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131. Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation” is dedicated to the challenges and opportunities emerging in the South Caucasus region 2 years after the end of the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 with focus on security and political matters.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Law, Treaties and Agreements, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Landmines, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

132. Sanctioning Russia: Implications and Expectation

Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West rapidly adopted unprecedented sanctions on Russia. These included a series of export controls and the sanctioning of the Russian Central Bank, major institutions in the financial sector as well as individual “oligarchs” who live and conduct business outside of the country. In addition to these government actions by the United States, the European Union and the UK, hundreds of Western private companies have withdrawn from the Russian market or suspended operations, further exacerbating Russian economic uncertainty. How likely are the sanctions to pressure Russia to halt its campaign in Ukraine, what is their purpose and logic, and what additional measures could be imposed?
Topic:
Economics, Hegemony, Sanctions, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

133. Ending the Threat of War in Ukraine: A Negotiated Solution to the Donbas Conflict and the Crimean Dispute

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The unresolved conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas region represents by far the greatest danger of a new war in Europe — and by far the greatest risk of a new crisis in relations between the United States and Russia. The Biden administration does not wish to escalate tensions with Russia, and no doubt appreciates that admitting Ukraine into NATO is impossible for the foreseeable future, if only because Germany and France would veto it. Nonetheless, so long as the dispute remains unresolved, the United States will be hostage to developments on the ground that could drag it into a new and perilous crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, War, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

134. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:
Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

135. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
Topic:
Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

136. Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts With Russia and Iran

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November 9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey. Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in their economic planning and political calculations. At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20, 2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21, 2019).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

137. Russia’s Iskander Missiles Fail in Karabakh but Cause Crisis in Armenia

Author:
Pavel Felgenhauer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Second Karabakh War, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, began on September 27, 2020, and ended on November 9, 2020, with a Russian-brokered and guaranteed agreement. The conflict claimed the lives of thousands of Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. But after 44 days of fierce fighting, it concluded with Yerevan soundly defeated: Armenia lost territory occupied during the First Karabakh War in 1992–1994 as well as over 30 percent of prewar Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—a region of Soviet Azerbaijan majority populated by ethnic Armenians. Today, the rump self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR or “Artsakh”)—still controlled by Armenians and not recognized by anyone—is fully surrounded by Azerbaijani troops and territory. The rump Karabakh “republic’s” perimeter is guarded by some 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” who also control the so-called Lachin corridor, the only highway left open from Armenia proper to Karabakh through the city of Lachin. The future of the rump NKR and its Armenian population is unclear. Baku refuses to discuss any special administrative status for the territory, insisting Armenians born in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast or their descendants must disarm and apply for Azerbaijani citizenships to stay as a minority inside Azerbaijan. In turn, the NKR leadership has declared Russian an official language alongside Armenian to avoid use of Azerbaijani Turkish (Izvestia, February 17). Officials in Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani) apparently hope this may tempt Moscow to keep its peacekeepers in Karabakh permanently and maybe eventually agree to annex the NKR outright.
Topic:
Weapons, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Nagorno-Karabakh

138. Putin Prioritizes Syria. Biden Should Too.

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Moscow is in Syria for the long haul and will continue to undermine American efforts there. In recent months, Moscow intensified its activities in Syria against the backdrop of a changing US administration. The Kremlin sent additional military policy units to eastern Syria, and continued diplomatic engagement through the Astana format, a process that superficially has international backing but in practice excludes the United States and boosts Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, Moscow also unveiled at its airbase in Syria a statue to the patron saint of the Russian army, Prince Alexander Nevsky. A growing Russian presence in Syria will further hurt Western interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

139. The Overseen Factors Impacting the Afghan Peace Process

Author:
Sahar Khan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The international community is focused on the ongoing intra-Afghan peace process, which has steadied despite several challenges. There are two developments, however, that will have a lasting impact on the process: The International Criminal Court’s investigation into war crimes committed by the Taliban, Afghan forces, and US forces, and the strategic evolution of the Taliban as a legitimate political actor.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Terrorism, Taliban, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

140. Russia and Turkey Deconflict Their Geopolitical Moves in the Caucasus

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The recent incidence of war in the Caucasus has shown that, when facing deep domestic troubles, Russia and Turkey demonstrate strikingly different patterns of international behavior. While Russia has become more cautious in responding to external challenges, Turkey has embarked on several power-projecting enterprises. Its forceful interference in the long-smoldering conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh took Russia by surprise and effectively secured a military victory for Azerbaijan. Moscow has assumed the main responsibility for terminating hostilities by deploying a peacekeeping force, but its capacity for managing the war zone and its commitment to deconflicting tensions with Turkey remain uncertain. The United States and the European Union have few levers for influencing this interplay of clashing agendas of local actors and regional powers and fewer reasons to trust Russian and Turkish leaders to put peacebuilding ahead of their ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Caucasus, and Middle East