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252. United States Diplomacy and the 1973 War
- Author:
- Daniel C. Kurtzer
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ushered in a period of active American diplomacy that contributed to two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements, one Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and, several years later, the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace. The successes of the American efforts masked a number of significant weaknesses in concept, strategy, and tactics that would plague U.S. diplomacy in the decades that followed. The story of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be told through “before and after” narratives of critical inflection points. The period after World War I—which witnessed the adoption of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine—was unlike anything that preceded the Great War. The period after the 1948 war—Israel’s war of independence and Palestine’s nakba—upturned history and took the central characters of that era in an entirely different direction from what preceded. The same can be said for the June 1967 war.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, History, Henry Kissinger, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1973 War, and 1967 War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, Egypt, and United States of America
253. Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at the 1973 War Half a Century On
- Author:
- David Makovsky
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- The October 1973 War is bound to continue to fascinate historians and many others for a long time to come. There are countless dimensions to the last of the Arab-Israeli interstate wars. The obvious military aspects of the war alone are worth thousands of pages. Then there is the superpower dimension, given that the 1973 War was the first conflict of the new period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is also a leadership angle, since none of the three leaders of the United States, Egypt, and Israel were around during the 1967 War and each felt they were now being tested. There are also the public domestic dynamics and decision-making struggles each country faced, alongside other countries with various levels of engagement like Syria and Jordan. Moreover, there is the role of regional players before, during, and after the war. Needless to say, historians of the war will remain busy for quite some time. I will explore two of these many dimensions: first, an example of the miscalculations within the United States, Israel, and Egypt that impacted the war and second, the legacies of the 1973 War that cannot be separated from the miscalculations.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, History, Armed Conflict, Henry Kissinger, and 1973 War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt
254. Palestine Country Report 2021-2022
- Author:
- Khalil Shikaki
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arab Barometer
- Abstract:
- These are the results of the 7th wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine. Data collection was conducted during the period of 14 and 23 October 2021 in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. All interviews were conducted face to face among a representative sample of the adult population, 18 years and above. The poll covers a variety of issues such as economic conditions, democracy and governance, satisfaction with government and other public institutions, emigration, religious practices, gender, education, media, coronavirus, and international and regional matters. Findings show that the economic situation and the coronavirus are the top two concerns of the public. When asked about the most important challenges facing Palestine today, the largest percentage selected “the economic situation, such as poverty, unemployment and inflation,” followed by the spread of the coronavirus, financial and administrative corruption, and internal instability and security. It is worth noting that respondents in most of the Arab countries covered by AB 7 selected the economic situation and the coronavirus crisis as the two most important challenges facing their countries. When asked to evaluate the current economic situation in Palestine, the vast majority said it is bad or very bad. When asked to speculate about how the economic situation will be in the next few years, less than a third said it will be much better or somewhat better.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Corruption, Education, Environment, Health, Democracy, Economy, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Palestine
255. Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking
- Author:
- Gil Murciano
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israeli governments have successfully isolated the normalization process from events in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. This separation has assisted the development of the process but, at the same time, impeded its potential to expand and deepen. In the last few months, the Netanyahu-Smotrich government has pursued policy efforts to challenge the status quo in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), increasing the risk of Israeli-Palestinian escalation. These steps changed the normalization countries’ attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinian issue. Their attempt to minimize involvement in the Palestinian issue has been replaced by a strong stance against Israeli government policy, and increased involvement, especially by the United Arab Emirates, in the Palestinian arena. Moreover, normalization countries appear to be reconsidering their policy of normalization vis-à-vis Israel and the value of further developing relations with it if the government continues its current line of escalation. The mainstream political right has branded the normalization process a historic success story. Its popularity among the general public, particularly moderate right-wing voters, turns normalization countries into significant leverage points to stop Israeli annexation and escalation activities. The threat of downgrading relations could incentivize the Israeli government to refrain from violating the status quo in the OPT. Subsequently, the specific involvement of the normalization countries in halting the escalation trends may serve as a basis for expanding their overall political involvement in the Palestinian issue, as separate countries or as part of international coalitions. Paradoxically, this Israeli right-wing government and its escalatory policies create an opportunity to finally leverage the normalization process to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Occupation, Normalization, Abraham Accords, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
256. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza
- Author:
- Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
257. A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework
- Author:
- Yitzhak Gal
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- As with many major crises, the catastrophic Oct. 7 Hamas onslaught on Israel and ensuing war in Gaza offer an opportunity for change. This policy paper proposes guidelines for a post-war roadmap to long-term economic, security, and political stability in Gaza. The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system. Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy. An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.
- Topic:
- Security, Economy, Political stability, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
258. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack
- Author:
- Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar
259. Securing Critical Infrastructure in Gaza is a Necessity for Israeli National Security
- Author:
- Mitvim
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- Ensuring the functioning of life-sustaining infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is critical for advancing the two main Israeli goals of the war in Gaza – the return of the hostages and the defeat of the Hamas regime. Providing clean drinking water and treatment of wastewater, along with the supply of food, shelter, and medicine, are critical security considerations for the following reasons: ● Granting legitimacy to the military action- Ensuring a humanitarian situation that is in line with international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip is a key condition for mobilizing internal, international, and regional legitimacy for military action. ● Ensuring the safety of Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages, and soldiers in Gaza – An outbreak of infectious diseases will directly endanger civilians, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and IDF soldiers in the Strip. In addition, there is concern that an outbreak of epidemics would likely spread into Israel and Egypt. ● Preventing long-term pollution that damages natural resources – A humanitarian disaster in Gaza will lead to long-term pollution damaging natural water sources such as the coastal aquifer and the many wells both in Gaza and in Israel. ●Conserving financial resources by preventing a humanitarian disaster – Prevention is always less costly. ● Maintaining Israel’s values and upholding its moral standing. Given Israel’s interests as detailed above, to prevent a humanitarian disaster occurring in Gaza, Israel must take concrete actions to improve the immediate humanitarian situation in the southern Gaza Strip. This requires that Israel: – Allow the entry or provision of sufficient basic water supply for the civilian population, while protecting water/wastewater infrastructure and the operation of desalination facilities, supply of chlorine into the water systems, and maintenance equipment needed. – Facilitate maximum sewage treatment by providing fuel for sewage pumping systems, and, as much as possible, operating treatment plants in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) professional bodies. – Permit sufficient energy supply for water and sewage treatment needs by considering to re-activate parts of the power lines in the south of Gaza, (monitoring the transmission of electricity), supplying fuel under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), and renewable energy systems that are disconnected from the grid. – Open the Kerem Shalom crossing for the transfer of essential humanitarian aid – water, fuel, food, shelter, and medicine – in order to overcome the backlog at Raffa Crossing in the provision of humanitarian aid. – Promote a framework that connects relevant factors in Israel to their counterparts in the UN in order to create a comprehensive mapping and status report of needs, locations, bottlenecks, contributions, assistance funding, and the like. – Promotion of a vaccination program and health monitoring – support for monitoring disease in Gaza and promotion of a vaccination program under the auspices of an international organization in accordance with health developments in the Gaza Strip.
- Topic:
- National Security, Humanitarian Crisis, Critical Infrastructure, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
260. Feature Article: In Search of Hope: Gaza’s Youth Face Death and Row the Boat in Uncertain Waters
- Author:
- Pal-Think for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In the scorching summer of 2023, hundreds of Gaza youths driven by depression and despair queued to submit their applications to obtain Turkish visas. In search of a better life, those youths have made the tough decision to travel to Turkey. However, the story does not end at this point. After landing at Turkey, many will attempt illegal migration to Europe using dangerous boats. Since 2007, local reports have confirmed that over 250,000 youths migrated from the Gaza Strip in pursuit of a thriving life in Europe. In August 2023, alone, there were over 16,700 Turkish visa applications submitted by young adults living in the Gaza Strip’s five governates. Interviews with applicants revealed that the most travelled destination is Turkey through which they can migrate to Europe. Young citizens, aged 18 to 30, emphasised that the already deteriorating economic environment in Gaza has created a space for higher immigration rates. Migration from the Gaza Strip has been increasing in recent years. As a result of stagnating economic situation, prospective migrant youth have highlighted that migration is not a voluntary choice but a consequence of prolonged economic hardships. Several research papers have shown that there are no accurate statistics on the people’s number who left Gaza, however, in May 2019 it was cited that more than 40,000 emigrants left Gaza as of the same time in 2018. While the United Nations estimated about 20,000 people left and according to human rights experts in Gaza, 70,000 people left from the period of 2014 until 2020. Although this is just an approximate estimate, these numbers suggest a high percentage of youth migrating from Gaza. According to UNHCR data, close to 150,000 people made their way into the EU this way in 2022 alone.
- Topic:
- Push Factor, Economic Crisis, and Irregular Migration
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Mediterranean