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1. The New Rules of the Game: Unfolding the targeting of an Israeli oil tanker in the Arabian Sea

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Friday, July 30, Iran targeted the Mercer Street oil tanker in the Northern Arabian Sea off the Omani port of Duqm, which was on its way from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Fujairah in the UAE, killing two crew members: a British and a Romanian. The Israeli ship was attacked by one or more drones. The attack came in two waves. The first wave was the bombing of the tanker with missiles carried by a normal drone. As the damage was limited, a larger suicide attack was launched on the dormitories of the ship's crew, with the aim of causing casualties, which actually resulted in the deaths of a British and a Romanian. The oil tanker belongs to the London-based Zodiac Maritime company, which is part of the Zodiac company owned by Israeli businessman Eyal Ofer. This is the second attack within the month of July, as the first one took place on July 3, targeting Csav Tyndall, which is also owned by Eyal Ofer.
Topic:
Oil, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Persian Gulf

2. Saudi Arabia: A Colossus with Clay Feets/Arabia Saudí: Un coloso con los pies de barro

Author:
Eugenia López-Jacoiste Díaz
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The political-religious foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism that marks its identity, society and politics. The Al Saud dynasty defends and expands Sunni Islam in the region and beyond its borders. In order to understand the interests and objectives of Saudi foreign policy, this article analyzes the main geopolitical elements at the service of the stability and hegemony of the Al Saud house in the most turbulent region of the Middle East. The Saudi government is developing a foreign policy, unsuspected in the past, to maintain its historic alliance with Washington, despite the ups and downs, and to transform the old rivalries between Riyadh and Tehran into new opportunities, including with Israel. This change in Saudi foreign policy is due to the controversial Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman who knows how to take advantage of the changing regional geopolitics and Saudi financial instruments, but also the military and technological in favor of a more proactive and modern Saudi Arabia, despite his weaknesses./El fundamento político-religioso del Reino de Arabia Saudí es el wahabismo que marca su identidad, su sociedad y su política. La dinastía Al Saud defiende y expande el islam sunní en la región y fuera de sus fronteras. Para poder entender los intereses y objetivos de la política exterior saudí, este artículo analiza los principales elementos geopolíticos al servicio de la estabilidad y hegemonía de la casa Al Saud en la región más convulsa de Oriente Medio. El Gobierno saudí está desarrollando una política exterior, insospechada en el pasado para mantener su histórica alianza con Washington, a pesar de los altibajos, y transformar las viejas rivalidades entre Riad y Teherán en nuevas oportunidades, incluso con Israel. Este cambio en la política exterior saudí se debe al controvertido Príncipe Heredero Mohamed bin Salmán que sabe aprovechar la cambiante geopolítica regional y los instrumentos financieros saudíes, pero también los militares y tecnológicos a favor de una Arabia Saudí más proactiva y moderna, a pesar de sus debilidades.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Oil, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Wahhabism
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

3. 5 Reasons Why a Global Agreement to Prop Up Oil Prices Won’t Work

Author:
Jason Bordoff
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
In April 1986, U.S. Vice President George H.W. Bush traveled to Saudi Arabia with a request for King Fahd, the country’s ruler at the time: Please raise the price of oil. After falling around 60 percent over the course of a few months, cheap oil was becoming a “two-edged sword for America,” Bush explained. Consumers might enjoy low prices at the gas pump, but evaporating revenues for U.S. oil producers undermined America’s own oil supply, and thus its national security. That was the last time the White House publicly sought more expensive oil—until now. U.S. President Donald Trump has been pushing Saudi Arabia and Russia to cut output in the hopes that less crude on the market will raise oil prices, which have fallen by two-thirds since the start of the year. A low oil price threatens an already teetering U.S. shale oil sector with a wave of bankruptcies and job losses. All eyes are therefore on OPEC and its allies, which will meet by videoconference on Thursday to discuss the way forward—followed by an emergency meeting of G-20 energy ministers on Friday, where the United States will be represented as well. It was at the last meeting of OPEC and key non-OPEC producers in Vienna on March 6 that Russia refused to go along with a Saudi proposal for deeper production cuts. The subsequent surge in Saudi supply set off a vicious price war that has seen the price of oil briefly fall below $20 a barrel.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and OPEC
Political Geography:
Middle East and Persian Gulf

4. An easy target? Types of attack on oil tankers by state actors

Author:
Maciej Hacaga
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
There was a huge reaction to the attacks that took place in the Gulf of Oman in May and June 2019 but, in fact, attacks on oil tankers are a century old problem. Oil tankers appear to be easy targets because of their size and cargo. The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of different types of attack on oil tankers that have been undertaken since widespread use of oil began. A comparative case-study approach was adopted to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of attack on oil tankers over the long-term, namely the last century. It briefly reviews the destructiveness of three anti-tanker campaigns during the two World Wars. They are subsequently compared with two post-1945 sets of attacks in the Persian Gulf region – the Tanker War of the 1980s and the 2019 attacks. The scale of damages inflicted by attacks on oil tankers is varied. The experience of both World Wars shows their effectiveness. However, post-1945 events do not provide confirmatory evidence. The main difference is the scale of hostile activities. It is not the characteristics of tankers that make them easy targets but political conditions (war/peace state of international system) that enable the application of weapons and tactics that bring about a different scale of destruction.
Topic:
Security, Oil, International Security, History, Maritime, Economic Security, and Energy
Political Geography:
Persian Gulf

5. Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil

Author:
Lawrence G Potter
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
Abstract:
This essay takes as its focus society in the Persian Gulf over the long term, both before and after oil. In order to understand the transitions society has gone through, it is necessary to review the region’s historical evolution and how society in the Gulf today differs from that of the pre-oil era. The Gulf is presented as a distinct historical region, where a tradition of free movement helped account for the success of its port cities, themselves linked more to the Indian Ocean basin than the Middle East. In the twentieth century, the historic ties that connected the people of the Gulf littoral were curtailed as nationalism became the dominant ideology, and borders and passports were imposed. After oil was discovered and exports began following World War II, the small Gulf shaikhdoms, most of which were under British protection until 1971, experienced a surge in revenues that ushered in the modern era. Newly independent states sought to impose a new identity, manipulate history, and exploit sectarian cleavages to solidify the power of ruling dynasties. The historic cosmopolitanism of the Gulf was ignored by states that privileged the tribal, Bedouin heritage of their leaders. Arabs and Persians, both Sunni and Shi‘a, as well as many other groups have lived with each other in the region for many centuries, during which mutual differences occasionally led to conflict. But the current mistrust, tension, and sense of vulnerability felt by all sides is a product of the modern age.
Topic:
Nationalism, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Religion, Maritime Commerce, and Independence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean

6. Misperceiving U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf: Raising the Hidden Costs of U.S. Dependence on Oil

Author:
Steve A. Yetiv
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
United States foreign policy in the Middle East over the last few decades has been controversial and checkered, and Washington has certainly flexed its muscles in the region. However, the question arises as to how aggressive America has been with regard to oil in the region. I distinguish between two perspectives in how America is viewed, which we can simply call the offensive and defensive perspectives, recognizing that there is a continuum of views. From the offensive perspective, America is viewed as having one or more of these goals: steal or own Middle East oil; control Middle East oil in order to undermine Muslims; dominate Middle East oil to advance global hegemony; or exercise “puppet” control over oil producers like Saudi Arabia to coerce them into charging far lower oil prices than markets would warrant.1 By contrast, from the defensive perspective, America chiefly aims to prevent others from threatening oil supplies in a manner that would spike global oil prices and possibly cause a recession or depression. Muslim opinion polls have revealed that oil issues are a broader source of tension in relations between elements of the Muslim world and the West. The U.S. role in oil-related issues feeds into historical, political, and religious perspectives of an imperialist and power-hungry America. In fact, a not uncommon view in the Middle East is that America seeks to exploit, even steal the region’s oil resources, a viewpoint much in line with the offensive perspective described above. I argue that the history of America’s role in the region suggests that this is largely a misconception, and that this misconception is not immaterial. It seriously raises the cost of the use of oil and of American regional intervention. This misconception not only stokes terrorism and anti-Americanism, but also complicates America’s relations with Middle Eastern countries, affects its image among Muslims, and hurts its global leverage insofar as such views become internationally prominent. Indeed, it is almost a maxim in many capitals in the Middle East that close cooperation with Washington carries a domestic political cost. Recall, for example, that the Saudis were initially reluctant to host American forces after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, even though they felt seriously threatened by Saddam Hussein.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, North America, and Persian Gulf

7. War and the Oil Price Cycle

Author:
Amy Myers and Jaffe Jareer Elass
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Oil has shaped international conflict for decades. According to one estimate, twenty-five to fifty percent of interstate wars between 1973 and 2012 had oil-related linkages. 1 But the cyclical nature of oil’s contribution to global conflict is not well understood. Not only are oil prices cyclical, but the geopolitics of oil are linked inexorably to the same boom and bust price cycle. Military adventurism, proxy wars and regional pathologies in the Middle East expand and contract with the ebb and flow of massive petrodollar accumulations related to the oil price cycle. The massive inflow of petrodollar revenues when oil prices are high creates disposable incomes that can be easily dispensed on regional arms races, especially since oil consuming countries like the United States are incentivized to increase arms sales as a means of solving oil import related trade deficits. Besides transferring wealth from industrialized countries to oil producers in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region and Russia (and stimulating renewed drilling for oil and gas in North America), high global oil and natural gas prices also slow global economic growth and encourage energy conservation. This causes petroleum demand to slow globally, lowering oil prices. Social and political problems in the region reemerge as oil prices recede. Regional governments have fewer resources to spend on restive populations that have become accustomed to generous handouts enabled by high oil prices. Job creation and visible social programs slow, dissatisfaction rises, and the consequences of economic downturns incite support for militants. Ensuing instability forces governments to use newly purchased arms, which ironically begins the cycle yet again, as new conflicts disrupt oil supplies. In this manner, the world experiences perpetuating patterns of military conflict, followed by oil supply crises, and accompanying global financial instability. In effect, the Middle East resource curse has become globalized. The challenges this is presenting on humanitarian, security and economic fronts have become increasingly dangerous. The arms race that has accompanied the rise of oil prices over the 2000s has been no exception and is now all the more complicated due to the violent participation of sub-national radicalized groups that are less susceptible to diplomatic pressures or initiatives. In this emerging geopolitical context, the rise of violent subnational groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda are increasingly putting oil infrastructure at risk, laying the groundwork for a future oil crisis that may prove harder to solve than in the past. As borders and ruling institutions have become contested, so has control of the region’s major oil and gas facilities. Initially an outgrowth of disunity inside Iraq, the conflict over oil and gas facilities is now accelerating across ungoverned territories, with important long-term consequences for global energy markets. Mideast oil and gas production capacity, along with surface facilities, are increasingly being damaged in ways that will make them hard to repair. Export disruptions, which were once sporadic, are becoming a more permanent feature of the civil war landscape. The level of destroyed capacity is currently estimated at about 2 million b/d and rising.2 The longer Mideast conflicts fester, the more that infrastructure could become at risk. There is an additional element to this oil and war story that links structurally with the oil boom and bust cycle. As oil prices recede, along with a decreased demand for oil and accelerating regional conflict, wealthy oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, are often tempted to use large oil production capacity as a strategic asset. They flood the market with increased supplies in order to lower prices, thereby hurting geopolitical rivals. This price war strategy, which was notably present during the prolonged Soviet war in Afghanistan and the eight year Iran-Iraq War, temporarily ameliorates the short run effects of war on surface export facilities through excessive production rates. In addition, it lays the seeds for the future uptick in the oil market, by discouraging investment in future oil productive capacity outside the Middle East when prices are extremely low. In the case of the 2000s, the destruction caused by ISIS on the oil sector in many locations around the Middle East, combined with expected losses in investment in other parts of the world (like Canada’s oil sands and the Arctic due to current low oil prices), may be creating the conditions for a future oil supply crunch. This has major implications on U.S. policy. This article asserts that the United State would be, in light of these circumstances in the Middle East, unwise to dismantle its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as has been suggested on Capitol Hill. It would be similarly unwise for the United States to lose focus on the importance of conservation efforts in the transportation sector which has both national security and climate benefits. The United States would benefit strategically from a reevaluation of its ban on oil exports. Finally, the United States should place a greater emphasis on conflict resolution in troubled states. By resolving internal conflicts over the distribution of oil revenues, the United States can better pave the way for long-term solutions whereby those same revenues can be integrated into national budgets in ways that brings economic prosperity to populations instead of rising military expenditure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, North America, and Persian Gulf