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221. 2020 Country Brief: Russia

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is our adversary. The goals of Vladimir Putin are simple and dangerous: 1) reassert Russian global “great power” status; 2) have supremacy over the territory of the former Soviet Union; and 3) create a sphere of influence in the international system to achieve dominance. To do so, the Kremlin seeks to weaken America and its allies by sowing domestic discord, discrediting the institutions of democracy, and destroying US alliances and partnerships. Under Donald Trump, they are winning.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Power
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

222. Outsourcing warfare: Proxy forces in contemporary armed conflicts

Author:
James K. Wither
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive examination of the different types of armed non-state proxy groups. It discusses their characteristics and sponsorship and how they are employed by states in pursuit of their security and foreign policy objectives. The article also analyses the reasons for the recent increase in the use of proxy forces, including the benefits and risks for states that employ them, as well as the broader impact of proxy forces on the international security environment, including great power competition. Data was collected and analysed from a wide range of secondary source documents. A descriptive, qualitative research methodology was applied to print and on-line publications available from governmental, institutional and academic sources. This involved literature reviews and case studies to provide an in-depth understanding of current thinking on the topic, while also identifying potential areas for further research. The article provides a comprehensive, qualitative analysis of the existing literature and case studies on the topic of proxy forces, which due to the research methodology applied, also relies on the researcher’s judgement, choices and assumptions. Proxy wars will remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Two strategic developments drive this conclusion. Firstly, there is the renewal of great power competition for influence, resources and security, and secondly, the imperative for states to achieve these objectives without employing their military forces in a manner that could cause a major war.
Topic:
Power Politics, Conflict, Strategic Competition, Proxy War, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and United States of America

223. Russia Attempts to Move Closer to Egypt as US Withdraws

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The efforts of Moscow to assert itself as a power in the eastern Mediterranean should sound a cautionary note.
Topic:
Security, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

224. The Tensions between Assad and Iran Present an Opportunity in Syria

Author:
Eran Lerman, Aiman Mansour, and Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran’s presence in Syria.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

225. Rising Tensions and Security Chaos in Syria’s Deraa Province

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

226. Idlib, the next phase of the Turkish-Syrian conflict

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s desire to woo Turkey from the West likely to prevent all-out war.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

227. Do Syria-Turkey clashes presage a wider confrontation in the Middle East?

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Despite Syrian-Turkish clashes this week, Moscow is set to remain the key arbiter in Syria.
Topic:
Hegemony, Conflict, Peace, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

228. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

229. Russia and Issues of HTS and Tanzim Hurras ad-Din

Author:
Anton Mardasov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

230. Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan heats up, Russia struggles to contend with a vastly more complicated landscape in the South Caucasus. Since shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s aims and policies in the South Caucasus have been constant, but its capabilities to project power and influence have fluctuated. Russia’s engagement with the entire Caucasus region is best characterized as a tide. Its power and influence began to ebb at the start of the Karabakh conflict—with the February 1988 massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit being the key galvanizing event.2 After that, the tide receded rapidly, leaving even Russian possessions in the North Caucasus without effective central control. The First Chechen War marked low tide, which only began to rise with the Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999. Until about 2004, Russia was too weak and internally divided to project power and influence in the wider Caucasus region in a meaningful way. To be sure, Russian influence was never gone completely, even during the lowest ebb of the tide. Russia still marshaled greater resources than the new states of the Caucasus could muster, and it threw its weight around. But in the 1990s, Russia did not have a unified governing apparatus, but rather a mass of competing clans among which regional actors could maneuver. For example, after the Soviet collapse, Moscow left the Russian military units in the Caucasus to their own devices. Those units served as mercenaries, arms suppliers, and logistics providers to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin.3 Russia’s assertiveness in the region grew steadily thereafter, with sharp upticks after the 2008 war with Georgia and Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Elites, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus