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1501. Economic Challenges for Belarus

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Overdependence on cheap Russian energy resources, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a lack of reform are the biggest challenges that could lead to the collapse of the Belarusian economy. Russia may use economic problems to make Belarus more dependent on it. Poland, other EU countries and the U.S. can support the Belarusian authorities in diversifying sources of crude oil supplies, negotiations on joining the World Trade Organisation, and possible efforts to obtain a loan from the International Monetary Fund.
Topic:
Debt, Economy, Crisis Management, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Poland, Belarus, and United States of America

1502. The Estonia-Russia Border Dispute

Author:
Kinga Raś and Rafał Tarnogórski
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The centennial of the Treaty of Tartu between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia in February 2020 did not end the border dispute. In 1944, the Soviet authorities changed the borders and since then, 5% of the territory of pre-war Estonia remains under Russia’s control. It argues the change was legally justified and that the region has not shown any willingness to adjust its borders back to those of the interwar period. Estonia, though, aims to assert its statehood, and some elites are directly raising claims. This means the continuation of the stalemate over the border, which will negatively impact bilateral relations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Russia and Estonia

1503. Water Shortages in Occupied Crimea

Author:
Daniel Szeligowski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Water shortages in occupied Crimea are of a long-term character since its local resources are insufficient to meet its needs. In the short term, the Russian authorities will attempt to resolve the water deficit on an ad hoc basis while stepping up pressure on Ukraine to unblock the North Crimean Canal. A forced takeover of the canal by the Russian military should be considered a last resort, given that the cost of such an operation for Russia would significantly exceed the possible benefit.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Territorial Disputes, Water, and Occupation
Political Geography:
Russia and Crimea

1504. Putting A Spoke In The Wheel: Russian Efforts To Weaken U.S.-led Alliance Structures In Northeast Asia

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Russia is widely accused of employing a range of instruments—both overt and covert—to undermine Western unity. However, to what extent is Russia engaged in comparable activities to weaken the South Korean and Japanese alliances with the United States? This paper answers this question by assessing Moscow’s actions in the domains of diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. It finds that Russia is indeed aiming to encourage Seoul and Tokyo to distance themselves from Washington and from each other. In particular, Moscow is committed to deterring U.S. allies from facilitating the deployment of additional units of U.S. missile defense systems within the region. Across the four domains, it is only in the economic field that Russia is found to lack leverage. Overall, Moscow has achieved several tactical victories, but has yet to seriously damage U.S.-led alliance structures within the region. All the same, Seoul and Tokyo must remain watchful of Moscow’s activities, especially since there are signs of increased cooperation between Russia and China in exploiting wedge issues between the United States and its allies, thereby potentially combining China’s economic weight with Russia’s skills in influence operations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

1505. Putin’s Strategic Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses the strategic framework for Russia’s policies toward Northeast Asia, placing it in the context of Moscow’s geopolitical repositioning after the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing confrontation with the United States, and the alienation from Europe. After 2014, the Ukraine crisis put an end to Russia’s quarter-century-long attempt to integrate with the West and become part of a Greater Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time and in the same place (Ukraine), Russia’s attempt to build a power center in the former Soviet space came to an end. Ukraine was not the cause of either failure, but it was the trigger of both. The conclusion was clear. Russia was not fit for integration into something that was bigger than Russia, and Russia was no longer capable of integrating former borderlands. Two-plus decades after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Russia stood alone—but also free. Such was the end of a grand illusion linked to the West, and also the end of three centuries of empire-building.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

1506. The (Re)emergence of the BRICS and the Reorganization of Power in Contemporary Geopolitics

Author:
Charles Pennaforte and Ricardo Luigi
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been able to do so since the end of World War II. This article’s objective is to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world’s geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

1507. Central Europe in the new Millennium: The new Great Game?

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After the fall of communism, Central Europe (CE) was a region with relatively high US interest and support. Washington supported the NATO membership of CE countries, provided financial as well as technical assistance to the region and several American high-positioned political representatives visited the region. However, during the last few years, it is evident that CE is a space where the Russian and Chinese presence and influence have been risen. The present article analyses several questions aiming to scrutinize the Russian and Chinese presence and activities in CE, particularly, when and how Russia and China penetrated into CE, what are the consequences of the rising Russian and Chinese influence and who are the supporters and opponents of Moscow and Beijing in CE. The article concludes that, the main competing actors in CE are Washington and Russia, while China profits from the US-Russia clash. While the US and Russian interests are dominat in security and political issues, China aims to penetrate CE economics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Europe, and United States of America

1508. OPEC+ as a new governor in Global Energy Governance

Author:
Rafał Ulatowski
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article tries to evaluate the roots of the OPEC+ agreement, how it operates, and its prospects for the future. It argues that OPEC+ is a new governor in the Global Energy Governance (GEG) “regime complex”. It grew out of a convergence of the interests and capabilities of OPEC and non-OPEC exporters. The article shows that the emergence of OPEC+ is a consequence of over three decades of competition and occasional cooperation between exporters united in OPEC and those outside the organization. That cooperation was always a consequence of the price war and the demand of OPEC members for cooperation with non-OPEC exporters. Intensive consultations and three agreements on production cuts between both groups of countries in the years 2016-2019 made it possible to begin the institutionalization of cooperation among them. Cooperation within the OPEC+ agreement is nonformalized, based on government-to-government negotiations, and flexible. The signatories to the OPEC + agreement decided to avoid founding any formal IGO, and OPEC + continues to exist as a summit process.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Oil, Governance, and OPEC
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

1509. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

1510. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America