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Begin New Search Political Geography Pakistan Publication Year within 25 Years

331. Beyond Promises: The Durable Solution to the Afghan Refugee Problem

Author:
M. Ashraf Haidari
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Diplomatic Courier
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
The saga of Afghan refugees began in late December 1979: Afghans were an impoverished people but content with their agrarian and traditional way of life. They hardly ever wished to migrate abroad for economic opportunities. But their normal lives abruptly ceased in the days following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the country became a major victim of the Cold War. Soviet tanks rolled into Afghan villages indiscriminately killing innocent civilians, destroying their livelihoods, and driving most Afghans abroad in search of protection and human security. More Afghans fled violence, persecution and ethnic cleansing and genocide as a result of regional proxy conflicts in Afghanistan throughout 1990s. Many sought refuge in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.
Topic:
Security and Cold War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran

332. A Strategy of "Congagement" toward Pakistan

Author:
Zalmay Khalilzad
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Pakistan undertakes a comprehensive review of its relationship with the United States, the United States should similarly review its approach to Pakistan. In the ten years since the 9/11 attacks, the key threat in South Asia has been the nexus between the Pakistani military as well as security services and the syndicate of violent extremist groups al - Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar - e - Taiba, and other insurgents operating against the United States, Afghanistan, and India. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States has sought to induce Pakistani leaders to break with these groups. While Pakistan has cooperated to a degree against some of them, the U.S. strategy has failed to transform Pakistan's behavior.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Taliban

333. Reversing Pakistan's Descent: Empowering its Middle Class

Author:
Xenia Dormandy
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Pakistan is not, today, a failed state. However, for the first time since I started focusing on South Asia, in the past eight or so years, there is a real possibility that it could become one. Pakistanis must take full responsibility for this state of affairs. Their unwillingness to do so, and attempts to shift blame to the United States, India, and others, is evident. The United States does hold some of the blame; its actions have at a minimum permitted, and perhaps even promoted, Pakistan's deterioration. Still, Pakistan has the resources, both natural and human, the experience, and the background to lift itself up if it chooses to do so. Its friends, including the United States, need to implement policies to help.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and India

334. Prospects for youth-led movements for political change in Pakistan

Author:
Michael Kugelman
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
This policy brief assesses the potential for two types of youth-led political change movements in Pakistan. One is an Arab Spring-like campaign, fuelled by demands for better governance and new leadership. The other is a religious movement akin to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which seeks to transform Pakistan into a rigid Islamic state. The brief discusses the presence in Pakistan of several factors that suggest the possibility of the emergence of an Arab Spring-type movement. These include economic problems; corruption; a young, rapidly urbanising and disillusioned population; youth-galvanising incidents; and, in Imran Khan, a charismatic political figure capable of channelling mass sentiment into political change.
Topic:
Political Violence, Youth Culture, and Political Activism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Arabia

335. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat

Author:
Jeffrey Dressler
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan's most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future. Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis' military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban's historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. The Haqqanis maintain considerable sanctuary and support nodes inside Pakistan's tribal areas. From their safehavens in North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies in Pakistan, the Haqqanis project men and materiel to resource their terrorist campaign in Afghanistan's southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia onwards to the provinces surrounding Kabul. The Haqqani Network is the primary proxy force backed by elements of Pakistan's security establishment. Pakistan's support for the Haqqani Network has increased, through both facilitating additional sanctuary and providing strategic and operational guidance. The Haqqanis serve Pakistan's interests by dominating key terrain along the border and beyond in Afghanistan's south and east, serving as a Pakistani-influenced “firewall” against national, northern, U.S. and Indian influence. The Haqqanis would also serve Pakistan's interests by being the primary influence in Afghanistan's Ghilzai Pashtun lands, as well as the tribal areas in North Waziristan, organizing these tribal areas in ways consistent with Pakistan's interests. The Haqqanis execute spectacular attacks in Kabul in order to generate a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. The Haqqanis have strengthened their presence in Logar and Wardak, surrounding the southern and western approaches to Kabul. They have also expanded into Kabul's eastern approachs in the provinces of Nangarhar, Lahgman, and Kapisa. The network will use these positions to increase their destabilizing attacks in Kabul. The Haqqani Network has increased their presence in Afghanistan's north, through their partnership with the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Haqqani Network and IMU execute targeted assassinations of northern powerbrokers who are affiliated with the Jamiat-e Islami Party. These assassinations are meant to undermine the Jamiat party and the influence of minority powerbrokers, who are historical rivals to the Pashtuns and the Pakistani state. The Haqqanis are ideologically committed insurgents, and they are increasing their territorial reach. The group also has ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Haqqanis have never given any indication that breaking ties with al-Qaeda was either possible or in their interests. Consequently, the Haqqani Network is not reconcilable. They also do not fully follow the guidance of the Quetta Shura Taliban, because they maintain a separate power base and leadership structure. Coalition and Afghan forces must conduct a sustained, well-resourced offensive against the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan. This campaign would likely require at least two adequately-resourced fighting seasons. Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. retains force levels at 68,000 troops after September 2012, rather than conducting a further drawdown. Without such a campaign, the Haqqani Network will be a dominant force inside of Afghanistan indefinitely, and the United States woulf fail to achieve its stated objective of preventing the return of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to Afghanistan. Addressing the threat from the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan is necessary, even if further action should ultimately be taken to disrupt the organization in Miramshah. The ANSF are not equipped to deal with the threat from the Haqqani Network in their current state. The Afghan Security Forces lack the intelligence, enablers, and sophisticated command and control required to reclaim the enemy support zones south of Kabul. The Afghan units are also under-filled and wrongly positioned for this fight. American troops in a properly-resourced campaign can help reduce the threat from the Haqqani Network to a level that the Afghan Security Forces can handle. The United States must not abruptly shift the mission of its forces in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to security force assistance. U.S. forces cannot curtail or cease offensive operations in the areas South of Kabul in Regional Command East in 2012. The United States and its Afghan partners must dismantle the Haqqani Network's strongholds in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia and contain the organization's expansion toward Kabul prior to a shift in mission. Failure to do so will present a strategic threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

336. Water Insecurity: A Threat for Pakistan and India

Author:
Shahid Ahmad
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For over thirty years (1960-90), the Indus Water Treaty has proved to be an outstanding example of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Due to the increase in water stress in the basin states since the early 90s, the Treaty has come under strain. It may find it difficult to survive into the next decade, even though there is no exit clause in the Treaty. Rising Pakistani demand and the continued building of hydro-power and other dams by India on the western rivers may further threaten the Treaty. What is the reality behind the emerging debates between the two basin states on water access and usage?
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Water
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Europe, South Asia, India, and Southeast Asia

337. La relation Pakistan – Etats-Unis : un patron et son client au bord de la rupture ? (The Pakistan-US relations : A relationship on the brink ?)

Author:
Christophe Jaffrelot
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
During the Cold War the US-Pakistan relationship was one in which the US considered Pakistan as a necessary part of its effort to contain communism in Asia while Pakistan considered its relationship with the US as strengthening its position vis a vis India. The high point in this relationship was during the Soviet-Afghan war. The US tried to renew this relationship after 9/11, although when Obama replaced GW Bush he stated his intention to move US-Pakistani relations off the security agenda which the Pentagone and the Pakistani army considered a priority. However, Obama rain into resistance from the Pakistani army and from the national security establishment in Washington- as can be seen from the security-oriented distribution of US aid. But not even in the area of security have the two nations been able truly to collaborate. To begin with, the strengthening of US-India relations angered Pakistan. Then Islamabad protected the Taliban in its fight with NATO. Finally, Obama violated Pakistani sovereignty (the Drone strikes in the tribal belt and the Ben Laden raid). These conflicting interest, however, do not necessary means the end of the relationship.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Peacekeeping, and State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

338. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism"

Author:
Bryan Rice
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Late in the evening of May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama announced to the nation that Osama bin Laden was dead. Earlier that day, the president had ordered a team of elite military forces deep into Pakistan to kill the mastermind behind the September 11 terrorist attacks, which had shocked the country and the world nearly ten years before. During his speech, President Obama said that he had told his new director of central intelligence, Leon Panetta, that getting bin Laden was the number one priority in the United States' counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaida. Upon hearing of bin Laden's death, Americans broke out in spontaneous celebration, and pundits immediately began speculating about its symbolic and operational importance. But what does bin Laden's death mean, if anything, for the future of al-Qaida? More broadly, what does it mean when terrorist groups experience leadership decapitation.
Political Geography:
Pakistan and United States

339. Ups and Downs in Iran-Pakistan Ties

Author:
Vali Kaleji
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Center for Strategic Research (CSR)
Abstract:
Iran was the first state that recognized Pakistan following its independence in August 1947. The Pakistani government reciprocated the act in February 1979, when Islamabad pioneered in recognizing the Islamic Republic of Iran subsequent to the victory of the Islamic Revolution. However, despite the aforementioned, bilateral ties between the two neighbors have undergone immense ups and downs during the past six decades. The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 put an end to the relations between Iran and Pakistan under the Pahlavi regime, opening a new chapter in Islamabad-Tehran ties that featured a vast spectrum of competition and cooperation. Studying the ties between the two states during the past three decades, this essay discusses and explains the five fixed elements of ideology and religion; identity based on ethnicity; religious extremism; developments in Afghanistan, and the nature of ties between India and Pakistan with a special focus on Kashmir and U.S. policies as principal and invariant variables influencing Iran-Pakistan ties. This article aims at identifying and explaining principle and fixed variables influencing the bilateral ties between Iran and Pakistan at the domestic, regional and international levels. The objective of this research is thus to bring about a better and more comprehensive understanding of existing ups and downs in the links between the two states within the framework of the Southwest Asian sub-system.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iran, and Asia

340. Fixing Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation

Author:
Moeed Yusuf
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Out of the proposed alternatives for dealing with Pakistan discussed in Washington, one that seems to have gained some traction calls for aggressively playing up Pakistan's civil-military divide by propping up civilians while dealing harshly with the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). While normatively attractive, the approach to deal with Pakistan as two Pakistans is unworkable. It grossly exaggerates the U.S.'s capacity to affect institutional change in Pakistan and fundamentally misunderstands what underpins the civil-military dynamic. In reality, any attempt by the U.S. to actively exploit this internal disconnect is likely to end up strengthening right wing rhetoric in Pakistan, provide more space for security-centric policies, and further alienate the Pakistani people from the U.S. A more prudent approach would be one that limits itself to targeted interventions in areas truly at the heart of the civil-military dichotomy and that would resonate positively with the Pakistani people: by continuing to help improve civilian governance performance and by providing regional security assurances to Pakistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Corruption, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Washington