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1. Palestine: Public Opinion Report 2023, Part 2

Author:
Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize SaudiIsraeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This report is the second in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses one important issues covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of various international and regional actors and other international relations issues. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier, and one poll conducted after AB8.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Normalization, and October 7
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Qatar

2. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack

Author:
Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar

3. Is the Muslim Brotherhood losing Turkey and Qatar in the light of the rapprochement with Egypt?

Author:
Michael Barak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Egypt's relations with Turkey and Qatar have been improving for the last six months, following a long period of diplomatic crises and hostility that lasted eight years and four years, respectively. This rapprochement is an attempt to reset relations in a way that would allow all three parties to maintain their good relations with the new U.S. administration. As a condition for normalizing ties, Egypt had demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). This demand has been described in the Arab media as an ominous sign for the MB, which feared it would be sacrificed on the altar of Turkish and Qatari state interests. However, the discourse of the MB's members on the subject, the continued anti-Egyptian remarks of senior Turkish government officials, and the intention of the Egyptian government to execute senior MB leaders suggests that the chances of Turkey and the MB ending their relationship are quite slim. Qatar, for its part, continues to allow the MB's members to find refuge within its borders, but at the same time is not interested in provoking Egypt.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Government, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

4. Israel's Relations with Arab Countries: The Unfulfilled Potential

Author:
Roee Kibrik, Nimrod Goren, and Merav Kahana-Dagan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries: The Unfulfilled Potential examines relations between Israel and seven key Arab states – Egypt. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Morocco and Iraq – against the backdrop of the changes sweeping the Middle East over the past decade. The researchers mapped out the potential for cooperation with each state based on shared interests, challenges and opportunities, and on the abilities, strengths and needs of Israel and those states. The researchers described existing diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation – relying on open source material, their expertise in the arena and interviews they conducted. The studies found that despite progress in cooperation between Israel and Arab countries, and notwithstanding certain growing normalization with specific Middle Eastern countries, the strategic-diplomatic, economic, social, civilian and cultural opportunities are significant and far greater than their current level. There is wide-ranging, unfulfilled potential in Israel’s relations with Arab countries, and it is more evident now than it was in the past. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and absence of significant progress in resolving it constitute the main obstacle to tapping the potential for cooperation between Israel and the Arab world, capping relations with a glass ceiling. In formulating its policy and actions in the region, Israel should learn the lessons of the past. It must take into consideration current realities and limitations, existing interests and processes. Just as important, it must also shape its actions, assessing and choosing from among various alternatives with a view to the future potential and tremendous promise they hold out. We hope this publication helps those interested in sketching the current complex picture and the potential that lies in relations between Israel and major Arab countries, and paves the way to expanded cooperation and normalization between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East. As the studies in this publication indicate, the potential for regional cooperation is great and its realization also depends on progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and UAE

5. The Battle for the Soul of Islam

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
It is not the caliphate that the world’s Muslim powerhouses are fighting about. Instead, they are engaged in a deepening religious soft power struggle for geopolitical influence and dominance. This battle for the soul of Islam pits rival Middle Eastern and Asian powers against one another: Turkey, seat of the Islamic world’s last true caliphate; Saudi Arabia, home to the faith’s holy cities; the United Arab Emirates, propagator of a militantly statist interpretation of Islam; Qatar with its less strict version of Wahhabism and penchant for political Islam; Indonesia, promoting a humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam that reaches out to other faiths as well as non-Muslim centre-right forces across the globe; Morocco which uses religion as a way to position itself as the face of moderate Islam; and Shia Iran with its derailed revolution. In the ultimate analysis, no clear winner may emerge. Yet, the course of the battle could determine the degree to which Islam will be defined by either one or more competing stripes of ultra-conservativism—statist forms of the faith that preach absolute obedience to political rulers and/or reduce religious establishments to pawns of the state.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Islam, Politics, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

6. Qatar Without Tamim Sudden Succession Essay Series

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Qatar's break with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors remains unresolved, and rumors circulate of bids to replace Tamim bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar’s forty-year-old emir, with one of his historically marginalized rivals. The Washington Institute has been sponsoring a series of discussions about sudden succession in the Middle East. Each session focuses on scenarios that might unfold if a specific ruler or leader departed the scene tomorrow. Questions include these: Would the sudden change lead to different policies? Would it affect the stability of the respective countries involved, or the region as a whole? What would be the impact on U.S. interests? Would the manner of a leader's departure make a difference? The discussions also probe how the U.S. government might adjust to the new situation or influence outcomes. This essay, twelfth in the series, explores Qatar, known historically as a refuge for “banished leaders, fleeing criminals, exiled religious figures, and other waifs and strays.” But the Gulf nation’s neighbors have long bridled at its independent streak, as shown by the 2017 rift with Saudi Arabia and three other regional states. The break—spurred by a perception of Qatari support for terrorism, closeness to Iran, and a range of other complaints—remains unresolved today, and rumors circulate of bids to replace Tamim bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar’s forty-year-old emir, with one of his historically marginalized rivals.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Qatar and Gulf Nations

7. The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Pandemic

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The fight against the spread of the coronavirus in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has forced cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, which were in conflict within the GCC. At the same time, the UAE took advantage of other countries’ need for support in countering COVID-19 to strengthen relations with China, Iran, and Syria, among others. The UAE’s activity emphasizes its ambition for domination of the region, which may lead to a new dispute within the GCC between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

8. The Lingering Stalemate: Qatar’s Blockade Awaits a Mediation Exit

Author:
Mohammed Cherkaoui
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
On June 6, 2020, the Qatari crisis entered its fourth year with two parallel political discourses, which have endured the complexity of issues between Qatar and the Quartet [Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt] since early June 2017: a) diplomatic hopes in the U.S.-backed Kuwaiti mediation amidst several gestures of rapprochement between the Qataris and the Saudis; and b) disparity of positions by the disputing parties while maintaining status quo politics. The Trump administration has urged the Quartet capitals to reopen their airspace for Qatari airlines as a step toward ending the open-ended blockade. The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. officials saying "there is a greater sense of urgency to resolve the airspace issue. It's an ongoing irritation for us that money goes into Iran's coffers due to Qatar Airways overflights." (1) The Trump White House has been irritated by the so-called "overfly fees" that Qatar pays to Iran to use its airspace. There is growing hope Washington’s call will trigger momentum for lifting the land and sea blockade imposed on Qatar as well. Qatar’s foreign minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani hopes “the initiative will produce results, we are open to dialogue and ready to meet each step forward with 10 steps from our side.” (2) Unlike the Saudis, the Emiratis have maintained the 2017 demands, and UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash insists “this issue will stay with us, and we have to manage it in a better way until we reach a future stage.” He has often characterized the blockade as “a result of Doha's interference policies," and argued "the solution for this crisis should be based on dealing with the causes of it." (3) As a result, the three-year blockade is causing a hurting stalemate for both sides of the Gulf conflict. In his new book “Qatar and the Gulf Crisis”, Kristian C. Ulrichsen argues the blockade has become “stuck at a political level where the Saudi and Emirati leadership—and especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed—appear reluctant to make the first move to offer concessions or progress to a negotiated compromise.” (4) This paper examines some major narrative turns of the Quartet-Qatar showdown and the transformation of Trump’s position. It traces the possibility of a de-escalation shift along Washington’s pursuit of mediation in the framework of the Kuwaiti diplomacy; and weighs on the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a counterbalance of the Arab Gulf strategic (dis)unity and common existentialism in a turbulent region.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi

9. Israel and Qatar: Relations Nurtured by the Palestinian Issue

Author:
Michal Yaari
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This article focuses on relations between Israel and Qatar, analyzing them in historical context, in the context of Qatari foreign policy and in terms of their potential and the limitations imposed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The article describes the shift from a mutual conception of hostility to unusual cooperation over the Gaza crisis. While Israel aspires to avoid additional rounds of violence with Gaza, Qatar seeks to strengthen its regional role as a mediator, and mutual interests converge into joint activity to avert an additional military clash between Hamas and Israel. The cooperation between the states illustrates how the Palestinian issue can leverage regional cooperation. At the same time, the untapped diplomatic, economic and civilian potential of Israel-Qatar relations points to the limitations imposed by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Economy, Conflict, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar

10. Turkey between Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Changing Regional and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Birol Baskan
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper discusses how Turkey’s bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar have changed after the Arab Spring erupted and assesses how the Syrian conflict affected them. The paper argues that Turkey had developed excellent relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the 2000s, but eventually fell out with Saudi Arabia and strengthened its relations with Qatar as the Arab Spring unfolded. The Syrian conflict, in which the three countries colluded to overthrow the Assad regime, has alleviated the deleterious impact of the differences between Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the bilateral relations or, to put it in another way, slowed down the deterioration of Turkey-Saudi Arabia relations. The paper also argues that the geopolitical landscape that pushed Turkey and Saudi Arabia apart also pushed Turkey and Qatar closer.
Topic:
International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Qatar