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1001. Cyber Posture Trends in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Current understanding of the cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union (EU) merits re-evaluation. It is often assumed that China and Russia are aligned, yet this is not always the case. Unlike Russia, which has an ongoing focus on information security, China’s official documents incorporate both information security and cybersecurity concerns that are similar to those of the EU and the USA. Moreover, while often paired, the EU and the USA have differing regulatory structures in cyberspace. Further, both actors increasingly mirror Chinese and Russian concerns about the impact of information warfare on domestic stability. By examining key trends in each actor’s cyber posture, this SIPRI Research Report identifies points of convergence and divergence. Its conclusions will inform a broader SIPRI project that maps cyber posture trajectories and explores trilateral cyber dynamics among China, Russia and the USA to assist the EU in navigating future cyber escalation and enhancing global cyber stability.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Information Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

1002. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

1003. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:
Régis Genté
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

1004. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1005. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:
Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

1006. Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
This explainer begins by recounting how an American-led NATO, a key element in U.S. global primacy, lived on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat it was meant to deter—and, if necessary, defeat. The next section highlights the implicit bargain that has sustained NATO: U.S. preponderance in Europe, achieved by the American willingness to serve as the continent’s indispensable protector, in exchange for Europeans’ freedom to spend more on butter and less on guns. Next comes a set of proposals to move NATO from burden sharing, a perennial point of contention within the pact, to a more far-reaching change, burden shifting, an idea that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made even more feasible and prudent. The explainer concludes by assaying the prospects for burden shifting and challenging prominent counterarguments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

1007. On the Controversial Illegality of the Unilateral Use of Force for the Prevention of Genocide: The ‘Doubtfulness’ Clause Adopted by the ICJ in the Case Filed by Ukraine Against Russia

Author:
Fethullah Bayraktar
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The ICJ in its order dated 16 March 2022, decided that the legality of the unilateral use of force to prevent acts of genocide is ‘doubtful’. Based on this order, it is possible to say that the ICJ provides a yellow light to unilateral use of force for the prevention of acts of genocide. But the ICJ expressed its opinion in this respect in 2007, underlining that every state may only act within the limits permitted by international law. The doctrine underscored that the unilateral use of force for the prevention of genocide was forbidden. In this situation, the following question arises: is it really doubtful? To find the answer to this question, it is necessary to examine the legal basis and means for the prevention of genocide. In this article, the legality of the unilateral use of force for the obligation to prevent genocide has been comprehensively discussed.
Topic:
Genocide, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), International Court of Justice (ICJ), Russia-Ukraine War, and Aggression
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1008. Ukraine–Russia Conflict: India’s Energy Security

Author:
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
Any major upheaval or crisis in any part of the world, particularly one that involves an energy-producing country, has an immediate impact on the energy markets. But, barring the first ‘oil shock’ in 1973, which caused an initial spike in prices, the markets have settled down, particularly once it is established that the energy supplies will not be affected. However, since February 2022, following the onset of the Russian–Ukraine conflict, energy security has returned to the forefront of national security concerns. Oil and other energy prices are climbing to record levels, hovering around US$100 a barrel. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the Ukraine war will severely set back global economic recovery from the COVID–19 pandemic, increase inflation, cause grave risks to the financial system, and even potentially fragment the world economy into geopolitical blocs (Gourinchas, 2022: 10–11). What makes the current conflict different from earlier crises? After all, the canvas of the conflict is essentially restricted to the European theatre and should, therefore, have limited fallout. Even when Russia attacked and annexed Crimea in 2014, the energy markets did not witness the kind of reaction and response the current Russia–Ukraine conflict is experiencing.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Oil, Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, South Asia, Ukraine, and India

1009. Overcoming American Hegemony: The Central Paradox of Chinese and Russian Revisionism

Author:
Adam P. MacDonald
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
China and Russia are adopting increasingly assertive dispositions to reconstitute local geopolitical environments to their strategic advantage, requiring the erosion of American anchored hegemonic networks in their respective home regions. Despite growing material power bases, these pursuits are and will most likely continue to be unsuccessful. First, they are seen as threatening to other regional powers who are increasingly working together to counteract them. Second, these counterbalancing efforts reinforce the importance of the United States, given its still preponderant capabilities and networked centrality, in facilitating the coordination of existing and new political, economic and security arrangements which are increasingly oriented against China and Russia. A central paradox lies at the heart of these powers’ revisionist approaches: their actions inhibit desired new geopolitical realities, principally defined by alignment patterns, from emerging by reinforcing rather than displacing American hegemonic regional networks. Despite the negative strategic results being produced, it is expected both powers will double down on their current approaches to try to impose favorable regional realities before their power capacity wanes as domestic challenges grow. China and Russia are not existential challenges to but rather re-invigorate American hegemonic networks and its leading role within them. The greatest threat to American hegemony is not external but internal in terms of domestic alienation against the hegemonic project itself.
Topic:
Hegemony, Geopolitics, Rivalry, Multipolarity, and Revisionism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

1010. Russia’s military after Ukraine: down but not out

Author:
Łukasz Kulesa(ed.)
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The June 2022 Madrid Summit decided on the next steps in enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture, describing Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.1 The poor performance of the Russian forces in the first months of their war against Ukraine and the scale of casualties and material losses they suffered should however prompt further reflection about Russia’s ability to recover and challenge NATO militarily. If the Russian military seems unable to prevail over Ukrainian forces (supported by a number of NATO countries), it may reasonably be asked whether unrolling “the biggest overhaul of our collective defence and deterrence since the end of the Cold War”2 is justified. This Policy Brief argues that NATO’s goals to shore up the Eastern flank are indeed warranted for three reasons – Russia’s political will to claim a victory, evidence of learning from past mistakes, and the existing Russian industrial capacity. In fact, the Russian military will probably experience a relatively speedy recovery. With the caveat that much is contingent on day-to-day developments and the ultimate outcome of the war, it is also plausible that Russia will “build back better” rather than simply rebuild a military which has proven to be ill-prepared for the operation against Ukraine.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Madrid Summit
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine