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32. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America
33. The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- The April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial, even happy, event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a “Declaration of Peace, Prosperity and Unification.” This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in “The Declaration” with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending “division and confrontation” on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task before them. Among the issues this review examines are the implications of various provisions in The Declaration for two great powers with long-standing interests in and influence on the Korean peninsula: China and the United States.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
34. Australia and the Korean Crisis: Confronting the limits of influence
- Author:
- Andrew O'Neil, Brendan Taylor, and William T. Tow
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian National University Department of International Relations
- Abstract:
- In this Centre of Gravity paper, Professors O’Neil, Taylor and Tow argued that the apparent optimism surrounding the upcoming ‘season of summitry’ on the Korean Peninsula should be tempered by the fact that there are potential risks attached to engaging the North Korean leadership without preconditions. They argue these include legitimising its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, alliance decoupling, and a serious deterioration in Asia’s strategic climate if the Trump-Kim summit fails to deliver concrete results. Building on a series of important policy roundtables in Australia, along with decades of experience, these three senior figures argue that Australian policy makers should look to develop a more integrated national approach to the Korean Peninsula. Policymakers should anticipate and prepare for a full range of possible outcomes. A clear definition and articulation of Australia’s considerable national interests in Northeast Asia—independent from those of the US—should be derived. Initially, the Turnbull Government should begin a whole-of-government review, managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This process would identify and implement policy initiatives where Australia can pursue a distinctly national approach to safeguarding its long-term interests on the Korean Peninsula, including future bilateral relations with North Korea.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Australia, and Pyongyang
35. Geo4Nonpro 2.0
- Author:
- Melissa Hanham
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- The most impressive discovery was North Korea’s Kangson uranium-enrichment facility. CNS believes it to be the first time this facility has been identified or analyzed in the open-source literature. It represents the possibility that North Korea has been producing—and can continue to produce—as much, if not more, fissile material for nuclear weapons than it could have using the only previously known enrichment site at Yongbyon. The first section of this report discusses the evolution of the platform: from the conception of Geo4Nonpro 1.0 and the initial training of G4N team members, to the lessons learned during the first phase of the project and how these lessons fed into the platform’s continued development. The second section describes the launch of Geo4Nonpro 2.0, its new features, and highlights news stories that featured Geo4Nonpro and the central role that it played in many of these discoveries. This is followed by an analysis of each campaign. Lastly, the team proposes the next steps and future applications for this innovative platform.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Emerging Technology
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
36. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in China and North Korea through Remote Sensing Imagery
- Author:
- Melissa Hanham
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Although uranium mining and milling constitute the first step in any nuclear-weapons program, nuclear nonproliferation analysts have devoted surprisingly little attention to monitoring these processes. Understanding and monitoring uranium mines and mills can provide deeper insight into fissile-material production. This report focuses on the insights gleaned from remotely sensed images of known Chinese uranium mines and mills to understand the current status of uranium mining and milling in North Korea.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and North Korea
37. Fears of War on the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- Dario Kuntić
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- War is lurking on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. It has been consistently testing a series of ballistic and intercontinental missiles, performing nuclear tests, and accelerating toward development of a fully functional nuclear weapon that could strike the United States. The North Korean regime is now estimated to have as many as twenty nuclear warheads and could soon be able to make some to �it on the missiles necessary to deliver them. With time running out, Washington may come to the conclusion that a preventive military strike against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is the only way to deprive Pyongyang of capability to launch a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile on the US. On a visit to Seoul in March this year, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson left open the option of a military strike to prevent the development of nuclear weapons program from advancing too far, vowed to defend allies in the region, and ruled out negotiations with Pyongyang. As Washington and Pyongyang escalate their war of words, with both sides hinting it could end with a nuclear con�lict, the prospect of serious con�lict is stronger than ever.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
38. Japan’s Shift in the Nuclear Debate: A Changing Identity?
- Author:
- Sayuri Romei
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Security and Cooperation
- Abstract:
- Throughout the Cold War, Japanese leaders and policy-makers have generally been careful to reflect the public’s firm opposition to anti-nuclear sentiment. However, the turn of the 21st century has witnessed a remarkable shift in the political debate, with élites alluding to a nuclear option for Japan. This sudden proliferation of nuclear statements among Japanese élites in 2002 has been directly linked by Japan watchers to the break out of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the rapid buildup of China’s military capabilities. Is the Japanese perception of this double military threat in Northeast Asia really the main factor that triggered this shift in the nuclear debate? This paper argues that Japanese élites’ behavior rather indicates that the new threats in the regional strategic context is merely used as a pretext to solve a more deep-rooted and long-standing anxiety that stems from Japan’s own unsuccessful quest for a less reactive, and more proactive post-Cold War identity.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
39. “The Best Possible Sanction:” Kim Jong-un and the Quest for Credible Nuclear Deterrence
- Author:
- Gary J. Sampson
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- In 2017, North Korea under Kim Jong-un has made significant strides toward the capabilities needed for a credible nuclear deterrent. This article analyzes the most recent achievements of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, including its September 2017 nuclear test and its three long-range missile tests in the latter half of 2017. Observers should not discount Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, other capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting require further development to achieve the full range of capabilities associated with a credible nuclear deterrent. Because of the high costs associated with the development of robust strategic intelligence and targeting capabilities, Pyongyang may be willing to settle for lower levels of capability in these areas, which may still be sufficient to guide nuclear attacks. As a result, policymakers must move to a bargaining strategy that acknowledges the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capability, marking a significant policy shift among regional allies. Pyongyang’s long-held desire to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its regional allies may be coming to fruition. Kim Jong-un has shrewdly played his hand from a position of weakness and succeeded where many others failed—a high-risk path upon which he still walks. China’s minimum credible nuclear deterrent may be a model for Kim Jong-un’s development of North Korean nuclear capability.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Surveillance, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
40. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
- Author:
- Mark Halchin
- Publication Date:
- 09-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
- Institution:
- Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America