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181. The Impact of Climate and Geopolitical Changes on Russia’s Energy Policies in The Arctic Region

Author:
Ferdi Güçyetmez and Sina Kısacık
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
After the Industrial Revolution, the energy resources under the polar ice sheets became even more important for becoming a global power. Providing the security of this energy, as well as its utilisation, is a very challenging process for countries. However, a new challenge has recently been added to these challenges: The Climate Crisis. In the new global system, new Arctic-centred policies must cover three important issues: Climate, security and energy. Russia has the longest border in the Arctic Circle. Russia’s challenge in the Arctic is not only to extract energy but also to protect it and deliver it safely to ports. Therefore, Russia needs to formulate security policies without ignoring geopolitics and climate, which are of vital importance for its national borders. In this study, Russia’s new energy security will be analysed by considering the effects of climate and geopolitics changes on the Arctic region. The focus will be on valuable minerals and energy transportation from the Arctic region. The research question is: How is Russia adapting its energy security policies in the Arctic region in response to the dual challenges of climate change and geopolitical security, focusing on the extraction and transportation of precious minerals and energy resources?
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia and Arctic

182. Israel, Europe, and the Russia-Iran Axis

Author:
Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
With the world divided between a U.S.-led order of democracies on the one hand, and a cartel of aggressive autocracies – China, Russia, Iran and North Korea – on the other, that is challenging America and its allies, Europe has an important role to play in Israel’s war against Iran and its proxies.
Topic:
National Security, Autocracy, Proxy Groups, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

183. Dirty Warfare? The Application of International Law to Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants in the Conduct of Hostilities

Author:
Julia Vassileva
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine poses multiple threats to international security, with nuclear safety and nuclear weapons returning to the forefront of global politics. Alongside verbal threats of using tactical nuclear weapons, Russia’s invasion plans have included attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as the shelling of the Zaporizhzhia complex in Ukraine. These actions raise critical questions about the application of international law to military operations involving NPPs and liability for resulting nuclear damage. This paper examines the scope of international law in such scenarios and concludes with implications from the perspective of strategic studies and NATO nuclear policy.
Topic:
International Law, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

184. Artillery in Present and Future High-Intensity Operations

Author:
Elio Calcagno, Bryan Clark, Sam Cranny-Evans, Alessandro Marrone, Nicolò Murgia, and Eugenio Po
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has highlighted among NATO allies the importance of planning for protracted, large-scale, and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, artillery capabilities have regained significance, with a clear emphasis on survivability, quality, quantity, range, but also on adequate munition stocks and production capacity. However, successful integration into a wider array of capabilities (including long range precision fires) and advanced Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities are crucial for an effective artillery force. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, recent events in the Red Sea have shown how naval artillery is gaining a prominent role as a cost-effective solution to defence from drone and swarming threats.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Procurement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Italy, and United States of America

185. US-Germany Missile Agreement: Deterrence or Escalation?

Author:
Polina Sinovets
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
This October was marked by a statement by the Head of the German Foreign Service Intelligence, Bruno Kahl, who claimed that by the end of this decade at the latest, Russian troops could “carry out an attack” against NATO.[1] The defence chief could hardly be accused of hyperbole. His comments took place at the time of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the Kremlin’s growing nuclear blackmail of the West and regular threats to use some measures[2] against any NATO country whose military deployments might potentially affect Russian missiles’ striking capabilities. Against this backdrop and with the new US administration coming to power in 2025 under the slogan of turning all its attention to China, Europe will have to care much more about its defence and security than before 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the weak spots of the European NATO pillar in terms of arms production, military budgeting and general preparedness for a large-scale war in European territory, which turns out to be critical for the security of the continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

186. The Fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Regime: A Strategic Blow to Russia

Author:
Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime marks a pivotal moment in Syria’s history, one that Middle East experts will undoubtedly scrutinise for its broader implications. Yet, for those studying Russia, the situation holds a clear message: the downfall of Syria’s dictator is a strategic blow for Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

187. The securitization of foreign disinformation

Author:
Nicole J. Jackson
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper analyses the Canadian government’s foreign and security policy responses to Russian disinformation in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It asks whether, how, and why the government has securitised the “crisis of Russian disinformation.” The paper first briefly reviews literature on the Copenhagen’s School’s “securitisation” theory and how it has been used to explain responses to other crises. It then adopts the framework to contextualise the Canadian federal government’s official rhetoric, and then to categorise government policies and actions. The sources consulted include government actors’ reports and stated intentions and policies from 2022 to 2024. Adopting a securitisation framework reveals that Russian disinformation has been rhetorically securitised by government actors as an existential threat to national security and democratic integrity which requires urgent action. Within a context of cascading risks, the government has taken a range of distinct yet reinforcing policies and actions, some more comprehensive than others. The paper argues that together this “pervasive rhetorical securitisation” and “ad hoc practical securitisation” comprise the Canadian government’s ongoing process of partial securitisation. This process is legitimising different methods of governance: security and warfare communications (to address threats to national defence and security), democratic resilience (to address threats to democracy), and, most controversially, blocking and sanctioning (to signal discontent to the Russian regime). The analysis further reveals that each approach has different benefits and limits. The paper concludes that the securitisation process is incomplete compared to the government's rhetoric, with no over-arching organisation or strategy. It outlines implications for future research.
Topic:
International Security, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, Securitization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Canada

188. Nuclear power plants in war zones: Lessons learned from the war in Ukraine

Author:
Joanna Przybylak
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to examine the lessons learned till mid-2023 from the war in Ukraine to find out how attacking or seizing nuclear power plants (NPPs) can be utilised to advance military and political objectives during an armed conflict. The qualitative research approach has been applied to the study, focusing on an analysis of academic research and relevant acts of international law. In order to examine Russia’s approach to the attacks against the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, numerous reports, official statements by the authorities, press releases, and Internet sources have been analysed. For evaluation of nuclear security and safety standards in Ukraine, the “seven pillars” model proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been adopted. The study indicates that strategically located NPPs can be used as “nuclear shields” for the occupying forces deployed at the plant or nearby. They may also become useful tools of “lawfare” waged with the use of flawed interpretations of international humanitarian law. Finally, nuclear security-related narrations analysed in the paper clearly prove that seized NPPs can be effectively used in information warfare. The research leads to the conclusion that civil NPPs in war zones can be weaponised and exploited by the hostile forces not only for impeding energy supplies (and thus shattering the public morale of the adversary) but also for blackmailing and coercing the decisionmakers of the attacked state and their international allies with a vision of man-made nuclear disaster.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

189. Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Marlena Zadorożna and Marin Butuc
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Russian disinformation carried out as part of the ongoing war in Ukraine is becoming a challenge for neighbouring countries that border the conflict region. The aim of the analysis was to identify common features between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland, which, as two of the countries that border Ukraine, were on a list of Russia’s main targets for disinformation in 2022. The geopolitical and historical importance of both countries increases their social polarisation. The study was therefore guided by the following research question: What common features can be distinguished between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland? The research took the form of an open comparison. According to the approach used, the empirical cases used for comparison were not explicitly limited a priori. In order to carry out the research, however, preliminary assumptions were adopted that ensured temporal, conceptual, and interpretative comparability of the data. Research results proved that Russian disinformation in both countries is based on the following common features: creating internal divisions, propagation of distrust towards the West, stimulating social emotions, use of social media, and popularising pro-Russian narratives. Analysing these areas may be helpful in increasing the ability of states to detect and disclose disinformation. Scientific publications describing Russian disinformation focus on the national perspective, which does not always correspond to the transnational nature of disinformation campaigns. Meanwhile, this article synthesises knowledge about disinformation mechanisms occurring in two countries bordering the conflict region and draws attention to the need for research in this area.
Topic:
Communications, Disinformation, Fake News, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland

190. Kosovo in Russian Foreign Policy- Discourse Fostering Instability in Kosovo and Countering Euro-Atlantic Integration

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi, Ardit Orana, and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Russian influence and interests in the Western Balkans are primarily centered around Serbia. According to a 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI), for Kosovar citizens, after Serbia (83%), Russia (8%) is seen as the main threat to the country, while 87% say that the country’s foreign policy should only be pro-European Union and pro-West, and 59% say that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely unjustified. Main takeaways from this paper include: Russia deploys state-controlled media (RT, Sputnik) and partners with Iranian outlets to spread narratives portraying Kosovo as a failed state, full of instability. Russia capitalizes on deep cultural, religious, and political ties with Serbia to maintain influence in the Balkans, utilizing ties with the the Serbian Orthodox Church and with Serbian elites to the detriment of Kosovo. There are indications that Russia had prior knowledge of or involvement in the Banjska terrorist attack in Kosovo, aimed at escalating tensions. By stirring instability in Kosovo, Russia aims to divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine, creating a multi-front challenge for NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Interests, Instability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Serbia, and Western Balkans