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61. Stuck in the Middle? U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Not since the visit of Deng Xiapoing in 1979 has a Chinese state visit attracted so much attention as President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States on January 19, 2011. After a rocky year in U.S.-China relations following President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009, attention naturally focused on the future direction of the relationship between the two countries. Further attention imbued with curiosity also centered on how a relatively declining United States and a rapidly rising China would shape the world order in the long-run. Also following North Korea’s provocations in 2010, the world carefully looked for any strong emphasis on the issue of the Korean Peninsula as a regional challenge. There have been two different interpretations in regards to the results of the U.S.-China summit: an optimistic outlook that the two countries will become cooperative partners and move forward as underscored in the Joint Statement, and pessimistic views that the two powers will merely continue the repeated pattern of conflict and check that they have been doing since November 2009. A similar mix of opinions prevails in regards to the Korean Peninsula. Some expect immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while others criticize the U.S.-China summit for barely papering over the cracks. However, neither hasty optimism nor gloomy pessimism is appropriate at this time. There is a need to utilize a comprehensive response strategy, which goes beyond narrow political understandings, based on a precise analysis of the results of the summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Summit
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

62. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

63. China’s Strategic Shift and North Korea’s Open-Door to China Policy

Author:
Seung-Yul Oh
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In the first half of 2011, bilateral trade volume between China and North Korea doubled compared to the same period of the previous year. On August 2, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Guan concluded his week-long visit to Washington at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, during his first visit to Russia since 2002, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a military base on the outskirts of the eastern Siberian city of Ulan-Ude to talk about bilateral economic cooperation on August 24. Seemingly, North Korea’s hectic diplomatic efforts shed light on the long-stalled Six-Party talks, and it tries to counterweigh its heavy dependency on China. Is North Korea changing its attitude toward the outside world? In order to answer the question, this paper delves into the strategic motivation of the North and China for expanding Korea-China economic relations in terms of China’s strategic shift and North Korea’s open-door to China policy. Since the global financial crisis, China’s hierarchical status in the world economic order in terms of economic volume and influence improved so fast that even China itself has been facing some difficulties in accommodating the changes in its domestic sociopolitical sphere as well as its external strategies. Premier Wen’s repeated emphasis on the imperativeness of political reform in China is, to some extent, related to the discrepancies in the speed of changes between China’s political institutions and economic power, that is, imbalances in the basis and the superstructure in terms of the political philosophy of Karl Marx. For Marx, the stubborn capitalistic superstructure was a big problem. But in today’s China, the bureaucratic and closed superstructure is in contradiction with its globalized market economy as the world’s workshop. China’s gains from its peaceful rise have not been free from the pains of growth. Such a dilemma might be understood from the example of the contradiction in China’s external political gestures: it categorically argues that it is a member of developing countries when meeting with representatives from those developing countries; nevertheless, at the same time, it deliberately releases news about its achievements in military technologies, for example, those of the J-20 stealth fighter and the super-aircraft carrier. In addition, at the news conference after the closing ceremony of the third China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in May 2011, the Chinese delegation used the phrase “two leaders” frequently, designating the two giants, China and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

64. The Breakup

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
"I need a little space." When lovers utter these words, it's usually a bad sign for the relationship. They feel suffocated. They're reexamining their commitment. They're checking out other options. But they don't have the courage to make a clean break.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and North Korea

65. Nuclear Energy, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament: Briefing Notes for the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Author:
Christine Wing and François Carrel-Billiard
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that is being held in New York in May 2010 coincides with the fortieth anniversary of the entry into force of the treaty. Although the NPT is commonly hailed as an essential pillar of international security, opinions greatly diverge when it comes to assessing the implementation of the treaty's three main objectives: promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, preventing the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons, and committing states to engage in disarmament.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Security
Political Geography:
New York and North Korea

66. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea?

Author:
Sung Bae Kim
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only a few months ago, a third inter-Korean summit and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks both seemed likely. With contacts for an inter-Korean summit under way since last year and the Chinese proposals for the Six-Party Talks having been warmly accepted by the United States and North Korea, the prospects were positive. The sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010, however, destroyed this optimism. A two-month multinational investigation, led by South Korea, uncovered clear evidence of North Korea’s involvement, and the South Korean government imposed strong and comprehensive sanctions against the North on May 24. The punishments included the suspension of inter-Korean trade, the resumption of psychological warfare operations, and strengthening naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In response, North Korea announced that it would sever all inter-Korean relations and threatened war with the South. The whole situation on the Korean Peninsula has been deteriorating day by day, worsening already high tensions so that even military clashes seem potentially possible. The prospects for the Six-Party Talks are now also very negative. The Cheonan incident has proved to be a black hole absorbing all other critical issues. Kim Jong-il 's visit to China in May 2010 seemed to signal that the Six-Party Talks might be resumed, but this possibility could not appease Seoul’s fury over the sinking of the Cheonan. Diplomatic efforts for the resumption of the talks have been replaced with new moves to initiate additional sanctions against North Korea. Of course, the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is after all an urgent problem with both regional and global consequences, cannot be forever tied to the Cheonan incident. After a cooling-off period, diplomatic mediations to resume the Six-Party Talks can be restarted by China. But the concern at this time is that North Korea, in light of the Cheonan incident, might insist on excluding South Korea from the talks. Given the current situation, is there any possibility for an inter-Korean summit? A summit might, paradoxically, be the only means of exit from the crisis. Interestingly, in 1993, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis had broken out and military tensions were extremely high, a proposal for an inter-Korean summit was accepted. The meeting was only canceled because of Kim Il-sung's sudden death on July 8, 1994. Today, for inter-Korean relations to resume, a whole new framework is needed, given that all existing North-South agreements have been nullified. Such a rebuilt relationship can only be achieved through a third inter-Korean summit. Moreover, progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is impossible until the current state of North-South relations is improved. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume that occurs, they would end up at best as a diplomatic battle between the two Koreas. In the end, the only solution is an inter-Korean summit, which could achieve a breakthrough both in relations between North and South and on the nuclear issue at the same time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conference, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

67. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

68. Debunking Chinese Thinking on a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium. There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent. However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement. If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

69. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

70. A Shrimp amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea's Regional-power Status

Author:
David Shim
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Recent developments in South Korea's foreign and security policies as well as major structural adjustments in the military alliance between the United States and South Korea indicate a new self-understanding on the part of South Korea in terms of playing a more assertive role in regional and even global affairs. Alongside its involvement in the so-called Six- Party Talks—a multinational framework to disarm a nuclear North Korea—South Korea's civil-military engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon demonstrates that the government's foreign policy posture is not only focused on Northeast Asian affairs but is also intended to engage in other international security hot spots. However, although it has considerable material resources and capabilities— in neorealist terms constituting the power base of a state actor—South Korea is widely seen as a minor player in world politics. By means of a specific set of indicators—pretension, endowment, influence, recognition—this paper seeks to answer the question of whether South Korea is a regional power. The methodological approach used to evaluate its position will be based on analytical frameworks and typologies compiled from the literature on regional powers. Following the introduction of this approach, different concepts of the term regional power and the selection of the methodological instruments are presented. The subsequent section analyzes the selected set of indicators with regard to South Korea's potential status as a regional power. The concluding chapter evaluates the findings and raises further questions related to the regional-power concept.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, South Korea, and North Korea