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271. Power-Sharing as a Peace-Building Solution for Ukraine

Author:
Uliana Movchan
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The institutional arrangement in Ukraine is a game with zero-sum: a strong president (winner) takes all. In the case of the ongoing conflict in the East of Ukraine and the consequences of such a conflict, it forces us to look for a solution to overcome the existing problem, especially, where each part of Ukraine can feel its impact on the political process (or decision-making). When comparing the power-sharing situation in Ukraine (like a president from one political party, and a prime minister from the opposite, or from another patron-client network, or a coalition consisting of opposite parties) it has been found that democracy is much more likely to occur in these situations, and Ukraine which is in the process of democratic trans- formation can come closer to other European countries. Therefore these findings open the door to thinking about not just how to reform the existing majoritarian model of democracy, which produces a winner-takes-all outcome, but to look for a model which would share something between each substantial segment of society, and would give a better chance for Ukraine to be a democratic country and a real part of the European community. Such a model could become the power-sharing model suggested by Arend Lijphart, which presupposes systems with inter- est accommodation and power sharing among significant segments of society.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Political Power Sharing, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

272. Turkey and East Central Europe: Idealism, Pragmatism, Misperception or Clash of Interests?

Author:
Konrad Zasztowt
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
urkey is focused on Russia in its policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, Cauca- sus, Ukraine, Balkan countries as well as, at least to some extent, Central European countries, including Poland. This priority has its impact on Ankara’s relationship with Eastern and Central European countries, which remain in the shadow of Turkish policy towards Russia. However that negative impact is not powerful enough to spoil Turkey’s cooperation with Eastern and Central European countries. It certainly limits the scope of such partnerships or alliances. Turkey contin- ues to cooperate with the region’s countries, but often rejects their Euro-Atlanticism. In Turkish perception the EU’s enlargement in Central Europe was unjust (as Turkey has been applying much longer for the EU’s membership without any significant progress, whereas post-commu- nist countries were accepted relatively quickly). NATO enlargement in the East in Turkey’s view was always a ‘risky adventure’. At the same time, from Ankara’s point of view the Middle East is strategically more important than Turkish northern neighbourhood. Moreover, Turkey wants to be an equal interlocutor in dialogue with Russia, the U.S. and the EU, whereas it often conceives post-communist and post-Soviet countries merely as a zone of influence for the Kremlin and Washington or their battleground in Cold War 2.0.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Poland, North America, and United States of America

273. Hot Winds of the Cold War

Author:
Uzi Rubin
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In his recent “State of the Nation” address, Russian President Putin unveiled six new strategic, advanced weapon systems. The important point about these impressive weapons is their ability to penetrate the global missile defense system that according to Putin is being deployed by the United States. But, such a system does not exist and is not even being planned. It is not surprising that the US responded to Putin’s speech with indifference. Putin’s speech reveals, more than anything else, the continuing Russian trauma from the “Star Wars” initiative of President Reagan
Topic:
Military Strategy, Weapons, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

274. The Great Distraction of Punitive Airstrikes

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Don’t congratulate the administration on avoiding Russian retaliation. The humanitarian crisis in Syria remains, and the real collision course here is between Israel and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

275. The Fall of Dera’a

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It remains deeply open to question as to whether Putin has either the will or the capability to prevent Iranian deployment in the border area.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

276. Diplomacy Backed by Military Force

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
How the wise use of force facilitates diplomatic processes in the Israel-Egypt-Hamas and Israel-Russia-Syria triangles
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and Egypt

277. Erdogan’s Dilemma

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

278. The American Interpretation of Russia’s Conduct: The Case of Syria

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

279. As the Middle East Turns: Domestic Unrest, Changing Partnerships, and an Unreliable United States

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the Mideast of today, the US is largely irrelevant, when it is not disruptive, and is certainly not providing clear leadership. With the current disarray in DC, it does not look like this will change any time soon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

280. Theatre operations, high commands and large-scale exercises in Soviet and Russian military practice: insights and implications

Author:
Diego A. Ruiz Palmer
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s Zapad 17 large-scale exercise, staged in September 2017 in cooperation with Belarus, as part of their combined operational grouping of forces, attracted unprecedented attention in the West. Widespread interest in Zapad 17 reflected a deepening concern even before its conduct that the exercise’s actual purpose and scale did not correspond to the troop size and objective announced by Russia, namely 12,700 Russian and Belarussian troops involved in fighting a postulated terrorist threat. Instead, by all accounts, Zapad 17 was much larger in scale than notified by Russia (60,000-70,000 troops versus 12,700) and oriented to fighting and defeating a capable adversary.1 Zapad 17 was only the latest Russian exercise to generate similar concerns.
Topic:
Imperialism, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe