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21. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:
Merle Maigre
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

22. Cyberattacks Integral to Russia's Political and Military Strategies

Author:
Aleksandra Kozioł
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
To destabilise democratic countries that support Ukraine, Russia employs cyberattacks on the target state’s public institutions and critical infrastructure. These activities have clearly intensified since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 and is in line with the implementation of Russian military strategy. In this context, it would be beneficial within the EU and NATO to develop joint action plans to respond to future threats in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

23. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

24. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

25. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

26. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:
Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

27. Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations

Author:
Gavin Wilde
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A review of academic, doctrinal, and journalistic writing covering the last three decades of Russian military theorizing on cyber-related issues yields three hypotheses that may explain the mismatch between the expectations of many Western observers and the reported impact of Russian cyber operations in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.1 By exploring the unique and oft-overlooked facets of Moscow’s conceptualization of “cyber,” this paper provides a foundation for better assessing Russia’s performance in cyberspace in Ukraine in early 2022, along with a more nuanced understanding of its capabilities and possible expectations going forward. These hypotheses are as follows: Russia’s Information Operations Troops—a rough analog to Western military cyber commands—remains in its infancy and appears optimized more for counterpropaganda than for offensive cyber operations. The operational command structure over offensive cyber operations, meanwhile, remains murky and is possibly more political than military in nature. Russia’s premier offensive cyber capacities are housed within agencies focused on intelligence and subversion—the key tool kits used against Ukraine since 2014—rather than combined-arms warfare. Moscow’s secretive and poorly executed February 2022 invasion precluded optimal performance in the initial period of the war, which is particularly pivotal in Russian thinking about effectiveness in the information domain. These are each examined through Russia’s own information warfare prism, which differs in crucial ways from Western conceptions of “cyber”—foremost in that it is more expansive, encompassing and emphasizing the psychosocial impacts of information and communication technologies on both the polity and the public.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

28. Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper examines the military effectiveness of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine,1 the reasons why these operations have not had greater strategic impact, and the lessons applicable to other countries’ military cyber efforts. It builds on previous analyses by taking a more systematic and detailed approach that incorporates a wider range of publicly available data. A major purpose of this paper is to help bridge the divide between cyber-specific and general military analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war. Most analysis of Russian cyber operations in Ukraine has been produced by cyber specialists writing for their own field, with limited integration of non-cyber military sources and concepts. Conversely, leading accounts of the war as a whole include virtually no mention of cyber operations.2 To begin filling the gap, this paper places Russian cyber operations in Ukraine within the larger frame of Moscow’s military objectives, campaigns, and kinetic activities.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

29. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

30. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia