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1441. The Russian Way of War in Syria: Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian Federation’s intervention in Syria is a watershed event. However the war there ends, its impact on Russia is likely to be profound. For the first time in its post-Soviet history, Russia’s military is fighting outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In doing so, it is exercising military capabilities that had atrophied from long lack of use. Moscow is also rebuilding its diplomatic muscle through its role in Syria by managing a diverse coalition, leading a parallel peace process, and forcing the United States to take the Kremlin’s preferences into account when making decisions in the Middle East. Through Syria, Russia has reemerged on the geopolitical stage. The war is not over, and there are many ways in which things could still go badly for Russia. Moscow may find that a return to geopolitical prominence entails costs and risks at least as great as the rewards that status brings. Nevertheless, the West will be dealing with a Russia that has changed fundamentally through its experience in the war. Understanding these changes and their implications for Western governments is the focus of this conclusion chapter. It is structured around two questions. First, what does Syria tell us about how Russia fights its wars? Second, how has Russia’s experience in Syria affected the capabilities of its armed forces? Answering these questions should increase our understanding of Russia as a geopolitical actor and allow Western governments to make more effective policy on issues where Russia is a factor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

1442. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited. Appendix A lists the 25 largest arms-producing and military services companies in the world, ranked by their arms sales in 2019.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Spending, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

1443. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Global Focus

1444. BRICS and Mortar: New Architecture in Education

Author:
Kishore Singh
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
In the beginning of the new century and the millennium, Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China came to be reckoned as the world’s fastest growing economies. Later, these were joined by South Africa, leading to the emergence of BRICS as a political coalition of five countries. The year 2009 was a landmark in this historic development. In that year, the first BRICS Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. The BRICS summits held annually since then have become an important political platform for the collective voice of BRICS countries in the form of BRICS Declarations. Education is one of the most critical areas addressed in successive BRICS summits. Centrality of education in people’s lives and its catalytic role for human development is widely recognised in today’s world. So it was inevitable that the BRICS countries would come together and create a common plat-forum on education as well. The first meeting of BRICS Education Ministers was held in November 2013 on the margins of the UNESCO General Conference. Since then, the BRICS Education Ministers have been meeting annually and issuing a separate declaration in tandem with the declaration issued at the summits.
Topic:
Development, Education, International Cooperation, and BRICS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Asia, India, South Africa, and Brazil

1445. Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria

Author:
Alexey L. Khlebnikov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region. The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

1446. The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria

Author:
Abdullah Al-Jabassini
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In June 2018, the Syrian regime forces backed by Russia launched a military offensive that aimed at terminating rebel rule and restoring control over southern Syria. By August 2018, Daraa’s rebel organisations were pushed to surrender under a “patchwork” strategy, including Russian-led negotiations between regime and opposition figures, and the Syrian regime’s use of armed force. The two fundamentally divergent approaches have demarcated three main zones in which the regime’s authority and thus the roles former rebels come to play in the post-rebellion period vary significantly. In eastern Daraa, Russia established the Eighth Brigade, a sub-division of the Fifth Corps, and entrusted Ahmad al-Oda, a former rebel leader, with its command. By incorporating former rebels in the Eighth Brigade’s ranks, Russia, in fact, intended to establish a local armed actor characterised by a wide margin of manoeuvre to handle local security affairs and inflict acceptable and monitored small-scale violence to limit the regime’s authority and to keep Iranian influence at bay, thereby limiting status quo violations. For more than two years, the Eighth Brigade has limited the regime’s authority, served as a bulwark against Iranian expansion, intervened to defuse tensions, and mediated to prevent wide-scale regime-led military offensives against several localities, all of which are Russia’s top priorities to maintain the status quo in the south. Nevertheless, the Eighth Brigade has been mired in struggles to overcome and mitigate top four interrelated challenges. First, the absence of official recognition by the Syrian Ministry of Defence. Second, the ambitions of Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. Third, the intermittent cyclical patterns of retaliations with local armed groups in neighbouring province of Sweida. Fourth, the ongoing rivalries among former rebel leaders.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Local, Peace, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

1447. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

1448. The Disrupting Stabilizer

Author:
Samuel Ramani
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
How Russia’s military, diplomatic, and economic roles in the Mediterranean have developed in recent years
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

1449. The Outsider: Russia in the Race for Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Julien Nocetti
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When analyzing the global state of play around artificial intelligence (AI), Russia so far looks like an “outsider” compared to the two technological leaders, the United States and China. Yet, like the European Union, Russia exhibits two apparently contradictory but fundamental trends: it is trying to reap the benefits of technological interdependence—digital, scientific, financial etc.—while also protecting its internal market and thereby achieving the “technological sovereignty” it so ardently desires. Russia’s state-led approach is compounded by the same problems that afflict Russia in the conventional digital sector: lack of investment, weak integration into international scientific and normative networks, political pressure on private companies, dependence on global technological value chains and brain drain. Might these factors lead us to underestimate Moscow’s potential in AI? This paper argues that although these weaknesses are significant, continue to hold Russia back and threaten to amplify pre-existing asymmetries of power with the United States and China, Moscow intends to preserve niches of expertise that it can deploy in foreign policy and domestic governance. The Russian authorities have also handed big parts of AI development to the armed forces and the defense industry, as part of modernization plans and for asymmetric use.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

1450. Ukraine’s European Integration: The Russian Factor

Author:
Hanna Pashkova and Halyna Balanovych
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The pace and effectiveness of Kyiv’s European integration course depends on many internal and external factors. The key ones being the political will of Ukrainian government, ability to implement and dedication to real pro-European changes in the country that would be tangible for Ukrainian citizens. This is the internal factor that is the main issue on the path to integration into the European community. That being said, European integration is a two-way street. The quality and level of Kyiv-Brussels relations to a great extent depend on the position and engagement of the European side, including EU’s internal processes and trends, which are rather complex, controversial and sometimes centrifugal in their nature at the moment. We are talking about an increased sentiment of restoring partnerships with Russia in the “business as usual” format inside the EU’s business and political circles. Russian hybrid aggression is a dangerous factor. For the Russian leadership that views post-Soviet countries as its zone of “privileged” interest, an independent Ukraine headed towards Europe and NATO is both a challenge and a threat. Firstly, Kyiv’s successful European integration is an incentive for other post-Soviet countries to step up, which means a failure for Russia’s plans of “forced” reintegration of Eurasian countries. Secondly, Kyiv achieving success in its European project is a model for Russian citizens and a convincing evidence of the inability of Russia’s authoritarian regime to offer an attractive democratic model of social development. This is why the Russian regime is using all of its available “hybrid warfare” to prevent Ukraine from integrating into Europe – from political and diplomatic pressure, economic blockade, information warfare to military intervention – occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Currently, Ukraine is a training ground and a testing area for Russia’s massive purposeful expansion into the EU territory. In particular, this includes discrediting the unifying European values and institutions, disorienting public opinion, interfering with elections, formation of pro-Russian lobby within the European establishment, support of radical movements, etc. The goal of this influence is to disintegrate the EU, reform Europe’s political system in line with the Russian scenario. An important factor is the EU member states’, institutions’ and other countries’ assistance and solidarity with Ukraine, as well as sanctions introduced by the West. Regrettably, over the period of almost six years, the sanctions have failed to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, failed to change the nature of Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy. Yet it is certainly crucial that the EU and other countries uphold a common course of conduct in regard to Russia, maintain and strengthen the “sanctions frontline”. At the same time, assessing the current confrontation in the notional Ukraine-EU-Russia “triangle”, it is worth noting that these problems have been temporarily overshadowed by the global COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has affected internal and external priorities of different countries, has shaken the global economy. On the other – it has “hit the pause button” for Ukraine’s European integration, made adjustments to EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation plans. Obviously, the problems that have been temporarily postponed will later resurface again – this time in the new circumstances and in the new form.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Conflict, Regional Integration, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine