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82. A Reading on the Future of Hamas
- Author:
- Omar Shaban
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- The aftermath of October 7, and assassination of senior commanders, has forced an existential rethink within Hamas
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza
83. The economic and social costs of the war in Gaza
- Author:
- Perrihan Al-Riffai
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- A year after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, which later expanded into Lebanon, the two countries in conflict, the Middle East region, and the global economy have been significantly affected. In Gaza, the war has caused nearly $18.5 billion in infrastructure damage, according to preliminary assessments by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union. The onset of the war also led to supply and demand shocks, causing a 21 percent year-on-year decline in Israeli economic activity in the fourth quarter. Lebanon, already deep in an economic crisis before the war, has seen one of its few stable income sources—tourism—collapse. Additionally, as international shipping routes are redirected away from the Suez Canal to avoid risks in the Red Sea, one of Egypt’s primary sources of revenue in foreign currency. In addition to the war, a convergence of factors—high inflation, mounting debt, population displacement, and natural disasters—has created a complex crisis across the region. This combination threatens to deepen poverty and inequality while intensifying climate-related impacts. This report reviews and analyzes the economic impact of the Gaza war on the countries at the epicenter, including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, as well as the wider region, including the Maghreb countries and the GCC, and the global economy. It tracks the impact on overall economic growth, key sectors, and other implications such as financial volatility, disinvestment, fiscal burdens, and pressure on the oil market. While the report provides comprehensive coverage of these elements, it is worth noting that the war is expanding to involve additional players, and its impact will likely continue to grow.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Tariffs, Macroeconomics, Trade, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
84. Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State
- Author:
- Yossi Mekelberg
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- The total stalemate in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires new thinking and weaning off of old paradigms. Currently as the result of the Hamas attack on October 7, the ensuring war in Gaza, and the deterioration of security in the occupied West Bank, the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians are at their worst since 1948 and seem the least conducive to a new a peace process. However, events have demonstrated to the international community that allowing this conflict to fester has had disastrous consequences not only for Israelis and Palestinians, but it has also had far-reaching implications across the region and the rest of the international community. This paper argues that an important step to break the deadlock is recognition of Palestinian statehood by individual countries and by international organizations, in particular the UN Security Council. Such recognition should incentivize both sides to negotiate peace based on a two-state solution, as it would overcome the asymmetry in the negotiations between a recognized state and movement representing its people. It will empower the pragmatic elements in both societies who are invested in peace, and will also send a clear message of sincerity from the international community that a two-state solution is the one it is behind and it will support.
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, United Nations, State, UN Security Council, 2023 Gaza War, and Peace Process
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
85. Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War
- Author:
- Aziz Alghashian
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- The paper aims to shed light on the obstacles and opportunities of Saudi involvement in a future Palestinian-Israeli peace process. It first explains the enigmatic nature of Saudi communication towards Israel and explains why Saudi pragmatism has been misunderstood. The paper also explains the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel, and that Saudi-Israeli normalization is treated as a gateway to a larger game-changing strategic treaty with the United States, rather than a keenness to cooperate with Israel itself. In addition, the paper argues that while the Saudi ruling elite are willing to play financial and security roles in “reconstructing” Gaza, it is unforeseeable that this will ensue without a credible peace process that can justify these efforts, especially against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its own economy. The paper then explains the ways in which Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, and European states can help cooperate in areas such as building a Palestinian economic horizon that can strengthen the Palestinian-Israeli political framework; developing Palestinian-Israeli green cooperation; and developing an Arab-Israeli network of academics, experts, and journalists that can be an intersection of top-down and bottom-up projects that aim to reach a two-state solution.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Normalization, 2023 Gaza War, and Peace Process
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Saudi Arabia
86. April 2024 Issue
- Author:
- Michael Knights, Sean Morrow, Asher Spain, Kevin Jackson, and Paul D. Williams
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights provides a highly detailed assessment of the six-month Houthi war effort that has seen the Tehran-backed group launch missiles at Israel and attack shipping off the coasts of Yemen. He assesses that: “The Houthis have used the Gaza crisis to vault into the front ranks of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance,’ arguably as the only axis partner to truly globalize the conflict through their anti-shipping attacks on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The movement has demonstrated boldness—as the first axis member to fire ballistic missiles at Israel—and resilience in the face of U.S.-U.K. airstrikes. The Houthis are likely to emerge from the war as a more confident, ambitious, and aggressive terrorist army, with a taste for provocative and eye-catching acts of defiance against Israel and the United States.” Our interview is with Colonel (Ret.) Miri Eisin, the director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University who previously served in a variety of senior intelligence roles in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). She stresses the need to learn lessons from the intelligence failures that preceded the Hamas-led October 7 attack so that Israel is not surprised again, for example with regard to the kind of threat Hezbollah could pose in the coming months. “All of us made wrong assumptions, and the combination of all of them brought about a colossal failure,” she says. “We collectively were wrong about the capability. We were wrong about the intentions. We were wrong about the ferocity.” Kévin Jackson assesses the current state of al-Qa`ida Central. He writes that “while the challenges facing the group are real, it should not be written off, as it has proved time and again more resilient than expected.” He adds that “in the wake of the Gaza war, al-Qa`ida likely feels emboldened by what it perceives as a uniquely auspicious geopolitical context to further its global ambitions.” The African Union is set to withdraw the remainder of its forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024. Paul Williams evaluates whether the Somali National Army (SNA) or al-Shabaab would be stronger militarily if this happens. He writes that “the SNA would retain an advantage in terms of size, material resources, and external support but performs poorly on non-material dimensions and would remain dependent upon external finance and security assistance. Overall, however, al-Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.”
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Houthis, African Union, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Somalia
87. CTC Sentinel: October 2024 Issue
- Author:
- Michel Wyss, Brian Dodwell, Michael Knights, and Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- A year on from the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel, the Middle East is entering its most dangerous period in living memory. The unfolding events will have far-reaching consequences for the region and the international terror threat. In our feature article, Michel Wyss assesses the intelligence failings in the lead-up to October 7. He writes: “Israel’s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons,” adding that “failures and negligence hampered both Israel’s overall political assessment as well as collection, analysis, and dissemination at the intelligence level.” He argues that one lesson learned is the need for humility and that also includes “the recognition that even seasoned intelligence analysts can fall prey to their own blind spots.” Our interview is with Christopher O’Leary, former FBI Counterterrorism Senior Executive and Director of Hostage Recovery. He provides insights from his more than two decades of working on counterterrorism investigations for the FBI. Reflecting on the Israeli experience since October 7, he discusses key variables for a government to consider when faced with a hostage crisis. Michael Knights examines a year of Houthi attacks against Israel and shipping off the coast of Yemen. He writes: “Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.” Matthew Levitt assesses the threat posed by Iran’s weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs). He writes: “Today, with Iran’s proxies wreaking havoc throughout the region, officials worry Tehran may have already provided weaponized PBAs to several of its partners and proxies. Such a capability, tactically deployed on the battlefield, could enable further October 7-style cross-border raids or kidnapping operations.” This issue is my hundredth at the helm of CTC Sentinel. It is an ongoing privilege to feature the insights of the best and brightest in our field and to count as my colleagues the extraordinary group of leaders and thinkers at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Houthis, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, and Palestine
88. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza
- Author:
- Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
89. A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework
- Author:
- Yitzhak Gal
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- As with many major crises, the catastrophic Oct. 7 Hamas onslaught on Israel and ensuing war in Gaza offer an opportunity for change. This policy paper proposes guidelines for a post-war roadmap to long-term economic, security, and political stability in Gaza. The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system. Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy. An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.
- Topic:
- Security, Economy, Political stability, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
90. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack
- Author:
- Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar