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111. See No Evil: South Korean Labor Practices in North Korea

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Economic engagement between South and North Korea is often justified as a means of encouraging economic and social evolution in North Korea, with the ultimate goal of national unification. The South has invested heavily in the North, and firms have employed more than 50,000 workers. Yet expectations of a transformational impact rest on unexamined assumptions. The North recognizes the Trojan horse nature of the engagement policy: results of an original survey of South Korean employers show that the North Korean government has largely circumscribed the exposure of its citizens to both South Koreans and market-oriented economic practices, in the process violating labor rights defined by covenants to which both countries belong. The problem seems intractable, given that South Korea's diplomatic commitment to engagement with North Korea trumps labor rights concerns and South Korean firms perceive that the North Korean status quo confers benefits. As the experience of labor rights movements elsewhere shows, conditions will likely improve only if an aroused citizenry—here, the South Koreans—demands change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, and Reform
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

112. Respond and Restrain: Deterrence and Reassurance in Northeast Asia

Author:
Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The US extended deterrent in Northeast Asia is strong. US alliances with Japan and South Korea are each arguably in the best shape in years, with alliance modernization efforts proceeding in tandem with domestic adjustments to security policy that strengthen the foundation for cooperative action. Policy toward North Korea, historically a wedge between Washington and allied governments in the region, is largely aligned, and serving as a glue rather than a source of discord. This otherwise sunny outlook is darkened by the difficulties in the Seoul-Tokyo relationship. The (from a US perspective) obvious convergence of interests among the three governments is overshadowed by a lengthy and depressingly well-rehearsed list of problems. The second US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, hosted by Pacific Forum CSIS and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, with indirect support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), explored ways to overcome those obstacles to enhanced cooperation. In an attempt to push the envelope, the 43 senior participants from the three countries joined 17 Pacific Forum Young Leaders (all attending in their private capacities) in discussions and a tabletop exercise that was designed to explore reactions to a nuclear contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The results were sobering and underscored the need for increased coordination and planning among the three governments to prepare for such a crisis in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

113. Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars

Author:
Huiyun Feng and Kai He
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China‟s diplomacy has moved towards a more confident or even assertive direction in international politics. Economically, the Chinese Premier refused to re-value the Chinese currency as the United States requested and instead started to lecture about U.S. economic mismanagement during the 2008 financial meltdown (Pomfret, 2010). Diplomatically, China responded furiously to Obama‟s decision of arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama in early 2010, threatening to place sanctions on American companies. Politically, China reluctantly cooperated with Western countries, especially the United States, to punish either North Korean or Iranian provocations to the international order. Many other examples, from the Copenhagen Conference to the diplomatic standoffs between China and its neighbours, have also been listed as indications of China‟s assertive behaviour since 2008 (Swaine, 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011; Perlez 2012; Ross 2012; He and Feng 2012). In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still on-going flare-ups with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, and the recently intensified tension with Vietnam in the South China Sea seemingly have further intensified regional concerns over China‟s rise. It is worth noting that some scholars have started to question the validity of the discourse regarding China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. For example, through critically examining the “assertiveness” meme in the U.S. pundit and academic circles, Johnston questions: “How new and assertive is China‟s new assertiveness?” (Johnston, 2013). Although the extent and the nature of the assertiveness are still debatable, it is clear that China‟s foreign policy has shifted to a new direction, albeit temporarily. The goal of this paper is not to debate the temporal origins or intensity of China‟s assertiveness. Instead, it focuses on examining the perceptual roots of China‟s policy changes. As David Shambaugh (1991) points out, behaviour is principally a function of perception. In order to make sense of Chinese behaviour, we need to dig into the mindset of Chinese leaders. However, it is difficult to gauge what political leaders really perceive due to the political hierarchy and the complex nature of the decision-making process in any state system, especially China. In this research we examine Chinese leaders‟ perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese foreign policy through the eyes of China‟s International Relations (IR) scholars. We use Chinese IR scholars as a “proxy measure” to make sense of Chinese leaders‟ perceptions because Chinese IR scholars serve as the mediator between the Chinese leadership and the general public (Shambaugh, 1991; Saunders, 2000). Based on an original opinion survey of Chinese IR scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing in July 2013, we empirically test the perceptual roots of Chinese scholars‟ preference for an assertive diplomacy. In particular, we examine two competing arguments about China‟s assertiveness. Some scholars suggest a “power perception” argument in which China‟s assertiveness is rooted in Chinese leaders‟ changing perceptions regarding its power status versus the United States. In other words, as the 1 United States and other Western countries were troubled by their economic downturn, Chinese leaders became overly confident with China‟s rise and thereby started to say “no” to the United States as well as show its “teeth” to its neighbours (Nye, 2010; Green, 2010). Others advocate a “policy reaction” argument, which attributes China‟s assertiveness to a nationalist reaction to unfriendly international forces, especially from the West, which threatened to block China‟s rise. Continuous economic growth also instigated the rise of nationalism in Chinese society, which in turn pushed the Chinese government to react to Western criticisms and “plots” with more fury and toughness (Carr, 2010; Small, 2010; Swaine, 2011; Ross, 2012). In other words, China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy grew from an intentional reaction to the strategic pressure from the United States and the outside world. There are three parts in the paper. First, we briefly introduce our original survey conducted in the summer of 2013. Second, we develop two hypotheses based on the current debate about China‟s assertive diplomacy and test them by using the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. We suggest that both the “power perception” and “policy reaction” arguments make sense in explaining China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. However, our findings suggest that a more pessimistic perception regarding Chinese power is more likely to be associated with a preference for an assertive foreign policy. In other words, it is not a confident or an overly confident China but a lack of confidence instead, which is more likely to trigger an assertive foreign policy in China. In the conclusion section we discuss the implications of our findings for China‟s future international relations
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

114. Obama’s Second Term in the Asia-Pacific Region: Reflecting on the Past, Looking to the Future

Author:
Sabrina Tsai
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Asia-Pacific region proved to be one of the top priorities of U.S. foreign policy during President Obama’s first term. The East China Sea and South China Sea territorial disputes; Kim Jong-un’s succession to the North Korean leadership and subsequent provocations; and China’s rapid military modernization over the last two decades were and continue to be among some of the top security issues for the Obama Administration. This paper outlines Obama’s Asia policy in the first term and assesses the trajectory of the U.S. “rebalance” strategy in the second term, taking into account the numerous personnel changes in Obama’s senior-level foreign policy team.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Barack Obama
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

115. Predictions on Power Structure and Policy Changes of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
Chang-Hyun Jung
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. The new stage of North Korea’s leadership succession began with the rise to power of the third generation leader Kim Jong-un. On 15 April 2012, the newly-appointed First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un made his first public speech during a military parade to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s centenary. It was the official announcement of the opening of the Kim Jong-un regime toward the world. A series of political events from the Meeting of Party Representatives to the Kim Il-sung centenary celebrations clearly show that the third generation of leadership is emerging as a new core power group backed by the second generation. This move means more than just a generational shift in North Korea’s power structure. It indicative of possible changes in policy lines on its internal and external affairs. Kim Jong-un conducted political reshuffles before and after the Meeting of Party Representatives in April 2012, as part of actions to implement a moderate shift in generation and to firmly secure his control over the military. Since smoothly establishing the hereditary succession process, Kim Jong-un not only moved toward assuming political leadership but also swiftly acquired a firm grip on the power elites in the party, government, and military by reorganizing and uniting power elites. It would seem Kim Jong-un’s rule is stable, at least in terms of power structure. The power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime has turned out to be a single leadership where the country is ruled by one strong man rather than a collective leadership. Instead of having “specific figures” as a regent or a guardian through a decentralization of power, North Korea seems to prefer to support the new supreme leader through “collective consultation.” The policies designed and implemented during the last three years of Kim Jong-il’s rule were in fact intended as a policy transformation process to prepare preparation for Kim Jong-un’s rule. These policy directions have been maintained since Kim Jong-un came to power. His first public speech on 15 April can be translated as an announcement on limited changes for a “knowledge-based economy.” This established a new period while inheriting the values of Jaju or independence from the Kim Il-sung era and Songun or military first politics from the Kim Jong-il era. In particular, Kim Jong-un emphasized the significance of “peace,” by stating in the speech, “for our party and the Republic’s government that consider powerful state construction and people’s livelihood improvement to be their general goal, peace cannot be more valuable.” Under Kim Jong-un’s rule with the keyword of “knowledge-based economy,” North Korea is expected to place priorities on improving people’s livelihood and will take on more flexible policy decisions from 2013 when the next administrations in South Korea and the United States will be established. As such it is an inevitable option for North Korea to rebuild its economy and attract foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the administrations in South Korea and the United States should not pressure North Korea but rather wait and respond calmly until the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un regime on economic change and openness are clearer. Above all the first priority should be placed on stable management of North Korean issues, given that many of the participants of the Six-Party Talks will enter into power transition process at the end of 2012. First, the U.S. administration needs to resume contacts with North Korea in order to implement the Leap Day Deal in which Pyongyang would place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, as well as freeze its nuclear programs. If the diplomatic pressure from the international community successfully leads North Korea to give up its nuclear activities and ease tensions, it would create the right environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Second, it will be worthwhile establishing contact through high-level channels to develop a clearer picture of what are Kim Jong-un’s intention regarding North Korea’s nuclear activities. In providing new opportunities for the North Korean leadership, a policy shift by Pyongyang may take place. Third, it is important that the Lee Myung-bak administration reopens channels for inter-Korean talks even at low-level so as to not leave too much of a burden for the next administration. Offering to hold inter-Korean family reunions for the second half of the year 2012 would be a good start. Fourth, the next administration in South Korea should be committed to establishing a more sustainable North Korean policy that can maintain consistency regardless of any power shift by comprehensively reflecting public opinion during a time when conflict among South Koreans on approaches toward North Korea is becoming worse. Whoever comes into power in South Korea after the presidential election, the main agenda of inter-Korean relations will be on the next inter-Korean Summit. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his willingness to talk, stating “(we) will go hand in hand with anyone who truly desires the country’s reunification and peaceful prosperity.” If the third inter-Korean Summit can be held in 2013, it would be a significant breakthrough in building confidence between two Koreas and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as making progress toward peaceful coexistence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

116. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia

Author:
Joseph S. Nye and Richard L. Armitage
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
This report on the U.S.-Japan alliance comes at a time of drift in the relationship. As leaders in both the United States and Japan face a myriad of other challenges, the health and welfare of one of the world's most important alliances is endangered. Although the arduous efforts of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and his colleagues in both governments have largely kept the alliance stable, today's challenges and opportunities in the region and beyond demand more. Together, we face the re-rise of China and its attendant uncertainties, North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile intentions, and the promise of Asia's dynamism. Elsewhere, there are the many challenges of a globalized world and an increasingly complex security environment. A stronger and more equal alliance is required to adequately address these and other great issues of the day.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Israel, Asia, and North Korea

117. Can North Korea nuclear crisis be resolved?

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
I thank Kyungnam University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for inviting me to present my views on the situation in North Korea. My area of expertise is in the nuclear arena and that is primarily what I will address in my paper. However, it is not possible to solve the nuclear crisis without addressing the underlying fundamental political issues, so I will offer my views, as a non-expert in this area, at the outset.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Israel and North Korea

118. Nuclear Developments in North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
Three years ago, Pyongyang expelled the international inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear complex and abandoned the Six - Party talks. The crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 turned into diplomatic calm in 2011, but Pyongyang continued to expand its nuclear program. It conducted a second nuclear test in 2009, unveiled a modern, sophisticated uranium centrifuge facility, and rolled out a road - mobile intermediate - range ballistic missile in 2010. Its coopera tion in missile technologies with Iran continued and nuclear cooperation is suspected. Beijing protected Pyongyang from crippling sanctions while Washington and Seoul remained reluctant to engage having been burned by Pyongyang's unveiling of its clandestine uranium enrichment program. Prospects for resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis looked grim. Then, surprisingly in December 2011, just before the death of Kim Jong - il, American and North Korean diplomats nearly reached a deal to return to the negotiating table. Even more surprisingly, the new Kim regime agreed to take initial steps with Washington in February. In this paper, I describe the troubling nuclear developments in 2011 and suggest targets for the upcoming negotiations to further reduce the nuclear risks while the parties resume the long road toward eventual denuclearization and normalization of relations on the Korean peninsula.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

119. Stuck in the Middle? U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Not since the visit of Deng Xiapoing in 1979 has a Chinese state visit attracted so much attention as President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States on January 19, 2011. After a rocky year in U.S.-China relations following President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009, attention naturally focused on the future direction of the relationship between the two countries. Further attention imbued with curiosity also centered on how a relatively declining United States and a rapidly rising China would shape the world order in the long-run. Also following North Korea’s provocations in 2010, the world carefully looked for any strong emphasis on the issue of the Korean Peninsula as a regional challenge. There have been two different interpretations in regards to the results of the U.S.-China summit: an optimistic outlook that the two countries will become cooperative partners and move forward as underscored in the Joint Statement, and pessimistic views that the two powers will merely continue the repeated pattern of conflict and check that they have been doing since November 2009. A similar mix of opinions prevails in regards to the Korean Peninsula. Some expect immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while others criticize the U.S.-China summit for barely papering over the cracks. However, neither hasty optimism nor gloomy pessimism is appropriate at this time. There is a need to utilize a comprehensive response strategy, which goes beyond narrow political understandings, based on a precise analysis of the results of the summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Summit
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

120. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea