongoing utility of armour in the light of lessons unfolding from the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian War. To set the information into a useful context, this report explains the nature of contemporary land warfare and speculates how the Australian Army is likely to fight in a future conflict. To further assist those making the IFV decision, this report offers a number of scenarios that outline potential operations that the government may direct the ADF to undertake. It also identifies current gaps in ADF capability that will need remediation if the IFV is to achieve its potential, as well as the other opportunities that might not be taken up because of the focus on this investment. The report’s analysis results in some key questions for decision-makers to consider as they decide on the infantry fighting vehicle acquisition: Does the government believe that its IFV investment will deliver an appropriate balance of protection, lethality and mobility (both tactical and operational)? Does the government agree with the requirement for an infantry vehicle with STANAG 4569 Level 6 force protection and equipped with an active protection system? Is the government confident that the number of the IFVs obtained will generate a deployable and sustainable force that represents a sufficient return on the investment? Does the government accept that the IFV options under consideration will enable the ADF to offset existing gaps in capability and allow it to conduct operations in a contested maritime environment, including sea and airlift, long-range fires and logistics? Is the government confident that the Army’s combined arms system is deployable in contested environments, particularly in a maritime scenario? Does the government believe that the IFV will provide utility in the range of contingencies that the government envisages the ADF will need to meet? Does the government agree that the IFV will contribute to the requirement that the ADF be able to shape, deter and respond to threats as mandated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)?
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, Economy, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Australia, and United States of America

10. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:
Gateway House
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America