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31. Achieving Minimum Viable Cyber Resilience: A Leadership Top Ten “To-Do” List

Author:
Steve Hill
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I t is a reflection of the growing maturity of the cybersecurity industry that when the UK’s Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden, a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security, claimed in a speech to the November 2024 NATO Cyber Defence Conference that Russia “can turn the lights off for millions,” he was roundly criticized for hyperbole. Pragmatism has replaced alarmism as the driver for persuading the state and the C-suite to invest in cybersecurity. The world has neither ever been more complex nor more fast-moving. But that is not the same as saying that the world is more dangerous. The same inter-connectedness that creates supply-chain fragility also acts as a disincentive for governments whose priorities are primarily inward-looking (domestic stability and growth) to escalate conflicts to outright regional or global warfare that will likely undermine that domestic agenda. We see therefore brinkmanship and “grey conflict” taking place throughout the world. This includes targeted assassinations, arson attacks, disruption of underseas cables, drone activity, social media election influence campaigns, and all kinds of cyber-attacks.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Gray Zone, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

32. A Transforming Eurasian Order

Author:
Feng Yujun
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I n recent years, driven by multiple factors, the international order has been undergoing rapid adjustment, evolution, and reshaping. In Eurasia, the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered persisting upheaval, acting as a pivotal catalyst for shifts in the regional order. Its impact has prompted historic changes in power dynamics, mutual perceptions, national identities, and strategic orientations among Eurasian states—shifts unmatched since the Soviet Union’s dissolution over three decades ago. These transformations are set to profoundly influence the regional order, becoming a central element in current and future global developments.
Topic:
Post-Soviet Space, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

33. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

34. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:
Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

35. Global Futures Bulletin: The BRICS and the Decarbonization and Biodiversity Protection Challenges

Author:
Igarapé Institute
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Igarapé Institute
Abstract:
The world faces an unprecedented convergence of environmental crises – climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss – that collectively threaten the planet’s ecological balance and humanity’s future. Reversing the Triple Planetary Crisis necessitates urgent and coordinated action across all sectors and countries, accelerating the transition to low-carbon economies while protecting biodiversity are key challenges for the coming years. Countries that have joined the BRICS in its inception (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are increasingly an important geopolitical force in current global politics, and their individual and collective action is key to the success of concerted global action. The group’s recent expansion – BRICS+ includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia joining in 2025 and Saudi Arabia finally formalizing its membership – offers an opportunity to boost the role of their New Development Bank (NDB) in bridging climate, biodiversity, and development finance, and aim for greater policy coherence for concerted global action across these agendas. Combined, BRICS countries are not only biodiversity and energy-rich but also contribute to a large share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This Strategic Paper examines the role of the expanded BRICS+ and explores whether and how this “mini-multilateral” grouping, with its considerable human and technological capacity, can address two major global challenges: accelerating decarbonization and protecting biological diversity. The discussion is framed around the opportunities and challenges faced by the member countries to increase their ambitions and become leading voices in these agendas – not only for BRICS countries (some of which are among the most biodiverse in the world) but also for the wider international community. Without a strong commitment by BRICS countries (individually and as a group) the world will fail to accelerate action on decarbonization and biodiversity protection.
Topic:
Climate Change, Pollution, BRICS, Decarbonization, Biodiversity, and Minilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and Global Focus

36. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

37. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:
Michele Nones
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe