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41. The Mobilization of the Defense Industrial Base in South America Through the Brazilian Admission in the NATO Catalog System

Author:
Sabrina Evangelista Medelros and William de Sousa Moreira
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article aims to describe and analyze the conditionalities and side effects of Brazil’s inclusion in NATO´s Catalog (NATO Codification System- NCS) for the national Defense Industrial Base and the country’s development (the agreement dates back to April 1997). The central hypothesis is that, through this process, there was a progressive conditioning of the national defense industry, and correlates, in favor of protocolization, which extended the internationality and scope of national agents, both as buyers and sellers, within this system and subsystems. The analysis of the process of inclusion of Brazil in the NSC and the characteristics and purposes involved and the analysis of the repercussions for Brazil.To do this, before the analysis of the repercussions, there is an explanation of the method used, once the objectives of the article consolidate through a medium-term prospective vision.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Spending, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Brazil, South America, and North America

42. Russia’s hybrid warfare in the form of its energy manoeuvers against Europe: how the EU and NATO can respond together?

Author:
Vira Ratsiborynksa
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO continues evolving and adapting to new security challenges and threats coming from the East and the South. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 the member states of the Alliance reaffi rmed their commitments on the core purposes of the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Th e Warsaw Summit marked a shift from reassurance to deterrence posture sending a signal that the Alliance is ready and is able to meet the challenge of hybrid threats. Th e changing security landscape in the Eastern fl ank reinforces NATO’s need to strengthen its core ‘hard power’ principles as well as update its ‘soft power’ infl uence on issues such as energy security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Energy Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

43. The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO Summits take stock of recent political and security developments, assess how they affect the Alliance’s posture and adaptation agenda, and decide on possible new directions. From the outside, a key feature of any Summit is also what it reveals about NATO’s political cohesion and relevance. The political cohesion of an international organization results from a general consensus among its key member states about its mandate, objectives and methods of operation. Relevance is about the extent to which an institution delivers on its mandate and therefore serves its purpose; relevance may be real or perceived, but is in any case essential to political cohesion. Cohesion and relevance can be undermined in at least three different ways. First, an institution’s cohesion and relevance are jeopardized whenever that institution proves unable to effectively deliver on the mandate it was established for. Second, cohesion and relevance are at stake when member states no longer agree on the objectives or methods of the institution, and as a consequence on the level of resources to allocate to it. Third, institutions’ cohesion and relevance may suffer from a lack of public buy-in for what they are and do. At all levels, the assessment results from a mix of rational analysis and a dose of manipulated subjectivity.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Western Europe

44. European defence: what impact for NATO?

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The story of the EU’s efforts to acquire some kind of autonomy in the security domain has al- ways been told with reference to NATO. Back in Saint-Malo in 1998, French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair framed the idea of a Eu- ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), part- ly in response to NATO’s primacy in handling the Yugoslav conflicts. The objective at the time was for the Union to be given the “capacity for auton- omous action”,1 with “autonomous” referring to freedom from NATO and the United States. In this endeavour, the perception in NATO has always oscillated between indifference vis-à-vis a process that did not seem credible, and concern that an increased EU role in defence could under- mine NATO’s centrality and the transatlantic link. Over the last few years, the EU has embarked upon a process of beefing up its defence profile, raising anxieties in NATO circles. Most recently, references to the need for Europe to acquire stra- tegic autonomy or to move towards a European army, have added to the concerns. But are there reasons for NATO to worry about what the EU and its member states are doing? Is the EU aspira- tion in defence threatening the transatlantic link? Does the EU have the power to unsettle NATO?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, France, and North America

45. Projecting Stability: Elixir or Snake Oil?

Author:
Ian Hope
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s internal security is intrinsically linked to external stability, and its quest for optimal security for its member states’ citizens therefore requires a presence at its periphery. This is what Projecting Stability is about. With this concept and activity, NATO takes stock of the indivisibility of security that is no longer composed of two distinct spaces. This is probably not new. After all, NATO’s crisis management and cooperative security efforts over the last 25 years have had a lot to do with handling the consequences of the internal-external security nexus. To a large extent therefore, NATO has been in the business of Projecting Stability since the end of the Cold War, just as Molière’s Mr Jourdain was speaking in prose without knowing it. Nonetheless, the Projecting Stability agenda was formalized at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and is now being run in parallel with Deterrence and Defence as NATO’s main effort. This poses at least three sets of questions. First, beyond the above-mentioned internal-external security nexus, what is it that Projecting Stability is really about and aims to achieve? How does stability relate to security, and how can one “project” it? Does it contain a value-promotion agenda, or is the concept a retrenchment from the ambitious democratization goals of the past? Second, to what extent can Projecting Stability be prioritized, given the prominence of the Russian threat and therefore the necessity to “deter and defend”? Can NATO do both? And how much consensus is there among NATO member states on the need for Projecting Stability? Third, where is Projecting Stability supposed to happen, with what local buy-in and level of intrusiveness, and through what sets of instruments? Does the activity carry potential unintended consequences by which, in lieu of Projecting Stability, the Alliance’s presence would bring instability? Are there any past activities that attest to this risk, and about which lessons must be learned? Overall, is Projecting Stability an elixir, i.e. the appropriate response to a well- posed question, or is it rather some sort of snake oil, i.e. a false solution or a concept that is doomed to stumble against innumerable political and operational obstacles? These issues are what Ian Hope’s edited volume Projecting Stability – Elixir or XII Snake Oil? aims to explore. It does so through a collection of chapters, authored by a group of scholars and NATO officials, which offer an open analysis of the potential and challenges of Projecting Stability. This NDC Research Paper is the first issue of a new series created by the NATO Defense College. NDC Research Papers deal with NATO-related issues from a multiplicity of angles that can be historical, political, operational or prospective; they can have an obvious research – or, even more so, policy – angle; they are analytical in nature, and must be relevant to the understanding of NATO’s challenges and policy making. May this NDC Research Paper be the first of a long list of analytically sound, thought-provoking, and academically rigorous publications by the NDC Research Division.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

46. Contested Seas Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe

Author:
Kathleen H. Hicks
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities. Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it. Russia presents three challenges of particular concern to the MDA efforts in Northern Europe: maritime hybrid warfare, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, and long-range strike systems. Maritime Hybrid Warfare—The Russian military is experienced and effective in its use of hybrid warfare, seen in Syria, Crimea, and Northern Europe. The ambiguity possible in the maritime domain lends itself well to this strategy. Russia uses three specific approaches in this realm: deception through different types of vessels including civilian ships, deniable forces like the amphibious and light infantry that easily navigate the complex Baltic and Norwegian Seas, and the country’s well-developed and diverse force for seabed warfare. Cyber and Electronic Warfare—Russia’s advanced EW capabilities have the potential to hinder information gathering and dissemination methods, which are both vital functions of MDA. These capabilities are challenging for military personnel but potentially devastating in civilian contexts, especially as civilian networks and technology (like GPS) are far less secure. Long-Range Strike Capabilities—New challenges for NATO and Northern European partners have emerged with Russia’s development of a long-range precision strike complex. The weapons, now being mounted on new and existing Russian naval vessels, give these vessels the option to stay in the Barents or White Seas and strike targets across Northern Europe. This, combined with air force capabilities based on the Kola Peninsula and in Kaliningrad, presents threats unlike any seen by NATO before. These capabilities require NATO and its partners to use MDA frameworks to monitor launch platforms across the domain. The modern history of MDA begins in the United States, with Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) / National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41) issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush. The document lays out core interests for the United States to enhance security in the maritime domain and creates a cooperative framework to support MDA operations across different spheres. At the same time, the European concept of maritime security awareness was built upon the U.S. definition of the challenge, placed within the context of rising illicit traffic in the Mediterranean. A weakness of the original MDA and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) concepts is that many of the associated capabilities and frameworks are focused on civil maritime issues. Given the global proliferation of advanced military capabilities, like antiship cruise missiles, NATO and its partners require a holistic understanding of the maritime environment that focuses on everything from civil maritime actions to high-end military operations and even issues associated with the maritime environment. A key implication of the heightened maritime threat environment is the need to improve the integration of and attention to undersea aspects of MDA. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a traditional strength of Western naval intelligence and operations, has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. Today, Russian submarines with conventional long-range missiles pose a threat to NATO. ASW must be integrated with MDA to address these concerns. Comprehensive understanding of the undersea realm should extend beyond ASW. Russia’s amphibious special forces and combat swimmers threaten more than just military targets, including civilian vessels and undersea cables, which are an integral part of MDA. ASW technology can be useful in countering these and other threats. In the Norwegian Sea, the biggest challenge for NATO is detecting advanced ultra-quiet submarines. This issue is sharpened by dramatically depleted stockpiles of sonobuoys, a constant need for increasingly advanced sonobuoy technology, and an American unwillingness to share highly classified information about the undersea domain. NATO would benefit from an apparatus like the ASW Operations Centers (ASWOC), used most prominently during the Cold War to streamline ASW operations. Integration of platforms is a challenge in the Baltic Sea as well, largely because Sweden and Finland are not NATO states, making data sharing challenging. Frameworks like Sea Surveillance Co-Operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project facilitate the work of regional states to address these issues but more must be done. Additionally, NATO monitoring of the Baltic region is largely domain specific and suffers from not examining the maritime domain holistically. The alliance and its partners should also act to focus on resiliency to continue to operate in the face of jamming and nonkinetic attacks from Russia. The key to enhancing MDA capabilities in Northern Europe is the integration of frameworks across the maritime domain. Cooperation between NATO states and allies is vital to understanding the complex environment. The CSIS study team has identified seven recommendations of particular importance: Create a Baltic Sea MDA analytic center at the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC) at Rostock, Germany; Empower a small analytic team at the BMCC to focus on maritime hybrid issues; Develop a training course for military intelligence officers on best practices for Baltic Sea MDA analysis; Create a classified Baltic Sea data environment that can incorporate both NATO and partner states; Develop a multinational operational framework for the Baltic Sea; Integrate subsurface sensors and antisubmarine warfare into a comprehensive MDA framework; and Acquire significant stockpiles of advanced sonobuoys and associated acoustic processing systems. These priority recommendations are presented in detail in Chapter 4 of the report, along with others. Collectively, their implication would markedly enhance security in Northern Europe by closing identified gaps and ensuring capabilities for collection, analysis, and action in MDA.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, Western Europe, Baltic Sea, and Norwegian Seas

47. The U.S., NATO, and the Defense of Europe: Underlying Trends

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Trump Administration has adopted an "America First" strategy, and taken aggressive stands on NATO burden sharing, trade, the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, and the treatment of refugees that have led many in Europe to question its support for NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance. At least some European security experts talk about the U.S. as it was backing away from the NATO alliance, and a split between the United States and Europe that will force Europe to create its own approach to creating military and other security forces. Many aspects of the Trump Administration's approach to foreign policy are as controversial in the U.S. as in Europe, and President Trump has proved to be an exceptionally volatile and combative leader who can express himself in extreme terms and suddenly change his positions. However, it but it is important to note the underlying realities that shape the new U.S. strategy, the U.S. military role in the NATO alliance, and Europe's own divisions and failures to create effective forces. The current tensions between the U.S. and given European powers should not lead Europeans - or Americans and Russians for that matter – to ignore the fact that the U.S. remains fully committed to a strong Transatlantic alliance, that its forces and capabilities are critical to European security, and the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget to Congress will greatly increase the contribution that U.S. forces make to NATO and Transatlantic Security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Western Europe

48. NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond

Author:
Matthew P. Anderson
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR, 2012), concluded that “the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.” In addition to the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, NATO’s “posture” notably included, then and now, some 200 B-61 “tactical” nuclear bombs stored at sites in five longtime member states. Since release of the DDPR, NATO relations with Russia have deteriorated. It would appear that the American B-61 nukes, soon to be improved through a multibillion-dollar life extension program, are destined to stay in Europe. Beneath the surface, however, linger disquieting questions about the fabled three-C’s of NATO’s deterrence – its military capability, its credibility and its communication to potential adversaries and partners alike. This paper suggests six nuclear deterrence reforms that NATO should consider following the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 in order to regain the credibility it once had during the Cold War.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

49. NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation

Author:
Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Daniel Hamilton
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The new threat landscape the transatlantic community faces means that NATO must adapt its strategy to remain relevant. While many transatlantic policymakers and thought leaders have called for a new strategy for NATO, few have outlined what that strategy should actually entail. This report proposes that NATO adopt a new strategy called "Stability Generation," built on the concept of ensuring stability in the NATO region and reducing the threat of significant conflicts in NATO's neighborhood. To accomplish this, NATO must add resilience as a core task to its existing tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. NATO must also enhance capabilities in the East against conventional and hybrid conflicts, in the South against instability arising from conflicts and extremism in neighboring countries, and across the Alliance to decrease vulnerabilities and enhance resilience, particularly with respect to cybersecurity.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
North Atlantic

50. Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners?

Author:
Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed as a defensive military alliance more than six decades ago, one of its fundamental tasks was to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the Allies have come to understand that their security depends on their ability to face threats emerging from well beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. NATO has thus broadened its focus from collective defense to security management beyond its borders: its numerous operations in this capacity have included peace support, peacekeeping, disaster relief and counter-piracy missions. These operations have taken place not only in NATO's traditional areas of intervention such as the Balkans, but also as far afield as the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, International Security, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe, and North Atlantic