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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Russia

131. Rep. Tauscher on Winning the Post-Cold War

Author:
Jon B. Wolfsthal
Publication Date:
10-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia's nuclear weapons complex is spread across 10 remote, closed and formerly secret “nuclear cities,” which employ almost 1 million scientists, engineers and technicians. Moscow's economic collapse has left these former “jewels” in the Russian nuclear crown struggling to survive, and workers with access to nuclear materials and expertise routinely go for months without getting paid. The U.S. Department of Energy, as part of the Clinton Administration's cooperative threat reduction efforts, has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to reduce the proliferation risks created by the poor economic conditions in these closed cities. By promoting the development of private industry in these cities, NCI seeks to prevent a brain drain of Russian nuclear experts to would-be nuclear-weapon states.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

132. Strategic Arms Control -- Moment of Decision?

Author:
Rodney W. Jones, Michael Nacht, Sergei Rogov, Kenneth Sr. Meyers, Steve Pifer, Nikolai Sokov, and Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
06-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In his introductory remarks, Jones pointed out that key Russian interests in the terms of START II, which the United States shared and helped address in the early 1990s -- the denuclearization of Ukraine and the decoupling of Russian strategic forces from dependence on missile production plants in Ukraine -- faded into the background after START I entered into force and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in December 1994. Russian criticism of START II thereafter focused on U.S. missile defense developments that could affect the ABM Treaty, on the heavy costs to Russia of implementing reductions, and on the unequal U.S. and Russian reconstitution potential under START II ceilings. By 1996, reactions to NATO expansion had become a further obstacle to START II ratification in Moscow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Ukraine

133. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference 1997 Agenda

Author:
Brad Roberts, Richard Speier, Leonard Spector, James Steinberg, Hank Chiles, Rüdiger Hartmann, Harald Müller, Leonard Weiss, Ben Sanders, Valery Tsepkalo, Shai Feldman, Phebe Marr, Riaz Kokhar, Virginia Foran, Dennis Gormley, Michael Moodie, Gennady Pshakin, Wendy Frieman, Shah. Prakash, Munir Akram, Michael Krepon, and Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
06-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade." Each year, preparing the agenda for this meeting and preparing my opening remarks, provides me the opportunity to survey our field, to take stock of recent accomplishments and set backs, and to anticipate the challenges ahead. In many respects the news in our field has been good. Since we met last, in February 1996: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature. The South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has entered into force for the regional parties, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has been opened for signature. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been upgraded and the way opened for further enhancements, under the second part of the 93+2 program. In the area of export controls, multilateral regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have added several new members and refined their rules... and China has strengthened its non-proliferation commitments by pledging not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear installations. In addition, there have been no new stories of significant leaks of nuclear materials from Russia or the other Soviet successor states, and U.S. cooperative programs to enhance security over such materials have gained considerable momentum. Reinforcing the norm of non-proliferation, the two nuclear superpowers continue to dismantle nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and there are reasonable prospects for further reductions under the pending START II treaty and an anticipated START III accord. Looking at the threshold states... Pakistan is continuing its freeze on the production of fissile material, although Israel and India are apparently adding to their plutonium stockpiles. The North Korean nuclear weapons effort appears to remain frozen, as the result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework understanding with the United States. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons program, according to recent testimony by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has not progressed in the past two years, while Iraq's nuclear activities are being suppressed by UNSCOM, and Libya's nuclear program appears to be languishing.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, Russia, United States, and Iran

134. Proceedings: START II, Missile Non-Proliferation, and Missile Defense

Author:
Alexander Pikayev, Alexei Arbatov, Richard Speier, Rodney W. Jones, John Pike, Michael Nacht, Linton Brooks, Stephen Cambone, Seth Carus, Robert Einhorn, Ronald Lehman II, McCarthy Tim, Yuri Nazarkin, Keith Payne, Henry Sokolski, and Mikhail Streltsov
Publication Date:
02-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The first panel focused on the U.S. and Russian stakes in strategic arms control, the prospects for START II ratification in Russia, the status of START III issues, and the possibilities for cooperative approaches to the issues of strategic offense-defense interaction. The Russian panelists, Ambassadors Yuri Nazarkin and Mikhail Streltsov, and State Duma member Alexei Arbatov, explained Russia's START II reservations, steps in the ratification process, and expected implementation problems in eliminating Russia's multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). On balance, they agreed that START II serves Russia's basic interests, in lower levels of strategic arms, eventual economic savings, and political and military parity with the United States. They acknowledged that the ball is now in Russia's court, and ventured that parliament's approval probably would occur eventually.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia and United States